THE ONE CHRIST

AN INQUIRY INTO THE TEACHER OF THE INCARNATION

FRANK VESTON, B.D.

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THE ONE CHRIST

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE MANNER OF THE INCARNATION

BY

FRANK WESTON, B.D.

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"GOD AND MAN IS ONE CHRIST"

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TO

ERNEST WYCHERLY CORBETT

PRIEST

WHO WAS DEAD AND IS ALIVE

AND TO THE MEMORY OF HIS WORK AND INFLUENCE

DURING FOUR SHORT MONTHS IN AFRICA

I DEDICATE MY BOOK

WHICH AROUSED HIS INTEREST IN HIS LIFETIME

AND WAS PROMISED TO HIM

ON HIS DEATH-BED

PREFACE

THIS book deals with one point of Christology alone, and that the manner of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. It represents an attempt to discover the exact content of the Subject, or Ego, of the manhood of our Lord. It does not in any way deal with the doctrine of the Incarnation as a whole, nor is it in any sense a text-book.

I beg that my readers will persevere in seeking the meaning of what I have written, in spite of the many blemishes that mar my work. This is my first attempt at serious authorship, and it has been made in the middle of my work as a missionary priest, in a country where books are few and which is far away from all centres of Theological thought.

I am under obligations to the classical works of Dorner and Professor Bruce, and for the doctrine of Personality I have relied much upon the writings of Dr. Illingworth. For the rest, it is impossible to name all those who, from St. Mark onwards, have taught us the doctrine of the Incarnation. References to special volumes will be found in the notes, and I hope they may be useful to general readers.

I owe my best thanks to the Rev. H. Maynard Smith,

of Great Shelsley Rectory, for help and encouragement at the beginning of my task, and for a generous promise to read the proofs of these pages on my behalf.

I have another friend to whom my book and myself owe not a little. To him, and to the memory of his influence in his short life in Zanzibar, I have dedicated my work such as it is.

For the convenience of readers I may explain that the book is divided into three parts.

Part I contains some preliminary matter and the data for a solution of the problem.

Part II is historical. I have tried very shortly to shew that attempts to solve the problem, whether direct or indirect, have followed one of three main lines.

Part III is made up of a statement of the theory that I have ventured to formulate, and a serious effort to test that theory by an examination, in the light of it, of the most important of the Christological facts with which the Gospel story has furnished us.

The notes at the end of the book are for the help of such readers as do not possess a large acquaintance with the doctrine and literature of the Incarnation.

F. W.

KIUNGANI, ZANZIBAR,
St. Mark's Day, 1907.

CONTENTS

PART I. THE PROBLEM

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

PAGE

1. The difficulty of the subject indicated: the need of courage and faith 3

   The present state of thought renders silence impossible . 6

2. The manner of the Incarnation is ordinarily explained by theories that bear the generic name of Kenotic. Meaning of Kenosis explained: limitations in its use . . . 8

3. The problem of stating the manner of the Incarnation—

   (*a*) is akin to that of the interaction of two personalities . 9

   (*b*) because, although the manhood of Christ is impersonal, He lives a personal life in manhood . 11

   (*c*) The difficulties arising from such a conception of His life are seen in the matter of His Will and His Knowledge 12

4. The line of enquiry to be followed 14

5. The limits within which the discussion will be conducted—

   (*a*) The Creeds 18

   (*b*) Recognition of Creeds is not a surrender of Reason. The Creeds make articulate the experience of Christians. The work of Councils . . . 20

   (*c*) Appeal to Scripture is not an appeal from Dogma as such 21

6. Some fundamental assumptions 22

   A warning 23

CHAPTER II

THE CHRIST OF THE GOSPELS

PAGE

The picture of Christ presented to us in the Gospels . . 24

1. St. Mark's Gospel. Full analysis as giving the main outlines of the picture 25
2. St. Matthew's Gospel. Extra details 30
3. St. Luke's Gospel. Extra details 31
4. St. Luke on our Lord's Childhood 32
5. St. John's Gospel. Extra details in the picture of Christ . 33
6. In general it appears that the Evangelists state two sets of facts, those touching the divinity and those springing from the humanity of Christ, without any attempt at unifying their conception of the one Christ 34

Comparison of this, the Apostolic method, with the Rationalistic method followed by later writers 36

7. The conception of Christ preserved in the Church of Jerusalem—
   St. James 41
   St. Peter 41
   St. Jude 43
8. The Christ of the Alexandrine Jewish Christian—
   Epistle to the Hebrews 43
9. St. John and the doctrine of the Logos 47
10. The beginnings of the true rationalism.
   St. Paul 48

We leave the New Testament with two sets of facts, and a hint as to the direction in which their reconciliation lies . 54

PART II. THE PROBLEM IN HISTORY

CHAPTER III

THE UNLIMITED LOGOS

The object of our enquiry is the self-conscious ego, or subject, of the manhood of the Incarnate 59

1. Athanasian Christology makes the subject to be the eternal, unlimited Logos, who from time to time limits Himself so as to allow manhood to act humanly 60

St. Ignatius, St. Justin, St. Irenaeus, St. Athanasius, St. Gregory of Nazianzum, St. Basil 60

This view has held its place in the Church: it is the outcome of the Apostolic method, as opposed to rationalism . . 60

PAGE

Analysis of this view 61

The manhood can only act humanly when the Logos is quiescent. The self-limiting Logos is the ego of the manhood 63

Hence the subject of the manhood is not permanent, since the self-limiting is only occasional 64

The great value of the Athanasian position in general . . 65

Two suggestions for the development of it—

(*a*) The act of self-limiting should be regarded as an act of the Logos within His unlimited and glorious sphere, not within the sphere of His life as Incarnate 65

(*b*) There is need to emphasize the place of the manhood in the relations of the Incarnate to the Father. Christ's soul is the necessary and everlasting medium of the consciousness of the Incarnate . 66

2. Cyrilline Christology makes the subject of the manhood the eternal, unlimited Logos. The manhood is regarded as being set free from all weaknesses that seem to be incompatible with the presence of unlimited divine powers in the Christ. Each human act of the Christ requires a powerful act of divine strength to restrain the divine nature for the moment, so that the human nature may be manifested in a human way 68

St. Cyril, St. Leo, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine 68

This view minimizes the reality of the manhood in order to maintain the unlimited extent of the exercise of divine power by the Christ 69

This view was emphasized by St. John of Damascus . . 72

It was made popular by St. Thomas Aquinas. It is common to almost all Catholic writers since his time 72

The main lines of the Cyrilline Christology are sacred to all Churchmen 73

In this special matter, however, they do not lead us to the light 75

Reasons for differing from the Cyrilline School . . . 76

3. Eutyches exaggerated the Cyrilline view. To him the manhood seemed to have been lost in the pleroma of the divine powers of the Christ. 78

Monophysites and Monothelites also carried the Cyrilline view to its most extreme limit 79

Peter Lombard founded on the Cyrilline teaching his theory that is called Nihilianism 80

Lutheran divines were able to deduce from Cyrilline doctrine their view of a manhood sharing the divine attributes . 80

CHAPTER IV

THE DIVINE-HUMAN

PAGE

The opposite position to that of the Athanasians and the Cyrillines is that from which men seek the subject of Christ's manhood in a human person associated with the Logos, or in a composite personality, neither merely human nor purely divine . . . 83

1. Nestorianism is the classic attempt in this direction—
   Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Antiochene school . 84
   Nestorius 85

2. Adoptionism is a reappearance of this view 86
   Felix of Urgellis 86
   One true thought behind much that is unthinkable . 87

3. Monothelites who aimed at a theory of a composite will in the Christ 88

These views based on three chief postulates—

(*a*) Manhood to be real must be personal . . . 89

(*b*) The ego of the manhood must grow and advance humanly. Hence consciousness as human person must precede consciousness as Logos. The perfect consciousness is a composition of both . . 90

(*c*) The Logos must limit Himself so as to leave free the human consciousness 90

Dorner has developed these views 91

They also colour much of the modern Christology that is known as Kenotic 91

Remarks on the theory of composite personality—

(*a*) The subject of manhood need not be merely human, so long as it is truly human 92

(*b*) Christ's manhood is not impersonal in the sense that it once existed apart from a personal subject. But it is permissible to name it impersonal because the person in whom it is constituted is not human . 94

(*c*) The doctrine of the gradual development of the perfect, composite Christ-consciousness, out of the merely human consciousness of the Child Jesus and the Logos-consciousness of the self-limited Son, requires two centres of consciousness in the Child Christ 96

(*d*) The logical issue of this view is Nestorianism . 98

(*e*) Atonement is inconceivable on this view . . . 100

CHAPTER V

THE SELF-ABANDONED LOGOS

PAGE

A third position is that from which men see the subject of the manhood in the eternal Logos self-limited or self-abandoned.

All theories so formed come under the general heading of Kenotic. 103

1. The normal Kenotic doctrine is that the Son abandoned certain attributes of Godhead which belong to the outward activities of God, e.g. omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence. The Son thus ceases to exercise His eternal activities towards creation 104
   Thomasius 105
   Dr. Fairbairn 105

   The result is a dual consciousness of the Christ. Some men hold that the Son also surrendered the moral attributes of God, and ceased from His life in the divine Being for thirty-three years 106
   Gess 106
   Godet 106

   These men seek to avoid a duality of consciousness; but their view endangers the dogma of God's Being . . . 106

   Hence a third course: to accept the idea of abandonment of the physical attributes, and to postulate a new kind of person, a new kind of consciousness: unique, partaking both of the divine and human 106
   Professor Clarke 107

2. Martensen is less extreme. He accepts the idea of a partial abandonment of physical attributes, and argues for a two-fold consciousness of the eternal Son. His weakest point is his reference to a human individuality 107

3. Bishop Gore argues for an abandonment of physical attributes, real and thorough, but only within the limits of the Incarnate sphere. Outside that sphere the Logos continues in full activity and untouched glory. The weak point is the idea of abandonment, necessitating as it does a conception of two kinds of consciousness in the one eternal Son 110

4. Remarks upon Kenotic theories.
   The good service rendered by the authors of them . . 114
   (*a*) These theories are unscriptural 115
   (*b*) An examination of Phil. II. 5–8 and 2 Cor. VIII. 9 . 115

PAGE

(*c*) The distinction between physical and moral attributes should not be overpressed. Omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence examined in their relation to the divine Love 119

(*d*) The idea of a self-abandoned Logos seems to preclude the thought of Resurrection, Ascension, and Glorification 123

(*e*) The Kenosis must be interpreted in view of the present self-limitation of the glorified Christ . 125

(*f*) The use of the word "human" in regard to Christ requires careful explanation 127

(*g*) The word "state" as applied to the life of the Logos in glory and to His life on earth may easily mislead us. A state is merely the sum of certain relations 129

PART III. THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

CHAPTER VI

AN ATTEMPTED SOLUTION

1. The Person who became incarnate is purely divine . . 135

His incarnation did not remove Him from His eternal activities and relationships 136

He is in no sense a composite personality 136

The idea of the Incarnation 136

2. His manhood is like ours in all things except sin . . . 137

His sinlessness. His human limitations 138

He is self-restrained in the measure of the capacity of His manhood to mediate divine power 139

The self-limitation not absolute 140

The manhood is the perfectly real medium of Christ's relations with the universe 140

3. His manhood is therefore the essential and permanent medium of His relations, as Incarnate, with the Father . . 141

Through manhood He receives all that He reveals to and bestows upon His people 141

4. Hence the limits to the capacity of His human soul are the limits to the measure of the divine power that He can exercise 143

PAGE

The one eternal Son thus stands in a dual relationship to us at one and the same moment; the one based upon the exercise of unlimited divine power, the other upon the exercise of divine power limited by the capacity of His human soul 145

This second relationship is made articulate and permanent by its manifestation through a real manhood 148

These two relationships can be separated in thought: but only the lower and limited relationship can come under our observation 149

The assumption of the lower relationship is the proof of the divine self-humiliation 149

Difficulty of conceiving the dual relationship of one person . 150

Analogy from experience 150

5. Within the limited relationship of the Son to the universe, which is the sphere of the Incarnation, He is conscious of Himself as God-in-manhood, the measure of His self-consciousness being the capacity of His human soul . . 152

Analogies from experience 154

The two points of view: heavenly and earthly . . . 156

The importance of the conception of a single consciousness of the Christ 157

Self-limitation is the act of the un-incarnate Son . . . 158

There is no self-consciousness of Christ other than as God-in-manhood 158

Danger of Cyrilline and Kenotic view, as suggesting dual consciousness within the sphere of the Incarnation . . 158

Summing up of the position 161

6. Hence within the sphere of the Incarnation the self-limited Son is the very real and adequate subject of the manhood . 162

He neither receives nor gives out except through His manhood 164

Analogy from experience 164

The thought of the self-accommodation of God to His children 167

The witness of Scripture to the reality of the revelation in manhood 168

7. The Christ has a single self-consciousness as God-in-manhood; but He has not a single will, whether simple or composite . 169

He is a divine person; His self cannot be isolated from His Nature. Will is a function of personality. He exercises divine will in the very act of the personal exercise of His human will 170

8. Also His experience is truly human. All He did and said and thought and felt was through His manhood . . . 170

Yet He Himself is not human but divine 171

PAGE

Distinction to be made in application of the term "human" to Christ and to us 171

9. So also His example is truly human 172

Modern thought emphasizes its humanity 172

But Scripture lays stress on the Divine perfection as being our example, and on Christ as our help to attaining it . . 174

Christ is ultimately divine: and His example is never on the level of ours. He lifts us up to His level 174

He is the Saviour because He is not merely human . . 174

10. The state of the Incarnation is permanent 174

The mystical body of Christ is the one term of the lower relationship of the Son to the universe; He in His glorified manhood is the second term 175

Hence we may not predicate of the Incarnate Son any mode of self-limitation or any measure of unlimited power which is incompatible with His permanent life as Son of Man in glory 177

The self-limited Son is the permanent Mediator because the law of His self-restraint is at once permanent and progressive 177

CHAPTER VII

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE CHRIST

We have to try our proposed solution of the problem by the test of Scripture. And first the evidence of the Gospels to the consciousness of Christ.

1. The consciousness of the Incarnate in His mother's womb is measured by the capacity of His perfect yet infant soul . 180

Bearing of the consciousness of the Infant Baptist on this point 181

2. The consciousness of the Boy Jesus.

Self-consciousness as God the Son is mediated and measured by the soul of the Boy-nature. God-in-boyhood . . 182

3. The Consciousness of the Man Jesus.

The Baptism shews the Son in manhood acting Godward . 185

The revelation of glory exhibited and vindicated the self-consciousness of the Son 186

The Transfiguration further shews how His manhood held an essential place in His communion with the Father . 187

4. His foreknowledge of the Passion and His grief.

His manhood is the true medium of His truly human grief and sorrow 188

Soul-agony requires a personal manhood: the Son Himself was the subject of the agony 190

PAGE

5. The knowledge of Christ.
Discussion and classification of Gospel passages.
(*a*) Power of insight 193
Parallel with this, power of mystical union with the souls of the faithful people 193
Omnipresence is the source of insight . . . 194
Conditioned omnipresence 194
(*b*) Power of foreknowledge 195
Parallel power of self-preservation 195
Omniscience is the source of foreknowledge . . 196
Conditioned omniscience 196
(*c*) Marvellous knowledge 196
Not beyond the power of human co-operation . . 197
Rarity of such exhibitions 197
(*d*) Limitations of knowledge 198
Passages discussed—
(i) Judgement Day unknown to the Son . . 198
(ii) "Who touched me?" 200
(iii) "How many loaves have ye?" . . . 202
(iv) "Where have ye laid him?" . . . 203
Relations of omnipotence and omniscience . . 204

6. The astonishment and surprise of our Lord 206

7. Our Lord is entirely infallible 207
Infallibility is assured to Him by the unity of His person . 208

8. Parallels between Christ's exhibitions of conditioned omnipotence and conditioned omniscience 210
Conditioned omnipresence 212

CHAPTER VIII

THE CHRIST AND EVIL SPIRITS

The Temptation not primarily for our example. It is the great battle of God against Satan for our souls 213
The power of the Victor is that which chiefly concerns us . 213

1. Living as God-in-manhood, depending for His self-consciousness on His human faculties, the Christ could be tempted by Satan as all men are 214
Human faculties are Satan's handles 215
In the case of Christ each temptation took account of the possible presence of divine power 216
Each temptation was endured until it had spent itself . . 216

PAGE

2. The weapons of the Victor were human 217
3. The power with which He wielded the weapons is divine . 218
The divine power is conditioned and mediated by manhood . 219
Criticism of humanitarian views 220
4. The evidence from the Gospel account as to the behaviour of evil spirits to Christ confirms this view 221

CHAPTER IX

THE CHRIST AND HIS FELLOW-MEN

Christ lived in the world a man among men.

1. His family-life 225
He was regarded as exceptionally wise: not as a worker of miracles, nor as possessed of miraculous powers and information 226
His relations expected nothing from Him of the kind that He actually displayed in His ministry 226
His mother's attitude 227
His fellow-townsmen rejected His Messianic claim because His early life had appeared normal 228
2. His special friends and disciples 228
They recognized something normal, side by side with occasional startling phenomena 229
They could desert Him as a conquered man 230
Manhood concealed Deity humanly; glorified manhood reveals it 230
3. The loneliness of Christ 231
His isolation from His fellows 231
He is truly human, yet independent of the human race . . 232
God in manhood 232

CHAPTER X

CHRIST AND THE HOLY SPIRIT

The weakness and the strength of the Christ must be reconciled in a unity 233
1. The Gospels clearly assert normal human limitations and weakness 233
But there is no evidence that sickness touched Christ, nor anything that follows on inherited sin 234
Death had no power over Him that it did not receive from Him. He could resist corruption 234

PAGE

2. He had a power of self-preservation, yet its exercise was human 235

3. His Miracles.

(*a*) The power was that of the Man Christ Jesus. But He is truly divine, and His power is divine conditioned in manhood 236

(*b*) As the Eternal Son He works always through the Holy Spirit. Essentially and necessarily the Incarnate acts in and through the Spirit 238

(*c*) But also the manhood of Christ was externally influenced and empowered by the Spirit 240

Hence the power is that of the Incarnate Son Himself, working with and through the Spirit, in twofold relationship with Him, but always in the measure in which manhood was able to co-operate with divine power 241

4. Thus we find a reconciliation of strength and weakness in the Christ 244

The human will of the Incarnate is the path of divine power 245

CHAPTER XI

CHRIST AND HIS FATHER

The dependence of the Incarnate upon His Father is shewn in His prayers 246

1. The characteristics of Christ's prayers.

No sign of absence of divine power 248

Joyful acquiescence in the divine will 248

No evidence of the inactivity of the divine powers during prayer 248

Prayer is a personal act 249

It is primarily an act of communion 249

The Son is in eternal communion with the Father . . 249

"The Word was with God" 250

This eternal communion made manifest in and through the manhood 250

2. The great prayer of our Lord in St. John XVII.

(*a*) He who prays is conscious of Himself as Son-in-manhood 250

(*b*) He speaks in certainty of being answered in accordance with His own will. His will is laid side by side with the Father's will 251

(*c*) He prays quite humanly, through His human will in which His divine will is conditioned 252

PAGE

3. Our Lord's relation to Faith is different from ours . . 252
Definition of Faith as the power of spiritual vision . . 253
Did Christ exercise Faith? 253
That in Him which corresponds to Faith in us is perfect knowledge of God's purpose and power, and utter surrender to His will 256
Our Lord's relation to Hope 257
It is different from ours. In one sense He did not exercise Hope 257
Definition of Hope as the Power of uttermost obedience . 258
That in Christ which corresponds to Hope in us is His power of obedient acceptance of foreseen suffering and death . 258
Faith and Hope become articulate in prayer . . . 258

4. Our Lord's prayers may therefore be interpreted as follows:—
(*a*) Expressions of His self-consciousness as Son-in-manhood 259
(*b*) The reception of the words of the Father . . 259
(*c*) The surrender of His will to the Father . . . 260
(*d*) The joyous response of His heart to the Father's purpose 260
(*e*) The mysterious communion of the Incarnate with His Father through manhood 261

5. The relation between the prayer of the Incarnate and the power that He possesses and bestows. His Will is the path by which God reaches us 261
Hence the value of the corporate prayer of the Body of Christ, the Church 261
Summary 262

CHAPTER XII

THE CHRIST IN HIS PASSION

How can the divine Son be the subject of a suffering manhood? Cyrilline and Kenotic Christologians alike fail to meet the difficulty 264

Consider three chief manifestations by the Incarnate of personal grief and suffering.

1. In the presence of the Greeks before His Passion . . . 266
Reality of the agony 266
Personal suffering 266
Triumph of His will in prayer 267
The Father's answer received by the Son in manhood, humanly 267

PAGE
2. Gethsemane 268
Conflict of the lonely Christ 268
His dependence on His human faculties 269
Satan's attack on those faculties 269
Struggle of Christ's will 269
Meaning of "the Cup" 271
Victory of the will 271
There is no ego of the manhood too great to have suffered personally 272
3. Calvary 273
Contrast of Christ with Job 273
Representative penitence of Christ 273
The consummating sin and the atonement made necessary by it 274
Christ's dependence on His human faculties 275
Effect of the darkness on the faculties of Jesus . . . 275
Conflict of the will 276
"My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" . . 276
Summary 277

CHAPTER XIII

THE CHRIST IN HIS DEATH AND GLORY

How could the Incarnate die? 282
1. Death followed by corruption is the penalty of sin . . 282
Death by way of transfiguration is not adequate to the redemption of the soul and body of a sinner . . . 283
Christ conquered death by passing through it without allowing corruption to overtake Him 283
Divine power conditioned in manhood enabled him so to pass 283
The Incarnate in His soul passed into Hades: His limited consciousness 284
The body in the grave ceased for three days help to mediate His consciousness, but it was not separated from Him who is God the Son, nor did it see corruption 284
2. Death of the soul is the last penalty of consummated sin . 285
It results from blindness to God's presence, aggravated by the final withdrawal of the light of that presence . . . 285
Christ endured the penalty of the withdrawal of the light . 285
But He did not suffer the death of the soul, even as He did not suffer the corruption of the body 285
He endured, and in His will held fast to the Father . . 286

PAGE
The unlimited Son could not have so suffered . . . 286
The self-abandoned Son could not have so endured . . 286
But the self-limited Son could both suffer and endure . . 286

3. The glory of the Risen Christ.
The manhood passed through death under the dominion of spiritual laws, and was empowered with divine strength and glorified 287
But He remains dependent upon His manhood for His medium of self-consciousness as Son in glorified manhood . . 287
His manhood is therefore the mirror in which we see all that can be known of God by us men 289
And it is the summing up of all that men can offer to God . 289
Summary statement of the unity of the Christ, the divine Son in manhood, from conception in the womb to His present position as Head of the Church 290

4. The perfecting of the Incarnate by the things that He suffered 291
God in manhood, God self-conscious in manhood, was not at His birth perfect in the sense of complete attainment . 291
Two lines of advance—
(*a*) Self-realization as penitent Head of the redeemed race 291
(*b*) Self-realization as glorified in ascended manhood . 292
God-in-infancy becomes God-in-manhood, manhood ascended and glorified 292

CHAPTER XIV

THE CHRIST AND THE DOCTRINE OF PERSONALITY

The proposed solution may be further tested in the light of the doctrine of personality 294
We try it by six characteristics of personality.

1. Self-consciousness.
For us men it implies knowledge of self as we are . . 295
knowledge of self as different from others 296
knowledge of self as we are in God . 296
In God the Son it means knowledge of Himself—
of Himself as distinct from Father and Son 297
of Himself in vital relations with Both . 297
This self-knowledge carries with it, in virtue of the unity of the divine nature, complete knowledge of the Father and the Spirit, and of all the divine activities and works . . 297

PAGE

Hence the self-consciousness of the Son is the ground of His omniscience 298

And His conditioning of self-consciousness, by willing to mediate it only by a human soul, requires a corresponding conditioning of omniscience 298

But the connection between self-consciousness and omniscience precludes the theory of an abandonment of the latter . 298

2. Self-determination.

For us men it implies freedom to choose to correspond with God's ideal for us 298

In God the Son it means His almighty will, directed to the eternal realization of His divine holiness 300

It is omnipotence: God's essential freedom and power . . 300

Creative omnipotence is a secondary idea 300

Self-determination conditioned in manhood involves conditioned omnipotence, and precludes abandonment of this attribute 301

3. Self-identity.

For us men it implies the permanence of the basal self . . 301

In God the Son it means unchangeableness or eternity . . 302

Hence His ability to condition His divine attributes without danger to His divine nature 302

Analogy from experience 303

The Incarnation attests the personality of the Son . . 303

4. Self-expression.

For us men it implies our selves and our necessary relationships 303

In God, the self-expression of the Father is the groundwork of the divine triune life 304

In God the Son it means His power of living eternally in His vital relationships with the Father and the Spirit, and of abiding permanently in assumed relations with the universe 304

Hence His self-expression is the basis of His omnipresence . 305

Thus conditioned self-expression implies a conditioned omnipresence, while it forbids the thought of abandonment of this attribute 305

5. Individuality.

For us men it means "I am always I," and yet "I am I and all of my friends that I can assimilate to myself" . . 306

The basal self is unique 307

The medium of self-consciousness is in no way unique. But I possess it in a unique mode. Hence the individual character of my personality 308

In God each Person possesses the Divine Nature in a mode peculiar to Himself 308

PAGE

Idea of individuality of the Three Persons 309
Comparison of personality with Deity, not Divine personality with human 310
Why the Son became incarnate 313

6. Unity.
For us men it implies the truth that the individual self is the unifying principle of all human activities and their fruits . 315
In God the Son it means that He possesses and exercises all Divine powers in a mode peculiarly His own. The whole Divine Nature is His; and in becoming incarnate He was able to condition it in and by manhood 316
Summary 317

CHAPTER XV

CONCLUSION

1. Summary of the lines of thought we have described, and of the proposed solution 319

2. Summary of the difference between the proposed solution and current theories 322
The proposed theory and authority 322

3. The proposed theory offers a basis for:—
(*a*) A true theory of the Church 324
(*b*) A correction of the humanitarian error . . . 324
(*c*) A doctrine of social brotherhood 325

Conclusion 325

APPENDIX

Note I. Definition of the Council of Chalcedon . . . 327
,, II. The Athanasian School of Christology . . . 328
,, III. The Alexandrian School 331
,, IV. The Cyrilline School 332
,, V. Authors named in Chapter V 334
,, VI. Passages bearing on our Lord's knowledge . . 335
,, VII. The Brethren of our Lord 336
,, VIII. Dr. Moberly's *Atonement and Personality* . . . 336

PART I

THE PROBLEM

THE ONE CHRIST

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE subject of this essay is the manner of the Incarnate Life of our Lord Jesus Christ.

I

Our task will make great demands alike upon courage and faith. It requires courage to lift our eyes above the figure of the Son of Man, seeking to pierce the clouds that separate us from His eternal state. What if the question that troubles us prove to be one of those that even His revelation in humanity was inadequate to answer? The revelation of the Glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ is ours, made our own by the Passion and Resurrection; may we go further and claim to know the manner of His existence within the humanity? Truly, the human mind is hard to satisfy. It knows God in human flesh. It knows manhood in God the Son. It must needs ask what is the exact relation of manhood to the divine Saviour! Is it merely the organ of His self-manifestation? Or the veil of His

divine glory? Or is it, in some way hidden from us, linked with the Eternal Son as Head of the Church, in His innermost relationship with the Father?

We need courage and need it sorely. For at every attempt to pierce the clouds we are baffled by our own human powers. We desire to think of Him: our minds start to form conceptions; but always we hesitate as one after another the attributes of the Divine Being press themselves upon our notice. We labour to account for the omnipotence of the Son, and the claim of the divine condescension makes us modify our thought. We begin to make terms with a conception of self-emptied power and the plea of the divine unchangeableness is pressed upon our notice! Omniscience occupies our minds; we see that divine love might be capable of a self-emptying of knowledge; but at once the claims of the infallibility of a divine Person hinder us from our conclusion.

We desire to speak of Him. We utter the simplest term at our command, calling Him a Person. And at once the interpretation put upon the term by our hearers reminds us that His personality is not as ours. Personality is still an unmeasured conception. We still dwell upon the idea of loneliness that it carries to our minds. It may be that our aspirations after social brotherhood may have a new light to throw upon it, but in the last resort a personality that can only exist in Triune life will never find adequate explanation in human speech.

And if Personality is a term requiring caution in its application to the Incarnate, what shall be said of self-consciousness? The "I" and the "Not I" is a human formula. "I and my Father are one" is the Christ's account of Himself. My self-consciousness is essentially lonely; His is essentially inclusive.

Baffled then at every turn we need a great courage to pursue our search after an explanation of the mystery of the Incarnation such as may serve us in our own age, in the light of our present knowledge.

Herein lies the power of faith to help us. Knowing ourselves to be sons of God, created in His image, positive that knowledge is ultimately one, we are prepared to make an act of faith in the likeness of our personality in some degree to that of God. If personality be the highest thing of which we have cognizance, it is no great assumption that in our own personality, if anywhere, we meet with the personal God. More than this, the Incarnate Son of God has united our manhood to Himself in His own divine personality. This personality then cannot be either essentially different from, or necessarily outside the ken of our own personality. That which can assume manhood is that for which manhood is at least not unfitted.

Faith then assists our courage. We cannot hope for a theory of the Incarnation that shall be adequate to that venerable truth. But we may surely expect to find a theory true in itself so far as it is able to go; a theory that takes us some way at least along the

right path; and leaves us, at however great a distance, face to face with the Truth.

In any case we may not be silent. In an age whose curiosity has no limits, silence is a tribute to scepticism. Reverence may suggest reserve, but it must be a reserve not of speech, but in speech.

The manner of the Incarnation has been an academic question for many centuries. It has interested the teachers of the Church as a branch subject in the great controversies of the faith, and as throwing light upon the measure of reality to be allowed to the manhood of our Lord. Traces of a discussion of it are found very early in the history of Christian controversy; it became of first importance after Nestorius had asserted the perfect entirety of the manhood of our Lord; and since the Reformation it has occupied the attention of many writers. It has grown in interest as our reverence for manhood has deepened. Yet so academic was it at first and for so long a time that it is still held to be a subordinate question of the Faith. So long as men hold fast the fact of the Incarnation, is not the manner of it merely a question for the Schools?

To this it may be replied that men as a race do not regard theology as an ordered scheme. Christology as a whole is merely a background to the particular doctrine that happens to be occupying their minds. They do not see things in their true proportion. And men of our generation seem more and more inclined to let the main fact slide from

their minds, because of the difficulty of accounting for the infallibility of a teacher who comes to them in the dress of a human prophet of the Jewish race. As of old generations of ordinary Christians lived untroubled by questions that afterwards split the Church, so it has been with our own age. All that is required to make a question vital is an awakening to the fact that we have been dwelling with a difficulty.

In this case one of the things which have helped to open our eyes is the higher criticism of the Bible. The claim that Christ's knowledge of the Old Testament is not essentially different from that of a Jewish Rabbi has made us realize the problem of the manner of His incarnate life. How is it possible for a Christian to worship Christ as God, to defer to Him as infallible in His teaching about God, and yet to class His statements about the Old Testament with the uncritical views of a Gamaliel? Such a question is widely asked. Even more widely than it is asked verbally, the lack of a satisfying answer is sorely felt.

Again, the modern tendency to belittle the supernatural and magnify humanity is making our problem a very pressing one. Formerly men rejoiced in the Incarnation as God's self-submission to His own law of evolution; they gloried in the new powers of grace and truth that He had added to the forces at work in the universe; but to-day they are preparing to reckon the Christ and His teaching as among the best of Nature's products. For this reason, therefore, courage

and faith must be called into exercise, and attempts must be made to re-assert the infallibility of the divine Redeemer without in any way minimizing the reality of His manhood.

In this enquiry my object is to discuss theories of the manner of the Incarnation, and to seek for some explanation of the mystery which, though necessarily incomplete, may allow me to contemplate my Saviour as true God and true Man, and yet as really and truly in person and operation, one Christ.

II

The large majority of the theories that will engage our attention are described by the term Kenotic, so that it is necessary to explain that term, and to state very briefly the problem that awaits solution.

Kenosis is a Greek substantive denoting an emptying. It has passed into theology from St. Paul's statement that our Lord "emptied Himself" of something belonging to the divine state in taking upon Himself our manhood.[1] With his use of the word we are not now concerned. Generally in Christology, Kenosis denotes that action by which the divine Son modified the exercise of His divine powers so as to allow to the full the free action of the powers proper to His manhood. It may be used of any such modification, from a mere self-restraint in the use of His powers to a voluntary self-abandonment of the attributes that lie behind those powers in action. It may

[1] Phil. II. 5–8.

be so used, wide as the difference is between the two extremes of thought, inasmuch as each writer claims St. Paul as a witness to his theory, quoting him as an apostolic authority for the Kenosis in whatever degree it is postulated. But in fact writers who do not conceive of any real self-emptying of divine attributes would probably prefer not to be classed among teachers of the Kenosis in the modern use of the word. Again, it will have been noticed that the meaning of the term has been limited to self-emptying. In orthodox Christology it is allowed a very wide extension. But writers who have a real claim upon the word are all careful to emphasize the entirely voluntary character of the humiliation of the eternal Son. Further, it may be remarked that the term is not at all applicable to any modification of the manhood, in its attributes or in the exercise of its powers. Such modifications have often been postulated, but since the manhood is conceived of as impersonal a term that connotes a voluntary choice is clearly inappropriate.

III

What then is the fundamental problem to which the teachers on either side have addressed themselves?

It is in part the problem of determining the limits of the influence of one personality upon another, and of measuring their mutual action. For before we can consider the incarnation of God in manhood, we naturally ponder the possibility of any union between God and man.

Man knows himself to be ultimately independent even of those who dominate him the most powerfully. In the last resort he must act upon the essential distinction between "I" and "Not I"; he cannot evade responsibility for his actions. Even the weakest man, held down by the influence of another's strength of character, unable to conceive himself as walking alone, has yet the constant dread of being deserted or bereaved. He knows that his personality is lonely.

Once more, the assumption of supreme influence over the person of another is never made without some allowance for a secret exercise of self-assertive power on the part of the weaker person. And always, in every union, the possibility of jealousy emphasizes the limits of personal influence. Nowhere is man more conscious of his loneliness than in the secret place of his own personality.

But of the three Persons of Godhead we are able to predicate mutual action as essential to their being. And it is just here that we read into the term Personality a meaning that it has not gained from human self-consciousness. Here it is that personality passes from exclusiveness to inclusiveness; "Three Persons in one God," not one person distinct and separate from every other person.

So that it is here that light comes to us, light feeble and flickering, yet able to pierce the darkness. For a personality that is essentially not exclusive may be conceived of as exercising a deeper, more lasting influence upon other personalities than is the case with

any merely human, lonely person. The very fact that there is no exclusive, separate "I" which only knows itself as a being apart, opens the way to a possible union that may be permanent and real. Yet, when all is said, the difference of the Nature in which the divine Persons are constituted from the Nature of the person influenced marks a difficulty in the way of union that we, with our present knowledge, cannot surmount. The communication to us of the life and power of the divine nature seems to indicate the direction in which the problem will be ultimately solved. But even so, the contents of the conceptions of the divine and the human are unalterably and immeasurably different.

Thus the action of personality upon personality, as we know it, is in the last resort external, and therefore terminable. The fixing of the human will towards God by grace, so that an everlasting union may be possible, only suggests that our problem will one day vanish in our wider experience; it does not help us to solve it in our present state of probation.

How then are we to conceive of the permanent union in the one person of Christ of His divine and human natures?

The Fathers and Councils met the question by the assertion of the impersonality of the manhood of our Lord. They would say that there is no real difficulty in conceiving the union, because the divine Son sought not to indwell or dominate a human person, but to assume and redeem human nature. And in

large measure their teaching has removed difficulties in the way of a rational conception of the union.

But there remains the divine Person. If divine personality is so different in content from human personality, if the one can only influence the other permanently by making over to it divine life and grace, lifting it up nearer to His own level, how are we to think of the possibility of His becoming the real and proper subject and ego of human nature? Can He really be the Person in whom is constituted a true and real manhood? What difference does the incarnation make to Him personally?

In the act of assuming manhood the divine Son added to Himself new powers of a level infinitely beneath His own, new modes of self-expression, inadequate to His Deity, and new relationships with His creatures; together with certain necessary limitations proper to our human nature. If then this union be neither merely economic nor only temporary; if it be indeed the everlasting basis of the adoption of the human race into sonship with God; surely in some real sense the divine Personality must have undergone some modification, at least in its operation, within the sphere of the Incarnation. Only so could the weaker assumed nature maintain both its proper limitations and its peculiar excellence.

This will become more evident by the consideration of two particular powers of the divine nature.

The co-existence of divine and human will-power in one person is not easy to conceive. On the one

hand, the eternal Son is seen coming into the world to do the Father's will, moving straight forward to His death upon the cross, and the subsequent culmination of His glory in the Resurrection and Ascension.

On the other hand, there is postulated of the manhood a real perfection, aud therein the possession and exercise of a real human will, capable at every moment of free choice, requiring to be momentarily moulded to the divine purpose.

How shall we conceive of this co-existence of creating and created will in a single Person, unless we postulate some modification of the operation of the omnipotence of God the Son? And the modification must be of such a kind as will avoid any the least implication of a duality in will-expression. The Christ has two wills: but we must conceive Him as able to express Himself as by a single operation of the two wills, if we confess Him to be a single person. The two operations belong to the two natures; but in studying the manifestation of His person through His wills at any moment we see it as one single personal act.

Or again, there is the difficulty of the co-existence of divine knowledge with a human mind in the one Christ. On the one hand, the Christ claims to speak with infallible and complete knowledge of the hidden secrets of the divine life. On the other hand, He shews Himself as subject to the limitations of a human mind, asking men questions, and admitting

His ignorance of the day and hour of the last judgement.

How are we to conceive of the co-existence of creating and created mind in a single person, unless we postulate some modification of the omniscience of God the Son? And as before, it must be a modification such as will avoid a duality of expression of the two minds of the one Christ. The Christ has the two kinds of knowledge proper to His two natures; but we cannot conceive Him as possessed of two different conceptions of one matter at the same moment. Therefore we say that though each nature has its own proper operation, yet His personal self-expression through His minds is such as to be in fact a single personal operation.

Of such a kind then is the problem to which this essay is addressed.

IV

The line to be followed is, briefly, this. In the first place, we must study with the utmost care the picture of the Christ given us in the Gospel narrative, seeking to take in each detail one by one, but each in its due proportion to the whole. This will require that we compare our own personal impressions with those formed by the Apostolic writers of the New Testament, whose view of the Christ is not only of unique interest but of primary authority. This done there will have emerged all the facts which go to make our problem.

Secondly, it will be necessary to describe shortly and to classify the various lines of thought along which men have sought a solution of the problem. It will, I think, be found that in the main the theories that have been evolved follow one of three lines.

The first line starts with the conception of our Lord Jesus Christ as existing in the state of Incarnation in the full possession of His divine powers and prerogatives. His state of glory He may not evacuate without the loss of His proper deity; yet the state of humiliation must equally possess Him if our humanity is to be thought of as really assumed and redeemed.

Starting from these postulates the theories branch off in various directions. The main position will be found to be that of the great Athanasius, who is content to be a follower of the apostolic method of stating the facts on both sides, refusing to attempt their reconciliation. An advanced position is that of St. Cyril, which came to be very popular in the Church; the position in which the fulness of the divine powers is maintained at the cost of the reality of the manhood; some of the normal limitations of manhood appearing to be incompatible with the perfection of Christ's divinity. The most advanced position is that in which men have in varying degrees postulated a relative deification of the manhood, in order that it may be properly constituted in the eternal Son, who is its ego or subject.

Along the second line we meet those who fail to find satisfaction in the thought of the Son in the ful-

ness of power as the subject of the manhood. Their theories will be seen to vary between a Nestorian association of the Logos with a human individual, and a conception of a divine-human person, of one divine-human consciousness, the result of the incarnation of the divine Son. The purpose of these theorists will be shewn to be the discovery of a really human ego, or subject of Christ's manhood.

The third line is followed by those who, being convinced that the subject of the manhood is the eternal Son Himself, seek to postulate of Him such a self-abandonment of His divine power as will reduce Him to the level upon which His manhood can truly and naturally develop and exercise its normal powers. These theories will be seen to vary in the measure of the self-abandonment which each assumes. Some advocates of this line of thought confine the Kenosis to the sphere of the Incarnation, but others are bolder and seek to remove the eternal Son from the sphere of His universal activities as the Word of God during the period of His humiliation.

It will also become plain that on all these lines there is assumed a complete separation between the universal state of the Logos and the state of His Incarnation.

Upon all these theories I propose to offer what remarks I can, drawing out what is useful in them and pointing out the extent of their failure to satisfy the facts.

Thirdly, an attempt will be made to formulate a

theory which will allow for the reality, permanence, and co-existence of the two states of the Incarnate, without in any way providing room for a wall of separation between them.

It will be suggested that the state of the Son of God at any one moment is merely the sum of His relationships. As His eternal glorious state is the sum of His inner relationships with the Father and the Holy Spirit and with the world that His wisdom has created; so His state of incarnation is the sum of certain new relations which He has willed to form with His creatures, and with the Father and the Spirit in so far as His peculiar indwelling of the redeemed and His office of Mediator render necessary a modification of the inner relationships, in respect to the incarnate activities.

Between these two states there is no definite separation. To demand a conception of the mutual exclusiveness of the two spheres of activities will be found ultimately to differentiate the Eternal Son as God from the Eternal Son as Incarnate; and in doing this we reduce the Incarnation to a figure of speech. That the Person who sat wearied on the well of Samaria is personally and identically the Eternal Son of God, who upholds all things by the word of His power, must ever be maintained. Our problem is to determine how the two states can exist side by side without separation and yet without encroachment. And I venture to think that the solution of the problem lies in the direction of the distinction of the

eternal and incarnate relations of the Son of God. I shall try to shew that the self-consciousness of the Incarnate is that of the divine Son as conditioned in manhood : a consciousness not different in kind from His proper consciousness as Eternal Son.

Finally, I shall attempt to put my theory to a severe test and shew that it has taken account of all the evidence supplied by the Gospels, and has sufficiently explained that evidence. To do this will mean a study of several of the leading features in the picture of the Saviour, and I would beg that no judgement of my theory may be pronounced until all that I have written in its support has been weighed. The last test will consist in trying my theory in the light of the doctrine of personality.

V

It is next necessary to specify the limits that must be set to speculation on this most sacred mystery of the Faith. We must accept the Creeds of the universal Church and the Definition of the Council of Chalcedon as fixing the boundaries within which it is permitted to discuss the problem.

There can be for Catholic Christians no question as to the fundamental facts of Christology. These facts comprise the essential divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ ; His perfect and entire manhood born of Mary the Virgin ; and the complete and permanent union of the two natures in the one person of the Son of God.

As to the manner of the union, which is the subject of this essay, all that we are told is that it is marked by four necessary characteristics.

(1) It is in no sense a mingling of the two natures. They remain separate and distinct at every moment, though both are constituted in the one Person of the Eternal Son. The union knows two terms only, and two terms always. There is no third term, no composite personality produced by the Incarnation.

(2) Each term remains in the proper possession of its attributes. There is no mechanical interaction of the one upon the other, resulting in the communication of the attributes of the stronger nature to the weaker, or in the extinction of powers of the stronger nature to make room for the exercise of the weaker. Whatever of modification of activity may be postulated, it is not permissible to think of either of the natures as being removed from its proper sphere either by the addition or subtraction of any of its peculiar powers or properties.

(3) The person of the Incarnate is one. He is God the Son. He possesses two natures, and depends for His self-expression upon the unity of the two natures in action. We may not ascribe the human acts of Christ to any one but the Incarnate Son; two natures do not imply in this case two separate persons.

(4) Lastly, the union is to be regarded as permanent. To all eternity, as at every moment; on the cross and at the Right Hand of God; the manhood is inseparable from His Deity.

Of the significance of these statements it is not necessary to speak now; we are at the moment only reminding ourselves that our thought about the Incarnate is to be kept within limits that are clearly fixed.[1]

In thus acknowledging the right of the Creeds to serve as definitions of the limits of theological speculation no sacrifice of reason is demanded or offered. On the contrary, reason is thus brought to its proper starting point. Every science begins with an assumption. The science of Christology assumes the Christ of the Creeds. It finds that on no other assumption can it account for the facts of the Gospel narrative, or for the collective experience of the body of Christians down the ages. The witness of the Apostolic writers and the great Christian teachers is to the Christologian a testimony based not merely upon reason but also upon experience.

The definitions of the Councils are the official summary of the private, personal experience of multitudes of faithful souls during a period of some four hundred years, an experience that the Christian body of every age has ratified and confirmed.

Herein lies the validity of the primary assumption of the Christologian. In assuming the divine and human natures of the Christ we are only attributing to human experience in the sphere of the spiritual the same measure of general truthfulness which it is allowed to possess in every other sphere of know-

[1] On these points see note 1.

ledge. A Churchman may no more ignore the collective experience of his fellow-Christians in the matter of the Incarnation than a Scientist may depreciate the value of experience as a testimony to the uniformity of nature, or a legislator may scorn the common verdict of his nation in favour of the recognition of the moral responsibility of man.

No exception may be made as against the Churchman on the plea that his experience is not universally attested. For the validity of experience is not measured by human heads, but by its extension amongst those who are qualified to realize it. We do not admit the evidence of the insane, the weak-minded, and the faddist as against the trained observer. We discount the pleas of the immoral and the non-moral as against the common conscience. So too we may justly set aside, as being without real weight, the counterpleas against the Christ of those who are indifferent to personal communion with Him, and those who have notoriously left undeveloped their spiritual sense. Even those who sincerely hold a private interpretation of His life and being must not be allowed to shake our confidence in the testimony of the millions to whom He has become the most intimate personal friend. If experience is to depend upon unanimity, no man may hope to attain to real knowledge.

Experience, in the last resort, has its seat in the court to which Revelation makes its final appeal on earth; and the experience of the Church is

voiced in the Creeds and Definitions of the Universal Councils.

These Councils, then, speak with the authority of the Holy Spirit both to Churchmen and on their behalf. For first, the Spirit, descending from above, guides and assists the counsels of Christ's mystical body, enlightening the minds of the faithful generally, and directing their teachers to a clearer view of the things of God. Each age has its proper inspiration. And secondly, ascending Godward from the heart of the redeemed race, He makes articulate before God the joyful realization by men of the once-hidden mysteries of redemption through the blood of Christ and communion with God in Him.

VI

The appeal from dogma to Scripture, which is taken to be one of the chief characteristics of the Anglican Communion, is not from dogma as such to fact as such, nor from a theory to the life of Christ. It is an appeal from any one doctrine that has proved false to the corporate experience of the Church, back to the original fact on which it claims to base itself. And so soon as the appeal has been heard, if it be allowed, that basal fact will be made to carry another, but true, dogmatic statement.

Thus to appeal to the Gospels on this particular question of the manner of our Lord's incarnate life is not to shut out from their proper place in the discussion dogmatic decrees of the Church. Rather

it is to isolate a single theory of the theologians by which they hoped to explain the authoritative dogmas; a theory that does not, however, in fact harmonize with the main body of dogmatic truth. So isolated we must analyse it, and test it by reference to the particular set of facts which it attempted to explain. In so doing, and in framing the new theory that is to take its place, men must rely upon the guidance afforded them by that whole system of defined truth which, as we have seen, we may term either decreed dogma or summarized experience.

As, then, we enter upon our task, it will be well to remind ourselves of the awful responsibility that is incurred by those who make their way into the presence of Divine Truth. Men rush into the presence of their King without any assurance that to them will be extended the Sceptre of acceptance. It is good to consider that the end of our approach to God is the true knowledge, of which the basis is obedience to His Will and the humble acceptance of His Word. No one should dare to come into the presence of the Incarnate who is not anxious to fall down and worship Him.

> Like you this Christianity or not?
> It may be false, but will you wish it true?
> Has it your vote to be so if it can?

CHAPTER II

THE CHRIST OF THE GOSPELS

THE portrait of Christ presented to us by the Gospel story is not a simple one. It strikes us differently in different lights. It is possible in some lights to see only the exceedingly human form of the Incarnate and to conceive Him as a man among men; a prince of men, yet man. While in other lights we see nothing so clearly as the divinity that manhood cannot conceal: we see Him as superhuman, supernatural, divine.

The problem is to find one light in which we may take in, as in one vision, all the features of the picture, seeing Him whole, in the entirety of His personal life as Incarnate Son of God.

To this end it is necessary to devote time and care to the study of all the features of the Christ that have been represented by the Evangelists; and to watch that no detail be exaggerated in the copy that we make.

St. Mark's Gospel is perhaps the best suited to our purpose. It supplies so much that is common to

the other Synoptists that we can gather the main features from it and then fill in what is necessary from St. Matthew and St. Luke.

I

What then is the picture of the Christ presented to us in St. Mark's Gospel?

We see Jesus coming from Nazareth to His baptism; and we are made the witnesses of a supernatural revelation. We see Him driven into the wilderness to be tempted of the Devil, and we find angels ministering to Him. He comes into Galilee, calling men to His service; He teaches with a new authority; He casts out an evil spirit by a word; heals a fever with the touch of His hand; and at sunset delivers from their sicknesses all who come to Him. In the morning He resumes His teaching, and heals a leper by a touch.[1]

After a few days He heals a sick man by a word, pardoning his sins. Then He calls Matthew, and declares His mission to sinners. He appears as the teacher of new customs, the authority for which is found in Himself alone; and He justifies Himself in breaking the law of the Sabbath as the Jews held it.[2]

Again, He heals on the Sabbath-day, and that by a word only. When He is face to face with the multitude, the sick press upon Him that a touch may heal them, and the unclean spirits own Him as their divine Lord. Next follow His call of the twelve

[1] Ch. I. [2] Ch. II.

apostles, His announcement that the Spirit of God is with Him in His ministry of mercy, and His call to new relationships in the service of God.[1]

After this He utters parables proclaiming a new kingdom founded upon obedience to God, visible, objective, and destined to grow.[2]

Then He manifests His power over winds and waves; casts out "Legion," heals a woman of her issue of blood, and raises the daughter of Jairus.[3]

Next we witness the astonishment of the people at His words and doctrine, and we see the twelve sent forth to fight evil spirits and to teach. Following upon their mission comes the retirement for rest, which is broken for the sake of the multitude. He feeds five thousand men on five loaves and two fishes, walks upon the sea, and on reaching the shore heals all who come to Him.[4]

He refuses to observe certain Pharisaic customs, and lays down new principles of judgement. He heals the daughter of the Syro-Phoenician woman; gives a deaf man hearing and more certain speech.[5]

Then He gives sight to a blind man. At this point He makes trial of His disciples' understanding, and they confess Him to be Messiah, though they do not at all grasp the meaning of His office as Redeemer.[6]

The next step is the manifestation of His glory in the Transfiguration with the glimpse that it affords of divine power, and the prophecy of a painful death.

[1] Ch. III. [2] Ch. IV. [3] Ch. V.
[4] Ch. VI. [5] Ch. VII. [6] Ch. VIII.

Descending from the mountain He removes the doubts of His disciples as to His Messianic office. Next He casts out a very powerful devil; and again He warns His disciples of His approaching death. Finding them steeped in selfish views of the coming Kingdom, He corrects their thoughts; and He also warns them of the terrible danger of opposing God's Will.[1]

He next authoritatively corrects the Mosaic teaching about marriage, and blesses little children as if to express His sanction of true family life. He then opens the high path of self-renunciation to a rich young man, pledging His word that in following Him he will find life in its fulness; and He lays down some of the conditions that bind all who wish to enter His Kingdom. Again He foretells His immediate death. He refuses to promise a definite degree of glory to the sons of Zebedee, but emphasizes the law of service. Then He heals a man who had acclaimed Him Son of David.[2]

He is welcomed in Jerusalem as Messiah, shews His power over the fig-tree, and exercises authority in the temple against that of the chief priests. He refuses to give any account of the source of that authority to those whose consciences are dumb.[3]

Both by parable and argument He silences His opponents, and holds up their evil motives to general disapprobation.[4]

[1] Ch. IX.
[2] Ch. X.
[3] Ch. XI.
[4] Ch. XII.

He speaks of the judgement of God that is to overtake the Jews, treating it as a type of judgement in general and as foreshadowing the consummation of judgement at the last day.[1]

It is at this point that we meet with an evident limitation of His knowledge. For He says that He does not know the hour and the day of the last judgement.[2]

After these sayings He foretells His death and the embalming of His body, and goes to His last meal with His disciples. He institutes the mysterious "Breaking of the Bread," and passes to His agony in the garden. We see Him in His very real struggle, and hear the prayer that He offers to His Father.[3]

After this we have a picture of His quiet dignity and heroic endurance amidst false accusation, insult, and cruelty. We hear Him confess Himself the Son of Man who shall come in divine glory, and we watch Him in His condemnation and crucifixion.[4]

Then quite briefly we read of His burial, and of His Resurrection from the dead.[5]

What is the picture thus presented to us? We are conscious of a Person whose power is overwhelming, whose very tenderness strikes us with awe. There are no circumstances of which He is not the master, no human needs that He cannot satisfy, no Satanic powers that He cannot subdue. He teaches with a

[1] Ch. XIII. [2] Ch. XIII. 32. [3] Ch. XIV.
[4] Ch. XV. [5] Ch. XVI. 1–8.

divine authority, correcting Jewish ethics as He pleases, and proclaiming a new reign of God in which He is to be the visible King.

The superhuman characteristics of Christ are emphasized in the stories of His Baptism, Transfiguration and Resurrection; in the instances of strange insight into men's hearts and His accurate foreknowledge of certain events; in His miraculous powers; in the attitude of evil spirits towards Him; and in His authority as Teacher and a Judge. The burden of St. Mark's Gospel is the superhuman nature of the Saviour.

On the other hand, St. Mark is quite clear in his insistence on the true humanity of our Lord Jesus Christ. For he records the story of the Temptation, and the help that the Angels brought Him. He dwells on the Agony in the garden of Gethsemane, and the struggle to obey; and he records the cry of desolation on the Cross. He tells us of many of our Lord's questions in which He sought for information;[1] notices how the Saviour marvelled;[2] and records an instance of His praying.[3] And as we have seen, he tells us that once Christ admitted that He was ignorant of the day of judgement.[4] Other questions there are that were perhaps asked from a didactic motive,[5] or were uttered to shew surprise, or to give rebuke.[6]

[1] Mark v. 30; vi. 38; viii. 5, 23; ix. 16, 21, 33. See below, ch. vii., pp. 198–206.
[2] vi. 6. [3] i. 35. [4] xiii. 32. [5] x. 3, 18; xii. 16.
[6] iv. 13, 40; vii. 18; viii. 12, 21; xiv. 37.

It is only an outline sketch, but it is a sketch of God in human flesh. The Son of God is seen making use of divine power in His battles against unworthy teaching, bodily sickness, and Satanic possession; and He conveys the impression that He is absolute master of all sets of circumstances. Yet all the while He leads an ordinary human life, such that His disciples were not afraid to dwell with Him, and that onlookers were astonished at His sudden exhibition of divine works and teaching.

His manhood is shewn to be the medium by which the divine revelation was unfolded and divine healing brought to all who had faith to receive it; but it is a real manhood, and to the ordinary observer, on ordinary occasions, quite normal. And this picture of the Christ is common to all the Synoptic Gospels.

II

In St. Matthew's Gospel we are again overawed by the powerful Healer whom no power, human or Satanic, can withstand; by the righteous Prophet who is as superior to Moses in authority as He surpasses him in wisdom;[1] and by the Friend of Sinners who challenges death deliberately that He may slay Sin. We are struck by the tacit claim of our Lord not only to a sufficient knowledge of the secret motives of the Scribes and Pharisees, but to the right to denounce them

[1] Cf. Sermon on the Mount.

openly.[1] The assertion of His authority to judge as Son of Man is the culminating proof of His insight into characters and motives, an insight that is plainly not merely human.[2] We are met by His claim to divine Sonship, and a new relation to believers that has no parallel in history, involving as it does a complete knowledge of the human heart and a capacity for simultaneous relationships with numberless souls.[3]

And as the leading thought of the Gospel St. Matthew depicts Christ as the King of the new Kingdom of Heaven, being careful to record the superhuman character of His birth.[4]

On the side of the human characteristics of the Saviour we find two questions that are not recorded by St. Mark, but they are not to be taken as requests for information.[5] Also there is a new instance of prayer.[6]

III

The impression produced upon us by St. Luke's portrait of our Lord is made up of the awe inspired by His superhuman power, and of the wonder called out by the beauty and moral grandeur of His new Kingdom. We are amazed at His unerring advance, through a world marked by guile and selfishness, against the combined opposition of men and devils. We find stress laid on the recognition of our Lord by

[1] Matt. XXIII. [2] XXV. 31–46. [3] XI. 27–29.
[4] I. 18–II. 23. [5] IX. 28; XIV. 31. [6] XI. 25.

devils;[1] and twice we are told of His power over death.[2] We are shewn His wonderful insight into the secrets of the heart,[3] His miraculous knowledge of the presence of fish,[4] and His power of self-preservation.[5]

On the other hand, we notice the emphasis laid upon the power of the Spirit,[6] and upon the power of the Lord that was present to heal.[7] Further, we are told several times of our Lord's prayers.[8] And in the last place we may notice that the people amongst whom our Lord had grown up were amazed at His sudden display of supernatural powers and gifts. It was not what they had been accustomed to see in Him before He began His ministry.[9]

IV

But St. Luke has three special points to put before us that require separate notice.

He tells us that as the Child Jesus grew up He was at every moment being filled with wisdom. He pictures Him as perfect babe, perfect boy, and perfect man. His development was unhindered by any internal flaw or external influence.[10]

Secondly, he records for us an instance of the self-consciousness of the Christ disturbing the ordinary, natural life of Mary and Joseph. Apparently it was an

[1] Luke IV. 34, 41; VIII. 28.
[2] VII. 11-17; VIII. 49-56.
[3] V. 22; VI. 8; IX. 47.
[4] V. 4-11.
[5] IV. 30.
[6] III. 22; IV. 1, 14, 18.
[7] V. 17.
[8] III. 21; V. 16; VI. 12; IX. 29; XI. 1.
[9] IV. 22; cp. II. 50, 51.
[10] II. 40 ff.

unique occurrence; but it assures us that as a child of twelve Christ was in some measure conscious of Himself as Son of God. There is no hint that the self-consciousness was independent of the human soul; rather the stress is laid on the extraordinary human wisdom and soul-development of the Child. We note that His Mother's heart was moved at what she saw, as if she had suddenly caught sight of something in her son that she had never suspected to be in Him.[1]

And thirdly, St. Luke refers to the growth of the Incarnate in stature and wisdom. He says that men were attracted to the Child by this wisdom, and he notes how it developed as the years went by.[2]

Thus St. Luke has no doubts about the very real humanity of the Lord Jesus.

V

St. John may be said to take for granted the picture of our Lord that we have found in the three Synoptic Gospels, so that all we need do here is to enquire how far he helps us to strengthen or to modify our impressions.

The most important evidence to the divine nature of the Christ is that which is based upon the revelation of His self-consciousness, His knowledge of His pre-existence, and His memory of the state of eternal glory.[3] And along with this must

[1] Luke II. 41–51. [2] II. 52.
[3] John VIII. 19, 38, 56, 58; X. 30; XVIII. 5, etc.

be noticed instances of a superhuman knowledge and insight.[1]

Also St. John recounts some miracles not mentioned elsewhere, including that of the raising of Lazarus. He is emphatic in pressing home the divine character of the Master's doctrine,[2] and he offers Him to our adoration as our Light,[3] our Guide,[4] and our indwelling Life.[5] Finally, we may say that the Prologue of the Gospel sufficiently declares that Jesus is the eternal Son of God.

On the other hand, the Apostle records the very human conduct of the Incarnate at the grave of Lazarus, His groans, and His tears; and he tells us of several questions asked to win information.[6]

VI

These statements of the Gospel evidence for the two sides of the doctrine of the Incarnation are, I think, sufficient. It seems plain enough that the Evangelists have no doubt at all that the Incarnate Son is Son of God, and that at the same time He is truly, really and completely man. They do not allow for any conception of Him that does not include these two main facts. It is impossible to account for the Gospel picture by any theory that does not provide on the one hand for Christ's consciousness of Himself

[1] John I. 42, 47, 48; II. 25; IV. 16, 17; V. 14; XI. 14.
[2] V. 37–47; VII. 16; VIII. 12–59; XII. 44–50.
[3] VIII. 12. [4] X. 1–18.
[5] V. 25, 26; VI. 47–57; VII. 37.
[6] XI. 34; VI. 5, etc. See below, ch. VII., pp. 202, 203.

as Son of God, however much His divine powers may have been limited, and on the other hand for His actual human life and limitations.

But if we ask how and in what sense the two opposite facts are to be reconciled, we shall find no answer in the Gospels. The Evangelists do not betray any consciousness of a difficulty, much less do they exhibit any tendency to evolve a rationalized explanation of the unity of the Incarnate. They had come to adore Him as God, they had lived with Him as man, yet they always speak of Him as possessing one single consciousness. But how these things came to be they neither ask nor explain.

The absence of all attempts to rationalize the Incarnation is characteristic of the Apostolic age; and it came to mark a school of thought that included many great names, from Clement of Rome to the great Athanasius.

The distinguishing mark of the school is respect for authority, and belief founded upon authoritative witness. The Apostles themselves had seen and touched and handled the Incarnate. They knew their religion to be based upon the person, Jesus, the Word of God. The dogma of His Divinity required no proof and no philosophic setting to those who had known Him intimately and had seen Him after He had risen from the dead. For them He was alive for evermore, ascended into the glory of the Father, and indwelling their hearts through and in the Holy Ghost whom He had sent.

So, on the other hand, the manhood of Jesus could never be anything but real to the Christian community, among whom were those whose heads had rested on His beating heart, whose hands had been red with His blood as they prepared Him for His burial, and whose eyes had seen Him in His new resurrection life. The revelation was with them, an abiding possession, in the power of which they were content to suffer and to die.

And when they came to reflect upon the bearing of their new faith in Jesus on their Jewish creed they were merely concerned to be true to the facts. From the manifest life and character of the Incarnate they argued back to the attributes proper to His dignity and work; and, having secured Him His due place in their conception of Godhead, returned at once from Theology to moral and personal considerations.

So the Fathers, who may be said to follow the Apostles in this line of thought, put authority before everything. The Apostles bowed before the evidence of their senses; and these Fathers accepted the Apostolic witness. They were content to refute the first heretics by a reassertion of the Apostolic doctrine.

The opposite method, which is in the truest sense of the word rationalistic, dates from the rise of the Alexandrine and Antiochene schools. It is characteristic of men who in finding Christ had also come to their first knowledge of the true God, the One and the Infinite; and whose mental training

disposed them to examine every doctrine proposed to them by authority, and to bring all into relation with their general view of the universe. As Christians they found the whole sphere of knowledge opening up to them in new ways. Their desire was to formulate a scheme of things, based upon the ultimate truth of Godhead, that would account for the creative and redemptive activities of the Infinite. God the Infinite is the centre of their systems. From Him they argue towards the Logos, the Word of God, the Christ; and through the Christ they reach their conception of the final goal of humanity.

Of course the rationalizing tendency was found to produce new heresies. And the rapid spread of heresy modified in course of time the Apostolic method. Where first the Fathers had only warned men to return to the original doctrine, submitting their minds to the Apostolic teaching, it became the custom to meet the heretics on their own ground to some extent, and to shew that reason and faith go hand in hand. Yet in the main the distinction between the two methods remained clearly drawn; indeed, it remains with us to this day. The late Bishop of Oxford, Doctor Stubbs, was as strong a supporter of the Apostolic method as the present Bishop of Birmingham is of the rationalistic method. Both methods have on them the stamp of the Church's approval: both have a work to do in the world. But there is no doubt that the Evangelists must not be classed among rationalists. And that it is so in

their case is a matter of much thankfulness, for they have provided us with a simple account of the facts that is not only independent of any passing metaphysical theory, but undarkened by any attempt at interpretation or explanation. The Gospel is a picture, not a treatise upon a picture.

This Apostolic witness may be viewed in three ways. We may consider, first, the strict adherence to authority that marks the mother Church of Jerusalem, under St. James. We may then study the somewhat less strict method of the teachers of the Jewish dispersion, that is followed by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews in his Christology. And thirdly, we may watch St. Paul as he seeks to win the reason of his Gentile converts; for it is he who is the most rationalistic of the Apostles, and his is the bridge that joins the two schools of thought. But let me here repeat that I use the word rationalist only in its true meaning. The true rationalist is not one who exalts reason against authority, but one who receiving a doctrine on authoritative witness seeks to explain it in terms of human thought.

VII

The Church of Jerusalem was composed of Jews, the large majority of whom were zealous in their observance of the Law of Moses. They regarded Christianity as the natural outcome of Mosaism; to them the Gospel was, as it were, a second volume of their sacred Book, inspired by Him who had

inspired Moses. Thus the first form in which the new Revelation was clothed and expressed was strictly Jewish. It was so formulated, in the divine providence, as not to puzzle unduly the mind of a sin-stricken Jew. The Cross, indeed, could not be hidden; the shame of the Crucified, which is His glory and our joy, could not be done away, but the fundamental facts of the Faith could be so stated as to cause the least intellectual perplexity to the Jewish monotheist.

The actual line of thought which characterized this Church is well known to us. It is recorded for us in the Epistle of St. James and in the earlier chapters of the Book of the Acts of the Apostles. The Theology is that of the Old Testament, with a second volume asserting as facts the divine nature of the Messiah, His very true incarnation in human flesh, and the personality of the Holy Ghost. There is, however, no appendix of explanatory Christology. The facts are all asserted; they are brought into vital connection with conduct, but there is no attempt to give them a theological setting.

The most striking thing in the doctrine of Jerusalem is that while Christ was undoubtedly worshipped as God, He is spoken of as if He were merely one individual chosen out of the Jewish race to be the Messiah. The stress is upon the very real humanity of the Christ. Of course, in part this must be ascribed to the tact and good sense of the Apostolic preachers whose desire was at first to persuade the

Jews, not to alarm them. They laid all the emphasis upon the Messianic office of the Son of Mary, leaving the doctrine of His Divinity to be taught to those who had accepted Him as the Christ. But even so the Humanity of our Lord must have been most real, and must have impressed others as completely natural, to allow of the language in which the Apostles spoke of Him. "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God"; "God hath made Him both Lord and Christ"; "His servant Jesus"; "Thy holy servant Jesus"; "Jesus of Nazareth" whom "God anointed with the Holy Ghost and with power: who went about doing good, for God was with Him."[1] These are typical phrases framed to connect the Son of Mary with the Servant of Yahveh of whom Isaiah spoke,[2] and to emphasize the reality of the divine power which He exercised, and the divine choice by which He had been sent to be the Messiah.

But it is not at all true that the Christology of the Church of Jerusalem was one-sided, omitting the doctrine of the divinity of Jesus. For in the first place, prayers were offered to our Lord Jesus as to God;[3] He shares the title of Lord with the Father and the Spirit;[4] He is the Prince of Life; the Glory of the Father; the Lord of all men; and the Judge.[5] And it is, in the second place, quite certain that St. Luke, who records this early teaching, considered

[1] Acts II. 22, 36; III. 13; IV. 27 (R.V.); X. 38.
[2] Isa. XLII., etc. [3] Acts I. 24, 25; VII. 59.
[4] Acts I. 6, 21; IV. 33. James I. 1.
[5] Acts III. 15; VII. 55; X. 36. James V. 7, 8.

that all this language was entirely compatible with the Christology of St. Paul.

St. James does not give us much help in the matter, but his epistle is of a piece with the evidence that we have adduced from the earliest sermons of the Apostles at Jerusalem. He is of course the most strictly Jewish of the first leaders of the Church, and appears to have remained quite uninfluenced by the ideas of Philo and the Stoics which were well known in Jerusalem. Professor Mayor[1] is of the opinion that he had read a little Stoic philosophy, and he has tabulated parallels between St. James and Philo. But no one suggests that Hellenism had laid its hand on St. James. He is a Jew of the Jews, and beyond his belief in the Three Persons of the Godhead[2] and in the Messianic office of the Lord Jesus,[3] we have no clue to his Christological position.

The truth is that the Jews, like the Muhammadans of to-day, were not concerned to reason out doctrines: they received them on the authority of a God-appointed prophet. "It is written" was their ultimate argument. Thus to Jewish Christians the word of the Lord Jesus, being of higher importance than the Books of Moses, required no explanation.[4]

St. Peter belongs to the same Church, but his outlook is wider than that of St. James. He was the leader of a large middle party of moderate men who

[1] Mayor, St. James, Introd. c. III.
[2] James I. 1, 27. [3] Acts XV. 28.
[4] Acts III. 20–26; IV. 12. Cf. Matt. V. 22, 28, 34; VII. 24.

themselves clung to Moses, but were not able to resist the divine guiding in the matter of a common life with Gentile Christians. Fearful they may have been and a little timid, but their mental outlook was less strictly Jewish. Thus by force of circumstances they came into contact with Hellenistic thought, not perhaps in books so much as in conversation. In fact, it seems probable that St. Peter had far less culture and education than St. James. He was certainly quite Jewish in thought and speech ; he was devoid both of the desire for and the talent of speculative thought; but he had known and loved Jesus Christ beyond most; and his natural broad-mindedness had led him to see the problems of the Church in something of their true light. It is true that a certain timidity, combined with a habit of accepting generously noble ideals without counting the cost, marred his usefulness as a leader in the very early days, but on the whole he marks an advance upon the position of St. James.

His epistles are very full of evidence of his belief in the divinity of our Lord, which it does not concern us to analyse here ;[1] and he lays very great stress upon His true manhood. St. Peter's love to our Lord leads him to write of the sufferings, the memory of which could never pass from him. Christ's real human blood is our ransom ;[2] and His very real sufferings are our inspiration to endurance.[3] He

[1] 1 Peter I. 2, 3, 11; III. 15, 22; v. 4. 2 Peter I. 1, 11, 17; III. 18. Cf. Acts II. 38; IV. 12; X. 36, 42.

[2] 1 Peter I. 19. [3] II. 21–24; III. 18.

really descended into Hades, consciously and vigorously, that He might open heaven to the souls that would accept Him;[1] He is really glorified in Heaven,[2] and will certainly come to judge.[3]

But like St. James, St. Peter has no explanation of the union of the divine and the human. The Incarnate is truly man, and He is God the Son. It is not necessary to say more. The manner of the Incarnation it did not occur to them to discuss.

Even St. Jude, who seems to have been on the right wing of the Jewish party, depending to some extent upon Pauline doctrine, has no realization of any need to rationalize the dogma of the Incarnation. At the time he wrote, the fundamental facts of the threefold personality of God and of the divinity and humanity of Christ were already expressed in dogmatic form;[4] but there is no hint that the dogmas had been rationally explained in their bearing one upon another.

VIII

The Jewish Christians, whose intellectual home was rather Alexandria than Jerusalem, were of a very different type. From the first they are spoken of as Hellenists; for the distinction long recognized by the Jews themselves passed over into the Christian Church.

The general characteristics of this school were a

[1] 1 Peter III. 18 ff.; IV. 6.
[2] I. 21; III. 22.
[3] I. 7; V. 4. Acts X. 42.
[4] Jude I. 1, 3, 4, 20, 21.

veneration for Philo's methods of mystical interpretation of the Scriptures, a desire to interpret their faith in a language in which it would be intelligible to the Greek world, and a broadminded view of the purpose of the Law. It must not be supposed that these characteristics were found in every Hellenist equally developed, or that Alexandrine thought was responsible for all the readiness of Jews in foreign cities to assimilate Greek thought. But no doubt Alexandria is the real centre of the movement which spread in all the cities in which Jewish colonies had been founded. Apollos coming from Alexandria as a famous Hellenist had a ready welcome in Ephesus; St. Paul everywhere found Hellenism at work as leaven in Jewish circles; and at the very first Antioch's Hellenism had proved to be the door to its Christianity.

We must then be prepared for a school of Jewish Christianity different from that of Jerusalem; a school that was based upon the Law, the Prophets, and the Sanctuary, but whose building was not strictly in the style of the Scribes and Pharisees. Its Greek Bible gave the tone to its methods of thought.

Of such a school was the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. His name is so far unknown to us, but his theological position is of the Alexandrine type, modified to suit those to whom he was writing. Even were he to prove to be the Greek St. Luke, it would still be true to say that his attitude to Judaism

and to philosophical reasoning is that of an Alexandrine Jew.

It is not to our purpose to discuss the Christology of this Epistle as a whole. We have only to pay attention to certain points.

First, we meet with an attempt to explain the relation of Christ to the Father in the eternal sphere. Bishop Westcott has summarized this teaching in his note on the Christology of the Epistle.[1] The Christ is the one eternal Son of God, Son not by adoption but by nature; Who makes God known to us in terms of human life; being His agent in creation, the medium of His revelation, and the heir of the world. He is thus the Creator, Preserver, and Heir of all things.[2] Thus we are shewn the Eternal Son continuously abiding in and with the Father, and exercising His proper functions in the universe. There is no hint of any abandonment of His eternal relationship with the Father, or of any cessation from the functions proper to the Word, to use St. John's kindred term.

But, secondly, equal care is taken to make very clear the reality of the manhood that He assumed. He took real flesh and blood, and passed through the valley of death;[3] His manhood was complete, so that He was able to be tempted through it;[4] and He was made perfect by the development of His soul under

[1] Westcott, Hebrews, 2nd ed. p. 424 ff.
[2] Hebrews I. 1–4, 8; II. 5; III. 6; X. 21.
[3] II. 14. [4] II. 17, 18.

the discipline of life.[1] Some of the human qualities that He exhibited are named. He was faithful, merciful, and sympathetic.[2] He depended on God and prayed to Him; and learned obedience by and in the very sufferings that led Him to His prayers and agony.[3] Finally, He exercised faith: but not the imperfect faith that is marred by ignorance and doubt. His faith was the certain confidence of a perfect soul that sees behind the cloud the invincible will of the Father. Hence came His power to endure, as He saw clearly the joy that was set before Him.[4]

Here then we have a very real attempt to make clear to men's minds the true significance of the terms divine and human as applied to our Lord. On the one hand, there is the Eternal Son become incarnate without ceasing to exercise His powers and prerogatives in the universal sphere, the sphere of glory. And on the other hand, we see Him as perfect and complete man, undergoing growth and development, and so passing to His glory.[5] But at this point the writer stops. It was not in his mind either to feel the need or to find the terminology of an explanation of the manner of the union of the two natures. Nevertheless we see in this epistle a striking example of inspired rationalism; the consecration to the service of truth of terms of human thought.

[1] Heb. IV. 15; V. 7–9.
[2] II. 17; III. 2; IV. 15.
[3] V. 7–9.
[4] XII. 2. See below, ch. II.
[5] I. 3; IV. 14; VI. 20, etc.

IX

Of St. John there is no need to speak at length. For we have already gathered the chief points of his witness to the matter before us. It is, however, interesting to note how in his use of the term Logos,[1] or Word, he shews much thought that is common to him and to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. But there is nothing to prove that he owes more to Alexandria than a term that must have been naturalized in Jerusalem long before it was required to manifest the eternal functions of the Son of God.

The striking thing about St. John is that he should have lived so long in the centre of Greek thought, the city of Ephesus, and yet have been so little drawn to philosophical methods and language. He adheres strictly to the Apostolic method of asserting the facts on both sides; shutting out all doubts concerning the deity of Christ, while equally excluding all suspicion of any unreality of the manhood. And his facts, with his method, he handed on to his disciples, who, in their turn, made them over to their followers. Ignatius, Polycarp, and Irenaeus are the true successors of St. John.

The final glory of the disciple whom Jesus loved was the accomplishment of this task of bringing to the world, that was beginning to speculate, that record of the Master's words and teaching which has proved to be the salt of human thought. He had

[1] John I. 1.

meditated on these words, for him they were all-sufficing, he had no need to go beyond them ; but it is in the power of these words that Christ has come, the stronger force, upon the pagan world, binding its leaders and spoiling them of their goods.

X

It remains to discuss the teaching of St. Paul, the philosopher of the Apostolic band, and the father of the Gentile Church. He comes nearer to metaphysical explanation of the Incarnation than any other writer of the New Testament. But so far is he from adhesion to any system of philosophy that his theology has survived all changes in the thoughts of men, and remains as catholic and fresh to-day as in the first age.

Saul of Tarsus had been a student in the schools and probably in the university of his native town. He had acquired some knowledge of the classics, measured the Stoic philosophy, and gained some insight into the Hellenistic movement. But he never became a Hellenistic Jew. He left Tarsus for Jerusalem, where he lived the strictest youth of the straitest sect, the Pharisee, being zealous for the Law beyond all of his own standing. He never gave himself up to the influence of Greek education, and the real master of his mind was Gamaliel. His conversion seems to have opened his mind in a marvellous way. In the light of his new faith he was able to recall much that he had learned of old and put away from him ; and he went to his work with a width of

sympathy in which no other Apostle could rival him. But always Paul the Christian was master of Paul the thinker, just as Saul the Pharisee had dominated Saul the student.

To philosophy he owes some of his terminology, his wide view of the divine government of the world, his singular tact in dealing with Gentile Churches, and his keen apprehension of the meaning of the intellectual tendencies of his age. But beyond this I think that no case can be made out for his dependence on Hellenism.

In his private life he lived as a Jew; his love for his nation and its traditions was deep and sincere; and his desire to work amongst them was genuine and even obstinate.[1]

Thus it is to St. Paul that we naturally look for a combination of the Apostolic method of authoritative teaching of the facts with the rationalistic method of interpreting the facts in terms of human thought. We expect a translation of the dogma of the Church of Jerusalem into language that the people of the Gentile cities could understand and appropriate. More than this we should not expect: for the agreement of St. Paul with the Apostolic body in doctrinal matters must have been very close to enable them to trust him so fully in the matter of Mosaism. They knew that St. Paul might cause trouble by his liberal views on the Law of Moses, and there might be terms in his vocabulary that were unfamiliar, but they also

[1] See Acts xxii. 17–21; and Rom. ix.–xi., etc.

knew that no one could question his loyalty to our Lord Jesus Christ, or his faithful acceptance of the one Gospel. St. Paul was able to do what he did because he was absolutely at one with the Apostolic body in his fundamental creed.

His was the mind of genius, seeing clearly what was but dimly suggested to other men's vision, and expressing plainly what others were only feeling after. His was the representative mind of the early Church, in the sense that along his lines alone did men who had despaired alike of Judaism and Hellenism find their way to God in Christ without violence to their intellectual positions. Both Jews and Greeks were led by him to see the inner meaning of the Incarnation, and rich in the mystical presence of Jesus within them they were able to press forward to the goal of their high calling as sons of God.

Typical of such minds are Luke the Greek; Apollos the Alexandrine; Barnabas of Cyprus; John Mark the once conservative Jew; Crispus the ruler of the synagogue, a Hellenist; Aristarchus the Macedonian; Erastus of Corinth; and Tychicus of Ephesus. Pauline theology it was that gave these men their strong faith. While on the other hand, the Apostle could keep the confidence of St. James of Jerusalem, interest St. Peter in his Gentile Churches, win his point at the Council of Jerusalem, and so order the Churches of Asia as to make it possible for St. John to undertake the oversight of them. And all this without a single act of capitulation to any

one form of philosophy. St. Paul is indeed the master-mind of the Apostles. His theology covers ground upon which the others did not tread. But cut out that which he taught in common with St. James and St. Peter, and his theology has neither foundations nor walls; it is merely a roofing, lying ruined on the earth.

I fear it may seem that my prefatory remarks are out of all proportion to the amount of evidence that I may be able to adduce from the Pauline writings; but my purpose is to emphasize the value of Pauline evidence as bearing witness to the teaching that was common in the Church of his day.

His main evidence to a belief in the divinity and humanity of the Christ need not engage our attention. We take that for granted as well we may; and we rather ask what he has to tell us about the manner of their union in the one person, Christ.

In the first place he asserts that the Incarnate occupies an essential place in the being of the Godhead, and in the life of the universe. Like St. John and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews he leaves no room for the theory that the divine Son ceased from the performance of divine functions when He became incarnate. To Him the eternal Son is the Image of the Father, the Creator and the First-born, the Cause of all things and their End. His work in creation is not that of a deputy who performs his task and goes his way: rather He is the necessary, essential, permanent link between the

creative will of God and its actual realization in the universe. So on the same analogy He is shewn to be the necessary, essential, permanent link between the redemptive will of the Father and its actual realization in the Church; He is the King of the redeemed race and the Head of the Church.[1]

Secondly, St. Paul rejoices that in Christ Jesus dwells the fulness of the Godhead bodily.[2] Therefore as the divine Person dwells with all His powers in and under the conditions of manhood, so He is the indwelling Saviour of all who come to Him, indwelling them by mystic union and knitting them through His Spirit into the one body, the Church.[3] But the conditioning of His Godhead in manhood involves an act of profound humility which the Apostle names Kenosis, or self-emptying; and again self-beggary.[4]

It is in this last point that St. Paul became the forerunner of those who have tried to explain how the divine Son could take manhood into Himself, and live as man. The explanations of his general statement that have been given all down the ages, it will be our duty to notice very briefly later on; and in dealing with extreme forms of Kenotic theory we shall have to return to these classical passages of St. Paul for our guidance.[5]

For the present I wish only to suggest the positive statements made by the Apostle.

[1] Eph. I. and II. Col. I. 12–19.
[2] Col. II. 9. Cf. I. 19.
[3] Rom. V. to VIII.; XII., etc.
[4] Phil. II. 5–8. 2 Cor. VIII. 9.
[5] See below, ch. V.

He says that the Christ was eternally one with God the Father; and that with a view to the redemption of men He deliberately entered upon a state that was not equal to the divine state. In order to do so He emptied Himself. Of what he emptied Himself we are not told. This state upon which He entered is the human state; but in His case its chief characteristic is that of bondage. The purpose for which He came He held firmly while living in manhood, and as man He humbled Himself to accept the death of the Cross.

Thus He has become to us an example of humility, for as God He humbled Himself, accepting the humiliation of life in manhood; and as man He chose to die, accepting the humiliation of the death of a disobedient slave.

Three main points, then, stand out in this passage. First, the Incarnation involved a state of being that is quite inferior to the divine state. Secondly, it involved the assumption of a true and permanent manhood. And, thirdly, it involved the acceptance of a state that must be called slavery as opposed to the perfect freedom of the divine state.

Now if we analyse the idea of slavery we find that it implies inability to exercise the powers and prerogatives of manhood apart from the will of a master. It does not at all imply the absence of natural powers, or the absence of the human right to exercise them freely. So that the analogy in no way helps us to determine the nature of the self-emptying, of the

eternal Son. We leave the Pauline explanation prepared for a wonderful manifestation of divine love; for a voluntary limitation of the powers of the Son within the sphere of the Incarnation; and for a very real self-restraint. But I think that we must accept the verdict of history, which seems to be that the Pauline doctrine of Kenosis is so wide and free from detailed explanation that teachers of almost every shade of opinion have felt justified in sheltering themselves behind the name of the Apostle of the Gentiles. For myself I do not think that his authority may be claimed for anything beyond the three points which I have named.

Thus we leave the New Testament with two sets of facts for which to account, and a statement of the direction in which the reconciliation of them is to be found.

On the one hand, there is all the evidence of the Gospels to the true and permanent Godhead of the Son, which is supported and emphasized in the Epistles: evidence to His dependence on and exercise of powers that are at once His own and divine.

On the other hand, there is a great deal of evidence that the Incarnate never for one moment acted Godward or manward apart from His manhood; and that this was so is clearly shewn by the picture of Him that was impressed upon the minds of the earliest Christians.

And St. Paul gives us the direction in which to seek

the reconciliation of this apparently contradictory evidence, bidding us to dwell upon the self-emptying of the eternal Son and His acceptance of a state of slavery in place of His own proper state of divine freedom and glory.

More than this we cannot claim to find within the covers of the New Testament. The Apostles' method allowed of nothing more; and that not because their inspiration was in itself too limited, but for the reason that the Holy Spirit gives to each generation strictly according to its need; and an answer to the question "How did God become man?" was not one of the needs of the infant Church. In fact, to judge once more from history, such an answer may perhaps be outside the region in which we are illuminated from on high. It may be that here we have to do our best to discover, by analogies and metaphors, some answer that may seem to us to be on the lines of truth. In any case, we are certain that any enquiry we make must concern itself with the two sets of facts that emerge from our study of the Gospels, and must be conducted in the light of the hints that we have received from St. Paul.

PART II

THE PROBLEM IN HISTORY

CHAPTER III

THE UNLIMITED LOGOS

IN studying the history of the controversy that centres round the manner of the Incarnation it is very difficult to keep within the limits of the enquiry. The somewhat narrow question of the actual manner of the union of the divine and human natures in the one person, Christ, is only too easily lost sight of in the many wider problems that are presented by the mystery of the Incarnation. In order, therefore, to a due limitation of our subject, it occurs to me to suggest as a point of view the search of the Christologians for the self-conscious subject, or ego, of the manhood of the Incarnate.

I am aware that this phrase does not in itself suggest the early centuries of the Church, and that many writers would have been surprised to hear that their work could be so interpreted. But in fact it is so. Men's difficulty lay in explaining the union of the divine nature of the Son with manhood; with manhood as it were impersonal: the sum of human faculties and powers apart from a human ego or person as subject thereof. They knew that imper-

sonal as this manhood was on the human side, yet in order to be effective and real it must be constituted in a person: in a self-conscious subject of human actions and human experience; one who could express himself humanly, and in so doing could carry humanity to its goal.

Who is this subject? Many answers are found and it is in studying these answers that we come to a clear idea of the history of the struggle over the manner of the Incarnation.

I

The first answer is that which issues from Athanasian Christology. It is not formulated; it rather emerges from our study of the Christological statement of his school.

The Athanasian school is the direct descendant of the Apostolic school. The basis of study is the record of the facts of the life of the Saviour as written in the Gospels, with the interpretation put upon them by the writers of the New Testament. Its method is that of juxtaposition: putting one set of facts over against the other without any attempt at a reconciliation: contemplating at once the reality of divine nature and its wondrous powers, and the reality of the human nature and its limitations. Its aim is to avoid the perils attending philosophic explanations, and to appeal to the authority of the Apostolic teaching.

The great teachers of this school are Ignatius,

Justin, Irenaeus, Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzum, and Basil.[1]

They taught that in becoming man the Incarnate had assumed a second nature, impersonal manhood: a human body, and a human soul: and therefore He possessed a twofold means of self-expression. He could act either through His divine nature or through His human nature, as He willed. As acting through His divine nature He is God the Son in full exercise of all His divine powers; and as acting through His human nature He is God the Son self-restraining, self-limiting, or as Irenaeus puts it, quiescent.

The main contentions of these writers may be stated thus :—

(1) The Incarnate is the eternal Son of God, who condescends to be clothed in our manhood; taking it into Himself that He may redeem it, and through it reveal God to us and exhibit manhood to God.

(2) The manhood is complete and real; because that which is not assumed by the Saviour is not redeemed. Also it is impersonal, for He took manhood, not a man, into Himself.

(3) The eternal Son must therefore restrain His powers from time to time, becoming quiescent or inactive, so that actions or sufferings that are proper to manhood may not be rendered impossible by manifestations of His divine power. As man He was limited, sorrowful, in pain, dishonoured, and ignorant of the day of judgement; while as God He was free

[1] See note 11.

from all such limitations. Hence it behoved Him to restrain Himself and His power partially and on occasions: otherwise His manhood would have been at the best ineffective and perhaps docetic.

(4) Hence the Incarnate, being both God and man, can act either humanly or divinely within the sphere of His incarnate life, although He is only one person. He who died and He who rose again is one and the same person; as man dying, and as God rising from the dead.

Who, then, is the self-conscious subject of manhood in the Incarnate?

At first sight it is the eternal Son, exercising all His divine powers. In the state of the Incarnation there is none but He. If we look further, however, we shall see that the Son is the subject of the manhood only when He restrains Himself and His powers. Athanasian writers all imply that He cannot be the subject of His manhood so long as He freely manifests His divine powers: for the divine would overwhelm the human, making human action impossible, and human experience a mere empty phrase. Thus they assume the Son as self-limiting to be the subject of the human nature in the Incarnate; while as subject of the divine nature they acknowledge the Son as exercising all His divine strength.

There is no logical statement of the two subjects: no recognition that these two subjects are, in fact, terms of different content. Their whole position is

studiously scriptural, and free from the dangers that attend the rationalizing theologian.

This position has been maintained by many down the ages. It became the basis of the doctrine developed by St. Cyril and St. Leo; it is claimed by many Christologians, who are far more rationalistic than scriptural; and it is widely defended at the present day. Dr. Liddon became famous by his presentment of it:[1] and among the many things for which Bishop Stubbs[2] will be remembered, not the least is that Ordination address in which he recalled his candidates from the following of modern teachers to the acceptance of the Apostolic method of simple loyalty to the Gospel picture.

What, then, is the inner meaning of this teaching as it affects the problem of the manner of the Incarnation?

In the first place we notice that it assumes the existence of the Logos in two states simultaneously: the state of divine glory and the state of humiliation. These two states co-exist: the Person inhabiting both is the one Word of God, the eternal Son, in full possession of His divine prerogatives and powers.

Next, within the state of the humiliation the Logos is seen to have what we must call a double consciousness. Generally speaking, He is conscious of Himself as God the Son exercising divine powers: occasionally He is conscious of Himself as God

[1] *Bampton Lectures* of 1866.
[2] Stubbs, *Ordination Addresses*, pp. 173–82.

the Son limiting Himself and His powers. These two states of consciousness are co-existent; for the full life of the Son in the state of humiliation allows for an occasional, limited self-consciousness as man; the Logos-life is never suspended or maimed.

The direction in which the difficulty of this doctrine lies is that of the manhood. Before manhood can act the Logos must become quiescent: must limit Himself. But this is only an occasional condescension on His part: He is not always quiescent. So that, in fact, the manhood has not any one permanent subject.

A subject to manhood is provided to meet every case named in Scripture in which the Incarnate acted humanly; more than this the Athanasian school does not attempt. It is impossible to say who is the subject of the manhood at those times when the Incarnate is manifesting His divine power, as in the raising of Lazarus, or in the Transfiguration, or at the Resurrection. It would appear that either the manhood is constituted sometimes in the Word as unlimited, and sometimes in the Word as self-limiting, in which case it is constituted in two subjects of unequal content; or it is not constituted in one permanent subject, in which case it becomes merely a vesture of the Son of God: an instrument of His works, and a medium of His self-revelation.

In either case, Athanasian Christology must be said to have failed to find a permanent subject to the manhood: but in so far as there is a self-conscious

ego in it, it is found in the eternal Son viewed as self-limiting or quiescent.

Nevertheless, the Athanasian position is a very strong one. It allows for the reality of the human character of all the phenomena which are ascribed to the humanity in the Gospels, though it does not provide for the conception of a manhood constituted in an adequate and permanent subject. Again, it lays stress upon the continuance of the divine activity of the Logos; and it finds a way for the Logos to manifest Himself in a limited way through manhood without parting with His divine powers. It allows for a special manifestation of the eternal Son, together with and in addition to His normal manifestation of Himself in the universe.

For myself, I believe that in the Athanasian position lies the gate to the truth. But two points at least require reconsideration.

First, ought not the self-limiting of the Logos to be regarded as an act belonging to the sphere of His divine activities, to the sphere of glory?

The weakness of the Athanasian view lies in placing together in one sphere the Logos as unlimited and the Logos as self-limiting. I shall try to shew later that this patristic doctrine would reach its perfection if it confined the conception of the Logos as self-limiting to the eternal, divine sphere; and made the Logos as self-limited to be the subject, or ego, of both the divine and human natures in the sphere of the humiliation. The difference is

enormous. For the act of self-limiting is as different from the state of being self-limited as an act of choice between two actions is different from the act of performing the selected action. This point it will be my duty to draw out at length later on. I have here only indicated what I think to be one necessary line of development of Athanasian Christology.

Secondly, does the Athanasian doctrine sufficiently take into account the place that the manhood occupies in the relations of the Incarnate with the Father?

It has been pointed out that St. Athanasius does not make mention of the human soul of our Lord. Not that he can for a moment be charged with any thought of denying its existence, or of minimizing the humanity of the Incarnate: but his attention was not concentrated upon the relation which the human soul mediates between the Incarnate and the Heavenly Father.

The Athanasian teacher regards the prayers of our Lord not as necessary to the Incarnate as such, but as made necessary to His state of humiliation by the needs of those for whom He came. The necessity lay partly in the weakness of the assumed manhood, which could only be real if the Incarnate would allow it to have its normal course, and partly in the requirements of redemption viewed as depending on the presentation of manhood before God. The soul has no essential place between the Incarnate and the

Father as the medium of His communion with the Father, in the doctrine we are considering.

The absence of all discussion on this point is of course to be explained by the state of the Christological controversy at the time. But I do not think that we are well-advised to acquiesce in its absence to-day. It is a point that much needs discussion.

Clement of Alexandria[1] used to emphasize the importance of the soul of Christ, regarding it as the ransom for sin. Origen spoke of it as the seat of union of the eternal Son and His human body. But what is required is that emphasis should be laid upon the place that the soul of Him who became man must occupy between the divine Self and His Father. For in this point will be found to lie the root of the doctrine of Christ's mystical body, and the basis of His high-priestly office. If the eternal Son took manhood into Himself that He might "deify" it: if His manhood is to be the Door of our approach to the Father, the Mirror in which we are to behold the Beatific Vision, the Instrument of His eternal Priesthood, and the Mouthpiece of His Intercession: must it not be really and completely His own nature, the nature in which He as Head of the Church approaches the Father? And if this is so, as indeed it must be, must not the subject of the manhood be permanent? Can we conceive of a single moment, during the thirty-three years of His earthly life, in which He was not approaching the Father through His man-

[1] See note III.

hood, in prayer, in offering of obedience, in communion, and in the reception of all that which He shewed to His disciples?

Surely there must be a permanent subject of manhood, and one Who is at least not in the full exercise of all divine powers. Rather He must be one Who is continually conscious, even in His relations with His Father, of the limits and conditions which His manhood has imposed upon Him. To this point also I must return. I have referred to it here, as indicating a second point in which the Athanasian doctrine requires development.

We may then briefly describe the position by saying that the Athanasian school of thought found no permanent subject to the manhood of Christ; and that the temporary subject to which they felt their way in obedience to the demands of Scripture is the eternal Son conceived as self-limiting and quiescent. But I can see nothing in their doctrine that is fundamentally incapable of development in the two directions that I have ventured to indicate.

II

A natural outcome of the Athanasian position was found in that of the Cyrilline school. Of this school St. Cyril of Alexandria and St. Leo are pre-eminently the leaders; but it may be taken to include Gregory of Nyssa, Hilary, Ambrose, and the great Augustine.[1]

[1] See note IV.

The first assumption of this school is the co-existence of the state of glory and divine functions of the Logos with His state of humiliation. In this it entirely agrees with the Athanasian school.

The second assumption is that while the manhood is real, it cannot exhibit in action anything that is ultimately incompatible with the divine fulness of power. The manhood may be weary, may suffer, and may die: but in no way can the human mind be capable of real growth, or of any the least ignorance. The real meaning of this teaching is that to the Cyrilline Christologians it was necessary to find one permanent subject of the manhood, it being impossible to postulate two subjects in one state; and therefore they ruled out as a possible subject the Logos as quiescent; and predicated of the manhood that its permanent subject must be the unlimited Logos.

In this position they provided for the human weariness, suffering, and death by the theory that these were all due rather to acts of divine will than to the inherent weakness of the flesh. Each act of weakness, each act of endurance was due to a corresponding act of divine will; thereby possessing an ethical value as redemptive beyond anything that could be ascribed merely to the weakness of human flesh.

They do not minimize the condescension of God the Son in assuming human flesh; they are astonished at the love that led Him to subject

Himself to the necessary laws of the human body, as He voluntarily willed to allow them to have their course, that He might prove His manhood, endure His Passion, and complete the Atonement.

But on the other hand they did undoubtedly minimize the reality of the manhood. For they allowed it no activity that is not due to a momentary act of will on the part of the eternal, unlimited Son of God; an act of will, I mean, in the restraining of His proper divine powers in order to make room for any human action on which He was determined. The Incarnate can, of course, do nothing apart from His divine will; but in this case the divine will cannot express itself humanly unless first it renders inactive all its own power. The Cyrilline school failed to explain the manner of the Incarnation because they did not see that human nature can never adequately mediate the self-expression of the eternal Son so long as He exercises all His divine powers in their fulness.

The truth of our criticism is confirmed by the denial of the reality of our Lord's growth in wisdom and of His ignorance, which is characteristic of this school. In the one case they say that He merely revealed more of His wisdom as the human powers developed, and in the other case He affected an ignorance that was not really His.

It will, I hope, appear later that this view of the effect of the human growth upon the manifestation of divine power has a large element of truth;

and also that there is a very real sense in which the humanity received power by its union with the Person of the Son of God. But when we have said this we have said as much as is possible in favour of this theory of the manner of the Incarnation.

To the Cyrilline doctrine of the Incarnation as a whole the Church owes her present peace on Christological questions, and her strength against her adversaries. But on the side issue of the manner of the union we cannot be content with St. Cyril's view. For in the first place this theory explains away two facts of the Gospel story for which it should have accounted. The growth of Christ in wisdom and His ignorance of the day of judgement are two facts vouched for by the Evangelists, but they are explained away by the writers of this school. And, secondly, it requires as subject of manhood the Logos conceived as unlimited: a view that must inevitably end in the deification of the humanity at the cost of what is proper to man, or in a semi-docetic conception of it as a mere veil or instrument of Godhead.

It is, in fact, only too clear that there was a real tendency in this school to regard the manhood as a veil between God the Son and men, rather than as the very proper nature of the Incarnate in His mediatorial action Godward and manward. All that I ventured to advance in criticism of the Athanasian view on this point applies with even greater force to the Cyrilline position. But the best criticism of the

theory is found in the logical development of it that meets us in so many Catholic writers down the ages, of whom we may take as typical St. John the Damascene[1] and St. Thomas Aquinas.[2]

They both hold fast the postulate that the eternal Word as unlimited is the true subject of the manhood; and they both maintain the completeness of the manhood in every particular. But they inevitably come to a position from which they see the manhood so filled with divine powers as to cease to belong to the human order. The manhood of the Incarnate is a thing apart. It is not divine, for in the last resort it cannot possess divine attributes as such: it cannot be actually omniscient and omnipotent. Neither is it really human: for in the last resort, again, the manhood that is God's cannot exhibit any of those weaknesses and limitations which, though proper to manhood, are incompatible with the self-manifestation of the eternal Son as unlimited.

Thus according to them the human will of Christ is not itself omnipotent, but it was the instrument of the Logos Who was all the while exercising full omnipotence in His incarnate state. Nor is His human mind itself omniscient, but it was the instrument of the Logos Who was all the while exercising full omniscience in His incarnate state. The human soul of Christ, according to St. Thomas, beheld perfectly

[1] Bruce, *Humiliation*, pp. 68 ff.

[2] Summa, III: x., xi., xii. Dorner, *Div.* 2: Vol. I, pp. 206 ff.

the eternal Logos; that is, from birth it knew Him in His unlimited power and glory as the Word of the Father. His mind possessed a complete knowledge of all things that can conceivably be revealed by God to a human mind of perfect capability on all subjects; and also it came by experience to a complete knowledge, of a different kind, on every matter that a human mind can learn by the exercise of merely human faculties.

Thus St. Thomas provides on the one hand for the subject of manhood, the eternal Son in the full exercise of all His power and prerogative; while on the other hand he thinks to postulate a real humanity. But in fact he has made the manhood merely a medium of divine self-revelation and an instrument of redemption.

We shall see that St. Thomas is right in his thought that the manhood must receive much by union with Godhead; we can admire the skill and the reverence with which he has struggled to solve the problem of Christ's human knowledge; but we still feel that he has failed to make the manhood real, and that he has not found its true subject.

This teaching, however, obtains largely in the present day amongst Catholic writers:[1] so much so that any one who values his reputation as a Catholic may well pause before he challenges it to justify itself. If any one wishes to see the doctrine drawn

[1] Hurter, *Medulla Theol. Dog.*, §§ 740–2. Darwell Stone, *Outlines of Christian Dogma*, pp. 82, 83; notes 18, 23.

out with great fulness, clearness, and reverence, let him read the article on the Redeemer in the second volume of Wilhelm and Scannell's *Manual of Catholic Theology*.[1] Shorter statements will be met with in many text-books both by Anglican and Roman Catholics; and meditations based upon this view of Christ are so common as to meet one in almost every book that treats devotionally of the Passion. But in spite of the authority and devotion of the writers who support this view, it must still be emphatically said that the manhood of Christ cannot be an efficient medium of the manifestation of the unlimited Godhead and at the same time an adequate representation before God of our weak and limited manhood. The normal teaching of Catholic theologians on this point removes the humanity of Christ from the human sphere. That manhood is of like nature with ours, in the sense that it was taken from the womb of a woman and that its elements are in their essence the same as ours; but in its life, in the degree of its powers, and in its sphere of operations it is made to be entirely unlike our own.

The excellence of this teaching lies in its insistence upon the divinity of the Person who is the subject of manhood; upon the divine nature of the consciousness of Christ, and upon His possession of His divine nature in its entirety. The weakness of it lies in the inability of its exponents to admit a continuous limitation of the exercise of divine power by

[1] See especially Vol. II, pp. 147–9.

the Incarnate, in their refusal to allow that the conditions of manhood could prevail over the freedom of Deity, and in their tendency to explain away whatever in the manhood seems incompatible with the presence of active divine power in the Incarnate Being. They are all too ready to confine the Kenosis, or self-emptying, of the Word to that act of will by which the Logos consented to allow the physical laws of manhood to have their way in His flesh. In this they are St. Cyril's disciples. In a word, they reiterate the teaching that the subject of the manhood is the eternal Son in the full possession and exercise of all His divine powers and prerogatives; Who, by a series of acts of divine love, in His divine power, condescends to allow certain physical laws to have their proper course in His flesh from time to time. Thus they would say that the Babe ruled the universe from Mary's knee, and that by an act of divine power He allowed the hunger of the body to prevail upon Him so that He chose to depend on Mary for His nourishment.

We must not for one moment depart from the main tenets of their position on the cardinal facts of the Incarnation. But on the narrow issue of the manner of the union of manhood with Deity I do not see my way to follow them. I cannot explain the Gospel story on this theory. For example, the fourth cry from the Cross, the cry that announces the forsaking of the Incarnate by His Father, ceases to have any meaning to me if the Incarnate Himself

was exercising full divine power at the very moment that He cried "Why hast thou forsaken me?" I am as far from accepting the extreme Kenotic view of this incident, and this will become clear as I proceed. But we must see to it that our theory, whatever it be, preserves all the conditions of manhood in its entirety if we are to account for the facts of the Gospels; and these conditions cannot be real and complete if the subject of the manhood be the eternal Son in the unlimited exercise of all His powers.

In adopting this critical attitude towards the Cyrilline view of the manner of the Incarnation, and the consequent scholastic interpretation of the manhood of Christ, I do not plead guilty to any disloyalty to the Catholic Church. The decrees of the Church do not bind us to any one view of the manner of the union of the divine and the human nature in our Lord: much less do they require our acquiescence in the scholastic statement of the threefold knowledge of Christ's human mind. We are free within the limits laid down by the Creeds of Christendom. If Cyril could differ from Athanasius upon the matter of our Lord's mind, it cannot be a sin to differ from Cyril. No Father is infallible. The consent of the Fathers is something more than the sum of their private opinions; otherwise it were not uncatholic to ignore it. And in this case we have only two opposite opinions of two large schools of patristic thought to guide us. The reasoning that would make me a sinner for differing from Cyril would

make him a sinner for differing from Athanasius. Far otherwise would be the position of a man who should set aside the whole patristic teaching on the fundamental dogma of the Incarnation. He would be convicted of ignoring the consent of the Fathers, that is the universal belief of the Church of their age upon which the seal of authority has been set by Councils, or of ignoring a doctrine which cannot be rejected without endangering the truths that have received that seal.

My excuse for so bold an attitude towards the received authorities is that having followed them along the main road, on which they are Christ's authorized guides, I find them unable to direct me along a by-path by which my circumstances make it necessary for me to travel for a time. To guide me along this by-road they have received no authority, and in my judgement some of them are so familiar with the main road, so accustomed to its straightness and its level surface, that they rather hinder than help me along the tortuous and rough path that it is my fate to follow.

Does this make my meaning clear? St. Cyril and St. Thomas fail me with regard to the manner of the union of the manhood with the divine Logos, just because they are so profoundly concerned to emphasize the main truth of His divinity, and His possession of the fulness of the divine power and prerogatives. They do not help those who wish to think out a side-issue; to discover the exact, definite, and

permanent content of the subject in whom the assumed manhood is constituted.

III

There were developments of the Cyrilline theory which proved to be quite incompatible with the orthodox dogmas of the Faith. More logical and less cautious minds were able to see that the true issue of Cyril's teaching lay in the deification of Christ's manhood, or in an entirely docetic view of it.

Thus we find a general tendency towards emptying it of its reality and its meaning; a tendency made famous first by the pathetic case of the old monk Eutyches,[1] who thought to follow the teaching of St. Cyril, and succeeded only in winning his own excommunication. The same tendency lay behind the intellectual movement that so seriously disturbed the Church of the fifth and sixth centuries, called Monophysitism: a name the sound of which is as unpleasing as the history of the heresy is perplexing. Again, the same tendency found expression in the Nihilianism of which Peter Lombard was the leading exponent.

Eutyches started from the conception of the presence of the unlimited Son of God in the state of the Incarnation; and he framed his view of the manhood so as to make both unnecessary and impossible any the least limitation of His exercise of divine

[1] Dorner, Div. 2, Vol. I, pp. 83 ff. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, pp. 59 ff. Bright, *St. Leo on the Incarnation*, pp. 162 ff.; 221 ff.

powers. He boldly brought over the manhood into the pleroma of the divine activity, and let it be lost in the glory of the divine nature. For all practical purposes it ceased to be manhood. The eternal Son became man, as it were, in the single moment of His conception in Mary's womb, swallowed up manhood into deity, and so carried it, and all who share it, to redemption and glory. What He exhibited of manhood in His daily life and in His Passion was at the best an apparition due to His divine power.

The Monophysites[1] were careful to avoid the utmost logical statement of this position, taking warning from the fate of Eutyches, bringing to their task a greater intellectual power, and working out their theory under less hurried conditions. But no amount of caution in speaking of the reality of the manhood, and no refinements for which the various schools of Monophysites became famous, could affect their fundamental position, or save it from condemnation. Their interest lay always in so exalting the manhood to a level not its own, or in so explaining away its functions and operations as to secure to the eternal Son, as subject of the assumed humanity, the unfettered use of all His divine powers.

A very great deal of the Monophysite and Monothelite controversies were concerned with a question subsidiary to ours. They had argued for the unlimited Logos as the subject of manhood: it then

[1] Ottley, *Incarnation*, Vol. II, pp. 113 ff.; 127 ff. Dorner, Div. 2, Vol. I, pp. 79 ff.; 121 ff.; 156 ff. Bruce, *ibid.*, pp. 67 ff.

behoved them to determine how and to what extent a human will could exist side by side with a divine will, without introducing at least a logical possibility of disagreement between the divine and human wills in action. They looked at the manhood, that is to say, from the Cyrilline position: and instead of revising the theory of Cyril, they sought to remove from the manhood the obstacles to its interpretation in accordance with his teaching.

So Peter Lombard,[1] in the twelfth century, arrived at his theory that the assumed manhood had no effect at all upon Him who assumed it. It is merely a veil: an instrument: to be taken and used for the purposes of revelation and redemption. Peter was alarmed at a growing tendency to postulate of the Incarnate a composite personality: a teaching to which we must shortly allude: and in his zeal to maintain the Catholic doctrine he reduced the manhood to a shadow, so that the Incarnation ceased to be the coming of the Son of God in human flesh.

With these theories must, I think, be classed the Christology of the Lutheran Church in its first days.[2]

Their view was based on a theory of the union of the two natures of the Incarnate as necessitating a mutual communication of properties; and all the stress came to be laid upon the reception by the

[1] See Dorner, Div. 2, Vol. I, pp. 310 ff. Ottley, Vol. II, pp. 199 ff. Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 175 ff.

[2] Bruce, pp. 82 ff. Dorner, Div. 2, Vol. II, pp. 266 ff.

manhood of divine powers. This stress was largely due to the desire to establish the doctrine of the real presence of the humanity of Christ in the Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist. The Lutherans thought to make this dogma the more easy of acceptance by ascribing to the manhood the attribute of ubiquity. Thus the manhood of Jesus was said practically to possess the divine quality of omnipresence. Of course no such glorification of the manhood could stop short at one attribute; and ultimately the manhood of the Incarnate was made to possess a majesty that is really divine. The theologians, it is true, did not agree as to the extent to which this majesty was revealed in action; but their theory fails because it postulates the possession of such majesty, with the divine attributes that go to constitute it. Such a manhood would cease to be manhood, as men use the term; and the Incarnate, had He so deified His humanity, would have deprived Himself of His one link with the race that He came to represent, and by representing to redeem.

Thus did the Athanasian doctrine of the manner of the Incarnation develope. First, the subject of the manhood is the eternal Son, occasionally limiting His powers. Then in the Cyrilline school it is the eternal Son in unlimited exercise of His powers at all times; powerfully willing to submit Himself to certain physical laws proper to the flesh. With the Cyrilline position is postulated a manhood that is not subject

to the normal limitations of humanity. And thirdly there is the ever-growing tendency to exalt the manhood, denying limitation after limitation, until it comes to have almost nothing in common with our own, except human birth, and tangible, passible flesh. And alongside with this is the condemned tendency to make the manhood disappear in the glory of the divine operation, so that for all practical purposes it is not a second abiding nature of the Son at all.

Here we must leave this particular class of attempts to find a subject of the manhood of the Christ.

It is by far the most luminous class: it contains within it all the teachers to whose doctrines we cling to-day. But I hope I have made it a little clear that, when all is said, no one of them has discovered for us the true content of the ego, or subject, of the Saviour's humanity.

The truth which must be maintained is that the manhood is revealed to us in the Scriptures; that it is through the manhood that we move to God; and no doctrine of the manner of the Incarnation will finally satisfy us that takes its start from a preconceived view of the Godhead, to which we have no right, rather than from our acceptance of the revelation of God in manhood, which has been conceded to our weakness and ignorance.

CHAPTER IV

THE DIVINE-HUMAN

THE opposite position to that which St. Athanasius defended, and from which St. Cyril made his advance, is marked by a tendency to postulate as the subject of the manhood in Christ a human individual, intimately associated with the divine Logos. Failing this, men were inclined to assume a composite nature or composite will, through which the Incarnate might manifest His dual activity. There is no attempt in the early centuries to predicate a real, continuous limiting of the divine prerogatives. To the early Christologians the unchangeableness of the divine nature and the remoteness of God from the level of His creatures were dogmas of the first rank. One mystery of the Incarnation lies for them in the condescension of the Most High to union with men: any further self-humiliation lay outside the field of their imagination. Thus all who might be dissatisfied with the Athanasian statement, or averse from the Cyrilline doctrine, naturally looked for relief to the discovery of some human, or partly human, subject of the Incarnate's

manhood; a subject that could be so associated with the divine Logos Himself as to save any duality of persons in the one Christ; if that indeed were a possibility.

I

It will be best first to consider the most extreme theory on this side. It is that made famous by Nestorius and his followers, but it owes its leading ideas and their development to the teachers of the Antiochene school of thought; and chiefly to Theodore of Mopsuestia.[1]

The Antiochene characteristics were a love of logic, a literal interpretation of the Scriptures, and a reverence for humanity as such. In this they were opposed to the reverence for mystery, the mystic use of Scripture, and the Platonic indifference to the flesh that marked the Alexandrian school of Greek thought.

They approached the Incarnation from the human side and argued, as it were, upwards. Granted a humanity that is real and complete, they argued to a human individual, real and true; and thence they proceeded to study the phenomena of the Christ. He is truly human; He must in some way admit of the presence of a human person; how, then, can He be God? The answer was found in the theory of a moral union: the association of Jesus the son of

[1] Bright, *St. Leo on the Incarnation*, pp. 159 ff. Ottley, *Incarnation*, Vol. II, pp. 68 ff. Dorner, Div. 2, Vol. I. pp. 25 ff.

Mary with the eternal Logos: an association the basis of which is the actual moral identity of the will of Jesus with the divine will of the Logos. This association was granted to Jesus from the first moment of His being, because of the great holiness that had been foreseen by God to be His; it carried with it the previous grace of a sinless birth, it was sealed and deepened at the baptism in Jordan, and it became perfected at the ascension into Heaven.

But Theodore would not admit that Christ was two persons. So close was the union, so identical were the wills, that the Logos and Jesus were not two but one; even as man and wife are one flesh.

As taught and popularized by Nestorius[1] this doctrine was quickly condemned. For he did not so maintain the association of Jesus with the Logos as to confess that God came forth from Mary's womb. To that point he would not go: and in his refusal to make the advance he shewed how far he had lost sight of the oneness of the Incarnate Son.

Catholic theologians were able to advance most powerful arguments against this position. They could prove that, on this theory, one man only was assumed and redeemed; that manhood at large still awaited a saviour. It became clear that between the positions of Theodore and Nestorius there was no real difference; that association and moral identity can never make two individualities one.

[1] Dorner, Div. 2, Vol. I, pp. 52 ff. Ottley, Vol. II, pp. 70 ff. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, pp. 46 ff.

But what they failed to do was to find the true solution of the difficulty that had baffled the Antiochene teachers: they could not find a true subject of the manhood of Christ.

II

Hence the thought that underlay the Antiochene tendency, though restrained from Nestorian channels, continued to make its way in the Church. We must notice one famous reappearance of it in the eighth century under the guise of what was called Adoptionism.[1]

This school of thought entirely disclaimed any connection with Nestorian dogma. It confessed the Catholic Creeds, it acknowledged in the one Christ two complete and perfect natures. But in its practical bearing it inclines to the Nestorian view. The position taken up is marked by two main propositions. (1) The manhood in the Christ is so real that it must possess an ego of its own; for since manhood differs from deity, the ego of manhood in Christ must be of different content from the ego of His divine nature. (2) Christ is one person only: one ego: the divine Son of God.

The reconciliation of these two opposite propositions led the Adoptionists, under Felix of Urgellis, to their peculiar doctrine. They held that the Son of God took manhood from Mary's womb, but that the

[1] See Dorner, Div. 2, Vol. I, pp. 248 ff. Ottley, Vol. II, pp. 151 ff.

Son assumed with the manhood a human individuality. This human individuality was at the moment of the conception in the womb so closely united with the eternal Son as to constitute, with Him and in Him, the Son of Man, who may be called divine. But this Son of Man is not to be regarded as by nature divine Son of God: rather it is by divine favour and adoption that He became Son at the Incarnation.

Thus the Incarnate Son may be contemplated either as Son of God by nature, for He is the divine Word of the Father; or as Son of God by adoption, for He is the true Son of Man, made man for our sakes: but in fact and ultimately He is one and the same divine Ego.

All this is of course most unsatisfactory, and the view of the personality of the assumed manhood is full of danger. Yet we can appreciate the insight that shewed men where to look for the subject of the human nature of the Christ. Felix saw that the Cyrilline position concerning the divinity of the Incarnate was impregnable, and on this he took his stand. He also saw that Nestorian views of the assumption of a human person by the Logos were untenable. He therefore sought to find within the being of the one divine person of the Incarnate some means of postulating of the manhood a divine ego that should be of a content commensurate with the humanity assumed. Not that he in any way foresaw the Kenotic view as held to-day, or foreshadowed it; but he did apparently see that it is to the Person of

the Logos that we must look for some act of loving condescension that will bring Him to the level upon which He can be the real, permanent subject of a complete manhood.

It was of course an unthinkable distinction that he drew, within the divine Ego, between the Son of God who is divine by nature, and the Son of God who is Son of Man, divine only by adoption. Still more unthinkable is the conception of the union of the Son of God with individual manhood which goes to constitute the Son of Man. But Felix deserves to have the credit for the true thought that he was given, and which he has handed on : the thought that while the subject of the manhood is divine, He need not fully exercise all divine powers.

With the many refinements of Adoptionism that were made we are in no way concerned.

III

Preceding the Adoptionists in time but vaguely allied with them on the side of emphasizing the completeness and reality of the manhood assumed by the Logos come certain sects of Monothelites. They are of course the children of the Monophysites proper ; and their theories are many. But in this connection we are only interested in the theory of the composition of the will of the Incarnate.

This theory may merely mean the united activity of two wills, which being constituted in one person may

be regarded as acting with one single operation in the power of the divine nature. But it may mean, and actually came to mean with the parties whose teaching we are considering, one single will composed of the divine will of the Logos and the human will assumed with manhood in Mary's womb. This composition of wills was not, of course, effected instantaneously at the Incarnation. It was due to the growing moral identity of the human will with the divine will ; and was therefore a matter of time the human will developing in power and sanctity, according to human laws but in the power of the Logos who had assumed it. Thus the Incarnate came to possess one divine-human will, more than human and not purely divine.

This theory affords, it is true, an instance of that Monophysitism to which we referred in our discussion of the Cyrilline position ; but it is inserted here as marking the road along which men came to the conception of a divine-human person within the Incarnate sphere, a divine-human subject of the manhood of Christ. For men came to think of the Incarnate as if He were the product of a composition of the divine Logos and a human person in whom the manhood is constituted : a divine-human person produced by the act of the Son in becoming incarnate.

The postulates on which this theory is based are these. First, manhood must be personal if it is real. The manhood assumed by the eternal Son is

real and complete, therefore it is personal. Little or no emphasis need be laid upon the person or subject of it: for in fact he is assumed by the Ego of the Logos in the very act by which he is conceived in the womb of the mother, Mary. He has no existence apart from the Logos.

Secondly, this human ego, although associated with the Logos must develope on normal human lines, as befits one possessing a normal human soul and body. Thus primarily he will be conscious of himself as a babe; next as a child, though he will, no doubt, have a secret instinct of divinity in a small degree. As he grows in soul his consciousness developes, and he comes to know himself and the Logos as the determination of himself, as the complement of the full conception of himself. This consciousness becomes perfect so soon as his manhood has attained the full measure of its stature and wisdom.

Thirdly, the divine Logos must limit Himself in such a way as to leave the human consciousness free. He cannot, as Incarnate, be fully conscious until the day of the perfection of His manhood. Then it is that He first knows Himself and humanity as the determination of Himself. Then it is also that He can fully reveal Himself through manhood.

Upon these postulates we are given the theory of the Incarnate as a divine-human person. He is one person in two individual, personal natures; with one self-consciousness proper to neither nature

by itself, but to both in composition. For as having assumed a human individuality He knows Himself as man in Godhood, and as the divine Logos incarnate He knows Himself as God in manhood; which is said ultimately to amount to knowing Himself as one divine-human person, whose being is constituted in the composition of the divine nature with an individual manhood.

This more or less is the theory developed by Dorner in his great work on Christology.[1] I say more or less: for his statement of his views is neither clear nor systematic. The striking doctrines of this theory are three. First, the divine-human personality, neither merely divine nor really human: secondly, the assumption of personal manhood by the Logos; and, thirdly, the gradual growth in consciousness, or the gradual increasing incarnation of the Word. For the Incarnation is not to be considered complete until the Incarnate has begun to express Himself before the Father in and through His manhood, however much that manhood may limit Him.

These doctrines will be found to mark certain of the extreme Kenotic theories. But as their exponents are important to us for their attempt to argue a self-abandonment by the eternal Son of some of His divine attributes, in order to allow Him to act as subject of the manhood, I think it better to defer my references to their teaching until the next

[1] Div. 2, Vol. III, 248–50, 253–60, etc.

chapter. Some of them might well be classed here with those who claim to have discovered a divine-human person in the Christ; but of greater moment is their Kenotic theory. Therefore, at the risk of spoiling the logical division of my subject, I venture to omit them here.

It remains to offer some general remarks in criticism of the views we have had under our notice.

(i) In the first place, I think the fundamental error of all who seek a human or divine-human subject of manhood lies in the false belief that the ego of manhood must, in some sense, be necessarily a man. The Antiochene teachers could not conceive of any one who was not a man exercising human functions humanly and completely; and in this failure they had many followers. Now it may be strongly argued that the ego of manhood in Christ may be superhuman. Provided that His personality possesses all the attributes of human personality as its minimum content, and provided that all His characteristic powers that exceed this human measure can, in some way, be limited, restrained, and controlled, there is no evident reason why such a superhuman person should not be the ego of manhood in the Incarnate. If man be God's image, may not the Son of God be presumed to possess, at least, all those characteristics that mark man's ego or personality?

We know ourselves as made in God's image; we recognize the unity of divine and human life and

action; we can see no necessary obstacle to the assumption by God of human nature. Man knows himself to be the centre of his own world; he interprets phenomena in the light of his own self-consciousness; judges events by his own experience; and is to himself an end. But the moment he finds God, or is found of Him, he gladly surrenders to Him the throne of his own little kingdom, realizing that God rules the universe and him on lines differing only in degree of power and goodness from his own; and he is content to hold his own realm as a tributary prince. In so surrendering himself to God, he perceives no break in the continuity of his life, and no essential divergence in method; he merely apprehends the ideal of which he sees himself and his own method to be an imperfect copy. The more he investigates the methods that obtain in the two kingdoms, the more is he aware of their real identity; an identity that he can explain in so far as he knows himself to be really and vitally the image of God.

For this reason he does not feel hindered from applying to God the terms of the highest category known to himself and in which he would class himself: the category of personality. He by no means claims to speak adequately of God in such terms; but all that these terms connote is the least possible that he will postulate of his God.

Hence it becomes possible for him to conceive of the manhood of the Incarnate as sufficiently consti-

tuted in a Person who is divine, if so be he can also postulate of the divine Person some actual and continuous self-restraint or self-limitation, so as to allow for the full activities of the assumed humanity.

The difficulty of this view lies chiefly in the conception of such a self-limitation on the part of the eternal Son: a conception that will come before us as we investigate theories of the Kenotic school. It is enough to note here that it was probably owing to this difficulty that the earlier Christologians, of whom we have been thinking, departed so far from the orthodox position.

(ii) Secondly, with regard to the impersonal manhood assumed by our Lord Jesus Christ, it would seem to follow that if a divine Person may so limit His proper powers as to act adequately as the ego of manhood, there is no reason why the human nature taken of Mary, that is, the flesh with its proper human soul, should not have been constituted in Him as its proper self. Thus never for a moment was there any need for a self besides Him, nor was the manhood ever really impersonal. In the moment of its conception it found itself in the Incarnate, who is its true ego or subject.

We, indeed, are lamentably ignorant of the significance of self as distinct from the soul: but it does not seem improper to argue that whatever is the ego or subject in which soul and body constitute one individual, in the case of the Christ the ego is the eternal Son of God. Thus it becomes clear in what

sense we may say that God became man. From the moment that it began to be, the manhood of Christ was personal, constituted in the person of the self-limited Logos, so as to be a very true, real, and complete manhood. And in the measure that the Logos did truly limit Himself so as to be the adequate subject of manhood, He did truly and really become man; not a man, but man.

Only let it be remembered that He is always true God, Son of God, Word of the Father.

This line of thought reminds us of the importance of emphasizing the fact that in the Incarnate the manhood is united with the divine Person, and not primarily with the divine nature. We may not think of the Son of God as so distinct from His eternal substance as to be able to effect the union of His proper nature with the assumed nature, and to act upon either as He pleases. Rather must we say that He who is eternally the subject, or ego, of the nature of the divine Son willed to become, at the same time, the subject or ego of human nature. Thus the two natures meet in the one Person; the Person is not, as it were, outside the two natures, controlling them from without. The divine Son and His eternal nature are inseparable except in thought. The act of becoming incarnate is His personal, divine act mediated by His divine nature. So that in analysing the Incarnate it is better to see in Him only God the Son and the manhood that He took; it is a mistake, fraught with grave danger, to see in Him God the

Son, and the divine nature, and the assumed manhood. God the Son is the Son Himself in His divine nature. It may be legitimate to differentiate actions proper to His divine nature from actions that are proper only to human nature, but it is impossible to conceive the Incarnate performing any the least human action without the divine nature. Personal action is action based upon the functions of the nature which is at once the determination of our self and the medium of our self-expression. Christ conditioned His divine nature when He became incarnate, but He did not divorce Himself from it.

(iii) In the third place, against all theories of composition of personality in the Christ very strong objections may be advanced.

First, they all require for their success the assumption of a period of development during which the human element of the unity grew to the state of perfection necessary to its true union with the divine. The perfect union does not date from the conception in Mary's womb. No teacher of this school would allow that the child at Mary's knee was really conscious of himself and of the Logos as the determination of himself. The growth was slow, it followed normal physical laws, and for all practical purposes the true divine-human consciousness dated from the baptism of Christ in the Jordan.

The Logos either restrained Himself or was self-abandoned during a period of years while the man-

hood developed towards its perfect stature: the consciousness of the human personality, as it were, ever advancing in apprehension of the Logos: until finally the Logos found manhood a fit medium of self-expression, and the human personality lost itself in the Logos. Thus there resulted the one divine-human person.

Such a theory breaks down, for it would follow from it that He who died upon the Cross had not the same Ego as He who was nursed by Mary. It cannot, then, be successfully maintained that it is merely a question of development, degree or measure: the question is, was the self-consciousness of the Child Jesus different in kind from the divine-human self-consciousness of the Crucified and Risen Christ? Now this theory can only be understood by suggesting that, during the days of childhood, there were two distinct centres of consciousness—the Logos who was waiting for the perfecting of the manhood that He might win to His divine-human personality, and the child Jesus who was waiting for his own perfecting that he might be fully conscious of himself as divine-human.

There is, I think, no escape from this duality. For however much the Logos hides His powers or lays them aside, He is still the Logos; and however close the union of the human child with the Logos, he is still a human child. It is only at the level marked by the attainment of perfection by His manhood that the Incarnate becomes the subject of a compo-

site consciousness. Thus round these two centres we may assume the action of two distinct wills; the divine will of the Logos and the human will of the child Jesus: for the quiescence of the divine will is not its non-existence. It is there, however complete its inactivity.

Of what nature, then, is the composite, divine-human personality? Of what kind is the composite will? Is there no danger of confusing the idea of unity of essential being with the idea of unity of moral likeness? We cannot conceive the resultant, composite unity except as a third term, where only two are possible. It may be a new kind of personality, in which case it will be out of place in the doctrine of the union of God and man; or by a clever change of names we may speak of Christ as divine-human, when in fact He is still only human and divine.

Secondly, the logical issue of these theories is Nestorianism. It is not to the point that their authors condemn Nestorius and all his tenets: a theory is judged not by the professions of its author but by the logical direction of its doctrine. Any theory that aims at a composite personality as the subject of Christ's manhood has at its base the assumption by the Logos of a single human individuality. Thus, with Nestorianism it provides for the redemption of one man, not for the redemption of the race.

An attempt is made to escape from the consequences of this position, and so from the old argu-

ment that killed Nestorianism. It is increasingly felt that the assumption by the Son of God of a human individual does not necessarily exclude the race from redemption. The modern world rightly refuses to accept any exclusive view of human personality, holding rather the corporate, social view of the individual man. The brotherhood of man, held as a scientific truth, seems to open the way to the belief that one individual might conceivably be exalted to the universal level, and become the centre of a redeemed race. Against such a view it seems almost enough to advance the experience of mankind. For apart from our theorizings the exaltation of one or another has never carried with it any the least pledge of the exaltation of the family, the tribe, or the race. Nor has the inspiration of this genius or that necessarily brought with it any increase in general knowledge or culture. The Jewish people are a standing witness to the contrary. Had the selection and inspiration of the few been able to raise the mass, the Jews would have had no need of a saviour. But their holy ones passed away, leaving the race in its darkness: and that because the isolation, illumination, and empowering of any one member of the race has never so far produced on any large scale the advance of the whole race in insight and moral courage. Though human personality is not exclusive, it most certainly is not universally inclusive.

And lastly, a very strong objection to these theories arises from the doctrine of the Atonement.

The eternal Son came to be the mediator between God and man; to be at once our High-Priest, our new Life, and our King. His purpose was to take our manhood, and in it to obey the divine law, by it to make atonement for sin with sacrifice, with it to enter the Holiest of Holies, and through it to raise us to the level of sonship. Upon this new level we were to learn how to perfect penitence and to accomplish obedience by virtue of our communion with His divine life brought to us in His manhood. Thus there was to come into being a new race, whose life is His life, and whose law is His divine will: a race of which He is at once a member and the Head, as He is both its creator and its re-creator.

It is, then, of the first importance that His divine personality should stand out, clear and certain, as the one subject of His manhood. For as man He is our Priest; but our Priest is divine. As man He is our sacrifice, but our sacrifice came down from heaven. That is to say, the "infinite worth" of the atoning sacrifice lies in the fact that He who became incarnate, who suffered, died, and rose again, is the eternal Son of God. We may postulate limitations of divine power, we may imagine restraint of divine prerogatives; but we are bound to maintain the simple divinity of the Crucified.

Again, since the atoning sacrifice lies not only in the Passion and Crucifixion, but in the whole act of obedience that was spread over a period of some thirty-three years, it seems necessary to demand that

the person who offers obedience during all those years should be one and the same. It is impossible to suppose that the obedient child of Nazareth had a self-consciousness different in kind from that of the Crucified. To make such a supposition is to bring into the Gospel story a double personality of the Christ, if not two Christs; it is to draw a line between what happened before the baptism in Jordan and all that followed it.

Yet once again, the Scriptural doctrine of the Atonement knows only two terms to the union: as it were, two parties only to the new covenant. On the one side God: on the other side man; and the point of union is He who, being God, became man while abiding in His divine state. The mediator is He who can at one and the same moment act as subject or ego to the divine nature against which sin has been committed, and to the manhood which is guilty of the sin. He it is who is able to mediate: exhibiting, in His own single person, God to man and man to God.

But if for the divine person of the mediator we substitute one who is divine-human, composite, neither merely God nor truly man, we rob the Atonement of its meaning. For such an one is not God to us: for every manifestation of Him is a manifestation not of the divine nor of the divine as conditioned in manhood, but of something that we can only call divine-human. So, too, He is not man to God: for before God He exhibits not the human,

nor the human as aided by divinity, but something that we can only call divine-human. An arbitrator from outside such an one might be: a mediator who is of both he could never be.

Thus, then, we leave these most perplexing theories that are so difficult to classify and to analyse. We have, I hope, at least seen this, that no attempt to postulate a divine-human subject of manhood can bring us peace; and that to suggest a human subject is to deny the true Incarnation of the Son of God.

CHAPTER V

THE SELF-ABANDONED LOGOS

THE Kenotic theories as to the manner of the Incarnation will occupy us in this chapter. I have hinted that in a certain sense some of them logically belong to the class of theories that aim at a divine-human subject of the manhood. But in so much as the whole doctrine so advanced depends upon the abandonment by the eternal Son of some at least of His divine powers and prerogatives, I have thought it better to class them together. And perhaps, even logically, my action is defensible. For what is primary to the Kenotic position is not the divine-human personality, which some Kenotists would deny to exist, but the deliberate act of self-sacrifice of the eternal Son with a view to His becoming the adequate subject of the manhood He willed to assume. This act lies behind everything; and the realization of it is the basis of the dogma of the Incarnation as conceived by these teachers, and the key to the mystery of the union of the divine and human natures in the one Christ.

The main thesis may be considered according to

the degree in which an abandonment of divine attributes by the eternal Son is demanded.

I

The normal Kenotic theory asserts on the part of the eternal Son an abandonment of certain attributes of the Godhead that are evident to us only in the outward activities of God. Omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence are so apparent: and they have been termed the physical attributes of the Godhead. The moral attributes are those which are in eternal exercise apart from the activities of God towards creation. For the Logos, therefore, to abandon the physical attributes is not to withdraw from the Godhead as such, nor to surrender His place within the divine Being; but it does mean his withdrawal from the activities of God towards all creation, and it involves the cessation of His functions as the eternal Word during the period of His life on earth.

On the other hand, the abandonment of these physical attributes is said to enable Him to act adequately, and within the necessary limits, as subject of manhood; while the possession and duly restrained exercise of His moral attributes render Him, in fact, the true Light of the world.

As we have said, there is a tendency in some writers to over-emphasize the personality of the manhood assumed, so that it is implied that the Logos

associated with Himself a human personality, and as the result of the Incarnation there appeared a new, composite person, neither purely divine nor purely human, but divine-human. The Incarnate is conscious, not as man, but as a man.

This type of Kenosis is illustrated in the writings of Thomasius,[1] who lived in the middle of the last century. And so far as the theory of self-abandonment is concerned it is found in the Christology of Dr. Fairbairn.

The critics of Thomasius saw that in fact he had postulated a dual consciousness of the Incarnate. For He must be self-conscious as a divine person, in spite of the abandonment of His powers; and He is also self-conscious as a man. Gess avoided this pitfall, but by a theory that seems contrary alike to the Scriptures and the Creeds. He held that the eternal Son laid aside, not only the physical attributes of the divine nature, but the moral attributes as well; that, in fact, He ceased for thirty-three years from His existence within the divine Being, thus laying aside all self-consciousness as the Son of God. The eternal Son during the period of His Incarnation upon earth did not receive the divine essence by the eternal act of divine generation, nor did He mediate the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father. So self-abandoned, the Logos became the human soul of the Christ. And thus the Christ is one person, of one single consciousness.

[1] For authors referred to in this chapter see Appendix, note v.

Godet has made us familiar with the name of Gess. He will not at all follow him in his Apollinarian views of the soul of Christ. But he does strongly teach the cessation of the Word from His existence within the divine Being during the period of the earthly life. The considerations that he urges are that the life of the Son in the bosom of the Father is a matter of love only, not of necessity; and that all which the Father does by the mediation of His Word He can effect immediately, while the Son is incarnate upon earth. The Father acts as and for the Word.

But this attempt to avoid the dual consciousness of the self-abandoned, Incarnate Word is too bold to succeed. Many who will accept the self-abandonment of physical attributes within the sphere of the Incarnation cannot at all see their way to acknowledge a cessation of the Logos from His cosmic functions.

Hence comes the theory that the eternal Word continued always in His activities in the universe; but that relatively, within the sphere of the Incarnation, He actually abandoned His physical attributes and constituted Himself the subject of His true humanity. But as Incarnate He has a new kind of consciousness, neither purely human nor purely divine; it is unique, partaking both of the divine and the human. Thus we arrive at a new, unique person, the result of the Incarnation, possessed of one consciousness and one will.

This theory has been clearly stated and strongly maintained by Professor Clarke, of New York, in his recent treatise on Systematic Theology. We notice that it is, in fact, a Monothelite Christ whom he preaches, and that the subject of the manhood is a new, unique, composite, divine-human person; but we may at least be glad that the Professor believes that the functions of the Logos are permanent and that the Saviour was miraculously born.

II

So far, then, we have been describing the more extreme forms of Kenotic theory. The next type that demands our attention is that represented by the system of the Danish professor, Martensen.

He has this in common with those we have mentioned, that he divides the divine attributes into the physical and the moral. Like Professor Clarke he refuses to accept the idea that the Logos can cease from His cosmic functions. But his Kenotic theory does not require a complete abandonment of divine powers. The main points on which he insists are these. The Logos lives a double life: He continues in His full life of glory and divine activity as the Word of the Father, and within the sphere of the Incarnation He also lives a life of limitation and poverty, marked by the renunciation of all true exercise of the physical attributes of Godhead.

The Incarnate is a man, the self-revelation of the

divine Logos; but His fulness from which we receive is not merely that of His human nature but of His divine nature. He emptied His fulness into the mean form of a servant, and so perfected Himself. In fact, He possessed His Deity under the conditions imposed by a human individuality, in the limited form of a human consciousness. Thus in the Christ we see not the naked God, but the fulness of the deity framed in the ring of humanity, and the physical attributes of Godhead are in some sense perfected and vitalized by their expression in terms of humanity.

Thus the Christ is one, with one, single divine-human consciousness. This consciousness He had not in His mother's womb; He arrived at it by passing through a preliminary consciousness of Himself as a human person.

In all this we see an advance in the idea of Kenosis: the eternal Son remains master of His powers, however He may restrain them; and the emptying of them is not the putting of them away, but the pouring of them into a personal manhood, in the measure in which they could be assimilated.

But we are startled at the continual references to a human person, a human individuality, and consciousness as a man. It seems that Martensen did not quite avoid the danger of postulating a composite personality, and some of his language suggests that he regarded the Logos as the soul of the Christ's humanity.

The implication that divine attributes of the physical order are perfected by expression in manhood may be accounted for by his theory that the Logos has eternal relations with creation; relations which at first existed in essence only, but later were manifest in visible form. Thus the Incarnation of the Word is really the crown of His self-expression as the eternal Word. The completeness of the divine Being required, as it were, the manifestation of the divine world-activities in terms of creation. There is, of course, the authority of St. John τό be quoted for this idea,[1] but not, I think, for the corollary of Martensen. To this we must return later.

It is, I think, possible to find in Martensen's view of the Kenosis something of the teaching of those Calvinistic divines who maintained what was called the Reformed Christology as against the Lutheran ubiquitarians.[2] The parallel does not extend very far perhaps, but it exists on the side of insistence on the reality of the humanity of our Lord in its proper limitations, and in the possession by the Logos of the divine powers that He would not use except in a human measure. The real advantage of this view of the Kenosis is that it leaves to the Logos as Incarnate the ultimate power over Himself. Thomasius and the extreme Kenotists place the act of self-emptying outside the sphere of the Incarnation. He

[1] John 1. 3. See Westcott *in loc.* See R.V. margin.

[2] See Dorner, Div. 2, Vol. II, pp. 338 ff. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, pp. 114 ff.

who is incarnate actually does not possess in any sense, as Incarnate, the divine powers that are proper to Him as eternal Logos. But Martensen will not admit this view, nor can it be reconciled with his thought that the divine world-activities of the Logos are to be clothed in a human form.

III

Bishop Gore has spoken with some favour of Martensen's view of the actual Kenosis, but he sees difficulties in the way of conceiving the double life. He appears to follow the line that leads to the conception of the Logos as remaining in supreme control over His divine powers, regarding Him as abandoning their use entirely within the limited sphere of the Incarnation: those divine powers, that is, which may be supposed to be incompatible with the proper development of His manhood. Thus with the extreme Kenotics he can practically differentiate the moral attributes from the physical; but with Martensen he refuses to postulate a cessation of the Logos from His cosmic functions; and he marks off a state within which he argues for a relative abandonment by the Logos of His physical attributes.

The Bishop is, of course, entirely clear in his assertion of the true divinity of the person of the Incarnate, His miraculous birth of the Virgin Mary, and the constitution of the manhood in the Logos

Himself, conceived as self-abandoned of powers incommensurate with humanity.

Briefly stated, the Bishop's theory is this: The eternal Son in His cosmic position as Logos continued in the full possession and exercise of His divine prerogatives and powers. But within a certain sphere, for a fixed period, for a definite purpose, He willed to abandon some of those prerogatives and powers, and to live, entirely and personally, under conditions of manhood identical with our own, except as to sin. Of this abandonment the purpose is our redemption and the motive His infinite love.

Thus we are to think of Him as being actually ignorant, and, in matters unconnected with His mission, accepting and holding the views of His contemporaries. But in all that concerns His work of redemption, He is to be acknowledged and obeyed as an infallible Teacher, the true, divine Light of the world.

It is to be inferred from Bishop Gore's theory that as Incarnate the eternal Son had so stripped Himself of omniscience and other attributes of the same class that He could adequately serve as ego to His assumed manhood; and, in fact, had a human consciousness. But there is no hint that the Son of God had assumed a human individuality. There is no talk of personal manhood. Dr. Gore seems to mean that the Incarnate knows Himself as Son of God in manhood, through the medium of His human soul.

The difficulty of this view to me lies in the dual conception of the Logos as unlimited and as self-abandoned. It seems possible to argue that the Word as self-abandoned has a different self-consciousness from the eternal Word as unlimited; and that the self-emptied Son as conditioned by manhood requires a form of self-consciousness that is different from both. In the first case, we have divine self-consciousness; in the second, one that is so far from being fully divine that we can only term it impoverished divine; and in the third case we have what the Bishop calls human consciousness, meaning in fact divine consciousness impoverished and then conditioned in manhood.

So that even if we shut out from the sphere of the Incarnation the conception of the unlimited Logos as fully conscious of His divine Self and position, we are still face to face with two centres of consciousness in the Incarnate: the one in which He knows Himself as self-impoverished divine—knows Himself, that is, as less than Himself; the other, in which He knows Himself as self-impoverished divine conditioned by manhood. It seems to me that we must make this logical distinction, and, once made, we have robbed the theory of its practical advantage and, therefore, of its only appeal.

What is needed, I think, is some such conception of the manner of the Incarnation as will unify the act of limitation and the act of accepting the conditions of manhood, so that the only knowledge that

He shall have of Himself as less than Himself is that which comes to Him through His recognition of human conditions. But such a conception would rule out all theories of self-abandonment of attributes as opposed to self-limitation in the exercise of divine powers.

To postulate an initial act of self-abandonment is to postulate His self-consciousness as self-abandoned Logos: as it were a kind of midway halting-place between the unlimited Logos and the Man Christ Jesus our Lord. This becomes plainer if we consider the unborn Babe. He is, practically, devoid of consciousness as conditioned in manhood: His human soul is, practically, inoperative. He may not, by hypothesis, be conscious as unlimited Logos, for He is in the sphere of the Incarnation. Hence we have a new self-consciousness as self-abandoned Logos which will ultimately be merged in His self-consciousness as Son of God conditioned by manhood.

Thus the theory of Bishop Gore seems to suffer from the same weakness as that of Thomasius; and there will always be a danger of a Godet arising to deprive the Logos of all self-consciousness; or of a Clarke, who will postulate a single, composite, divine-human consciousness, in order to avoid this dual consciousness.

IV

It is now possible to offer some general remarks upon the theories to which I have drawn attention.

And at the outset it should be noticed how much indebted the Church is in fact to the Kenotists for the thought that the subject of manhood must be sought for in the Logos conceived as self-limited. These writers have made it a commonplace of Christology that there is a permanent ego of the manhood whose self-consciousness is of different content from that of the divine Son in His freedom and glory; and yet He is one and the same in essence. That is to say, they have made us familiar with the thought that the self-limitation of the Son is real and permanent. It is easy to forget the debt that we owe to them; it is even easy to refuse to acknowledge it because of our dislike of some of their theories. But the fact is that their main doctrine is an axiom of our modern Christology, although there was a time when such a view would have been regarded as in the highest degree rash and presumptuous.

Of course it is quite another matter to accept their measure of the self-limitation of the Son. For here the choice is seen to lie between a continuous act of self-restraint at the one extreme, and at the other a single, final act of self-abandonment of divine prerogatives. And where the choice is so wide, the scope for a wrong choice is very large.

(1) My first criticism of the extreme Kenotic view is that it takes us outside the Gospel revelation and the Apostolic interpretation of it.

The general tendency of the New Testament is towards the doctrine of the permanence of the universal life and cosmic functions of the eternal Word. The Pauline doctrine of the Son is that He is the expression of God, the divine self-manifestation, from whom all things come, in whom all things are, and to whom all things move. Without Him the universe would not be. To this the Epistle to the Hebrews also witnesses. And all down the ages the Church has received and maintained that the Word never for a moment ceased from His activity in upholding the creation. If then we are suddenly bidden to revise this doctrine, have we not the right to demand weighty and indisputable evidence based on Scripture? But of such evidence there is not the least trace. Thus we feel justified in putting on one side all those Kenotic theories that carry over the self-emptying of the Logos into the eternal sphere. Of all such opinions we can only say at the best they mark attempts to meet real difficulties, but the solution they offer is in itself more difficult than the original problem.

(2) But what shall we say of a relative self-abandonment? Of a self-abandonment, that is, by the eternal Son of some of His divine attributes within a certain fixed sphere. Is there no Scriptural authority for that?

There is, and there is not. There are passages of St. Paul that can be explained in the light of a moderate, relative Kenosis; but there is no passage that cannot be equally well explained in some other way.

The crucial passage is that in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Philippians.[1] Kenotists interpret it to mean that the eternal Son "emptied Himself" of the prerogatives of equality with God; so emptied Himself as not to possess any divine characteristics which in their judgement are incompatible with the free exercise of the characteristic powers and weaknesses of the human or servile form. He laid aside, rather than conditioned, the divine form of existence, and assumed the human form of existence. Martensen seems to think that the Logos limited His divine powers completely; Bishop Gore is content with no term less than abandonment: He was self-abandoned of His omniscience and omnipotence.

St. Paul, in the passage in question, is presenting our Lord to us as the exemplar of the race in humility. Of what exactly, then, did He empty Himself in order to be a true example of humility? The Apostle contrasts equality with God and a state of servitude; freedom and limitation. There is no evident hint that our Lord laid aside the omnipotence and omniscience of God in order to become man. The Apostle's point seems to be that the eternal

[1] Phil. II. 5-8.

Son deliberately chose to empty Himself of all the characteristics that mark the state of equality with God, and to make His own the characteristics that mark the state of human slavery. The Incarnation meant for Him not only taking our manhood, but assuming the characteristics of slavery.

Now slavery is a purely negative state. It is the state of a man who is by right possessed of all human qualities, but by the accident of his state is prevented from the exercise of them, either in part or altogether. He is at the mercy of his master, whose will may change from day to day, and who may at any moment free his slave from his limitations. Were he to do so, the slave would be found to possess all the proper attributes of manhood. Thus slavery is based, as a state, not on the absence of human rights and powers, but on the absence of the actual liberty to exercise them. Limitation, therefore, and not abandonment, is the keynote of slavery.

For St. Paul, the divine love of the eternal Son is the Master that has constrained Him to enslave Himself in order that men may come to give Him love for love. Under this law of loving self-limitation the Son lives, possessing all His rights as God, but hindered from the exercise of them. The limits of the self-emptying are fixed. A slave cannot part with the essential attributes of manhood: he is merely hindered from the exercise of them. And on this analogy Christ may not be said to have been self-

emptied of any essential attribute of God or Godhead: He merely limited Himself in, or restrained Himself from, the use of the divine powers that are His.

Not more than this can, I think, be certainly deduced from the passage. As quoted by advanced Kenotists it is not valid. It might be patient of the interpretation they put upon it, were they able to support their view by any other Scriptures. But taken alone, we do not feel that it will bear the weight put upon it. Rather, for my own part, I feel that their interpretation of it puts a meaning upon the term slavery that is quite illegitimate.

So again the "self-beggary" of our Lord to which St. Paul alludes in his second Epistle to the Corinthians[1] cannot be quoted as certainly decisive, unless it is proved that no other form of self-limitation, except that which they advocate, is real and true. The text may be taken to cover any act of self-limitation that really affects the eternal Son; any, in fact, that is not merely dramatic.

Therefore, on the whole I am inclined to say that Scripture does not require the so-called Kenotic doctrine of self-abandonment; and that history goes to prove that this interpretation of the particular passages does not lie near the surface.

To say that we cannot explain our view of the Incarnation except by such a complete kenosis of divine attributes as we have examined, and that we

[1] 2 Cor. VIII. 9.

can deduce such a kenosis from the Pauline writings is one thing; but to say that the Pauline passages require such a view of the Kenosis of Christ is quite another thing. And it is the latter statement that requires proof before men as a whole will accept so startling a conception of the Incarnation as is advocated by the advanced Kenotists.

For it is not only our traditional view of the Incarnation that is at stake. With that we might be tempted to part in favour of a fuller, richer, and more living conception of the eternal Son of God in human flesh. But it is the dogma of the unchangeableness of God that must bear the stress of the change. And in the sphere of fundamental dogma no change can for a moment be contemplated that is not demanded by evidence of Scripture so weighty that refusal to accept the new light would become impossible to the seeker after truth. Of course we must remember our ignorance of things divine, our poverty of thought, and our inability to measure the divine love and the divine power. But since we owe these truths to the revelation of which Scripture is our only written witness, we may not desert what we have so authoritatively received at the bidding of men whose position as teachers in the Church has yet to be established.

(3) The thought of how the advanced Kenotic doctrine influences our views as to the Godhead, leads us to consider the distinction that is drawn between God's moral and physical attributes.

It is quite legitimate to distinguish in thought between God as transcendent and God as immanent; between God as He is in Himself and God as He manifests Himself in creation; or between God as He exists in threefold life and God as He expresses Himself in a threefold way. All this is necessary to clear thinking. There is no just cause of complaint against those writers who speak of God as He is in Himself as God the Triunity, or the Godhead; and of God as He is manifested to the universe as God the Trinity, or simply God. Triunity and Trinity: Godhead and God: it is a question of nomenclature, and such a choice of names at least serves to arrest our attention.

But it seems to me to be not a little dangerous to ascribe to God, that is, to God self-manifested, a set of attributes that are not to be ascribed to Him as He is in His eternal nature, that is, to Godhead. We must surely allow that the attributes of God as creator belong to Him essentially, however true it may be that certain qualities are manifested more plainly in the world-activities than in the divine life apart from the world. Otherwise it would be necessary to predicate of God change at the moment of creation. If, then, the world-activities of God are based essentially upon the eternal attributes of Godhead, how is it possible to separate them, even in thought? For the distinction to be made would be in the

degree of their manifestation, and not in the nature of the qualities themselves.

Why, then, are we told that Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Omnipresence belong only to God as self-manifest in the work of creation? Why are they physical as opposed to ethical? Why may the eternal Son lay them aside without violence to His divine nature?

Martensen and Dr. Fairbairn contrast omnipotence and love to the disadvantage of omnipotence. Yet in our own experience the child ascribes omnipotence to the mother in the measure that he loves her. He sees no antithesis: perfect love requires omnipotence, that it may never fail the beloved. So thinks the child.

Surely God's omnipotence is His eternal love, manifested and directed to the fulfilment of the desires of His fatherly Heart; as His omnipresence is His eternal love seeking to unite Himself with all His children; and His omniscience is His love embracing each one of them, holding them to His Heart, knowing them and becoming known of them.

The love of God did not come into action first at the Incarnation: it came under men's observation.

To cut off these great attributes from the essential, eternal love of God is to inflict a grievous harm upon our dogma of the Godhead. It is to render possible a perversion of our view of God's Fatherhood as essential to His being. We must not regard the Incarnation as in any sense perfecting or tempering

the divine attributes in themselves, unless we are prepared ultimately to distinguish the God of the New Testament from the God of the Jews. Surely the truest thought is that God has no accidental attributes that can be laid aside. Even were they accidental in the sense that the existence of creation is an accident, unnecessary to God's essential being, they could not be laid aside when once creation had become an actual fact. In short, God's attributes are in one sense aspects of God Himself. And God cannot abandon aspects of Himself. He may so order things that any particular aspect is lost sight of and hidden; but that is self-limitation and not self-abandonment.

The Omnipotence of God is a figure of speech for His all-conquering, loving will; His Omniscience is the name we give to His personal consciousness of all that is; His Omnipresence is a word-picture describing His necessary relations to His creatures. To my mind we materialize our conception of God and His love if we differentiate the moral from the physical attributes of our Father, except for the purpose of classifying our thoughts of Him and His activities. And any theory of Kenosis that is based upon this distinction is, I think, doomed to rejection. The movement of loving apprehension of God's Fatherhood which has marked the last two or three generations will not be stayed until it has adequately vindicated for God the essentially moral and fatherly character of His omnipotence and omniscience. This

done, the advanced Kenotic theories will be as houses without foundations.

(4) A fourth criticism of the more extreme of these theories arises from the contemplation of the powerless Logos. For on this line of thought we conceive the Logos to have stripped Himself of certain divine attributes, including His omnipotence, and then to have conditioned Himself by the assumption of manhood. As man He exercises no powers that are ultimately incompatible with true humanity, for in fact He does not possess them. It thus becomes difficult to conceive of how He resumed His powers. It is admitted that the state consequent upon His self-abandonment is coterminous with the state of His humiliation on earth; and within that state He has not full divine power. How, then, was He able to exercise His powers again? Surely the fact that He was actually able to do so goes to prove that He never really surrendered His proper attributes, but merely limited Himself in the exercise of His divine powers, the self-limitation remaining in His own power throughout the whole period of His life on earth.

Another reason for taking this view of the matter is that in fact we must still believe the Christ as Head of the Church to be the subject of His glorified humanity, and therefore to some extent limited in His self-expression through manhood. For we may not suppose even glorified humanity to be equal with the divine nature of the Son. If,

then, self-limitation is the characteristic of the heavenly state of the Incarnate, is it not at least probable that it is also the true characteristic of His earthly state? If self-abandonment of divine powers is incompatible with the heavenly glory of the manhood, is it not a little rash to postulate it of the earthly state of humiliation? If possible it is better to conceive the manner of the Incarnate's life on earth to be of one kind with the manner of the same life in heaven. Thus the extreme Kenotic views increase in difficulty as we continue to examine them. It seems clear that if the Logos had once laid aside, completely and entirely, His divine powers in order to enter upon a certain new sphere, He could never have resumed them without going outside that limited sphere. The power necessary to the resumption of the divine attributes could only be His again after He had ceased to live in the limited sphere. In which case the Incarnation has no permanency, and the mediatorial work of Christ is not everlasting. And it is also fairly clear that even if the abandonment is conceived as taking place within the sphere of the Incarnation, so that the power of resuming the divine attributes is always present to the Incarnate; yet at the time of the glorification of the manhood the process of self-abandonment has to be changed to a process of self-limitation.

It is surely a much richer thought that the self-limitation is continuous from the moment of the conception onwards; that at every moment He

willed to live in conditions of manhood, and that in His acceptance of the law that governs this life lies the value of the Incarnation as an act of divine self-sacrifice. In time and through eternity the Christ is God the Son, self-limited in manhood.

(5) The difficulty of postulating a change from self-abandonment to self-limitation at the moment of glorification requires to be considered for another reason.

If the human mind of Christ cannot exist in Him side by side with divine omniscience, in any degree; if the Son must abandon His divine knowledge in order to come to human knowledge; we are at a loss to understand the process by which in the life of glory the Incarnate can resume divine knowledge without laying aside His human knowledge. If the two kinds of knowledge are incompatible, the glorified Christ must cease to exercise His human mind. But if it is only a question of degree, if the two kinds of knowledge are not mutually incompatible, what we ought to postulate of the Incarnate Son is not abandonment of powers, but a real limitation of them in use.

Again, the union of the human mind with the divine is real. It is constituted in the Person of the Son. The advanced Kenotists say that the union was only possible after the Son had ceased to possess divine knowledge as such. What, then, will the effect upon the human mind be of a sudden assumption of divine knowledge on the part of the Incarnate? If

one of the terms of the union be raised, as it were without preparation, to the divine fulness of power, it seems probable that the relationship between it and the second term of the union will prove inadequate. For no measure of glorification given to the manhood will raise it to the level of the Godhead. It seems to me that the common theories of Kenosis make the relations of the Incarnate to His manhood on earth entirely different from those that are His to-day in Heaven. They do not sufficiently allow for the continuity of those relationships which are in fact endless, for beginning at the Saviour's conception in Mary's womb they will last for ever and ever.

Why are men so fond of isolating the thirty-three years of the Saviour's life on earth from the rest of His incarnate existence?

It is, I think, impossible to arrive at the truth of the manner of the Incarnation unless we view the life of the Christ as a whole. It begins in the womb of Mary: it does not end on Mount Olivet. It is the endless life into which the sons and daughters of God are taken by Christ and in which they live in Him and with Him—His mystical body, His Church. Whatever then we postulate of the manner of the incarnate life on earth must bear some relation to the manner of it in Heaven all down the ages. And if the divine glory is in itself, as such, entirely incompatible with the state of humiliation on earth, how does it become compatible with

His life as man in Heaven? Is it not possible, at least, that He may have to remain self-abandoned for ever? This is a serious question, for it affects the union of Christ and His Church: it touches the matter of our own salvation. We can be saved only by the life of the Son of God made man; by the life of God made over to us through manhood; and it is from the divine Saviour in Heaven that we look for aid. But if the fulness of deity cannot exist with manhood, in spite of limitation; if nothing short of abandonment of the divine powers will make possible the union; then we must confess that we have no certainty that in Heaven the divine fulness can be brought to us in and through the glorified manhood.

Of course we are rightly mistrustful of arguments on points that are in a sense outside our ken; but it does seem sufficiently clear that the more advanced Kenotists have taken so partial and local a view of the life of the Incarnate Son as to render their theory inadequate to explain all the facts.

(6) Once more, I am inclined to urge that advanced Kenotists have not sufficiently weighed the meaning of the word human as applied to our Lord's consciousness, experience, and example.

The purpose of their work is to provide us with a conception of a really human Christ: a Christ who is to be a true human example to us, and share our experience. But the word human may carry one of two meanings. It may connote something belonging

to a man; or it may connote something that is proper to manhood. In the former sense it can never be used of our Lord Jesus Christ. His consciousness, experience, and example do not and cannot belong to one who is a man. For He is Himself God, the eternal Son of God; and no measure of self-abandonment will ever make Him anything else but God. But in the second sense, as connoting something proper to manhood, the word human is most rightly applied to our Lord. His human consciousness is His consciousness of Himself as conditioned by manhood, and limited by it; His human experience is His experience of the universe as related to Himself through a human soul alone; and His human example is the example of what perfect manhood can be and can accomplish in divine power.

Which of the two senses is necessary to establish the true humanity of the Christ?

Extreme Kenotists lean to the former sense. They try to humanize the Christ, the divine Person. Thus Godet is content to explain the works that were to prove the divine Sonship of Jesus as "the works which the Father wrought through Him." He and those who think on similar lines have failed to realize that you cannot make God to be Not-God by any process of deprivation of powers. So long as the Ego of the Christ is in any sense divine, Christ is not personally human in any true meaning of the word; and further, a divine Ego conditioned in and working through manhood is still divine. Hence

there is an atmosphere of divinity surrounding the normal life of Christ: something that entirely differentiates Him from all others.

This atmosphere of divinity may be explained as the perfection of manhood: only we must in that case make it clear that perfect manhood is manhood indwelt by God. It is this, I feel, that many Kenotists fail to understand. They do not observe that ideal manhood is not unaided manhood; they are led away by a passion for magnifying humanity.

The measure of the perfection and reality of Christ's manhood is its uttermost dependence upon the divine Ego in whom it was constituted. His manhood is real: real in weakness: real in growth: real in its proper limitations of knowledge and power: and as real in its inability to attain its perfection apart from the power of Deity. Perfect humanity is God-aided humanity.

(7) The last remark that suggests itself as having a bearing on the Kenotic position concerns the use of the word state in describing the Incarnation.

There is a tendency to divide off the state or sphere of the universal functions of the eternal Logos from the state or sphere of the Incarnation, as one field may be fenced off from another field. It is not that the distinction is made only in thought, for the better study of one sphere or the other; but in fact men appear to conceive of a gulf between the two spheres, which gulf the Logos

could only cross at the cost of certain of His divine powers.

Such a view of the matter does not commend itself, and is, I think, to some extent a cause of the spread of extreme theories of the Kenosis. A better statement would be that the word state, or sphere, in both connections means "the sum of relationships." The universal state is merely the sum of the universal relationships proper to the eternal Son, Godward and manward, being based upon His eternal self-consciousness as God. The Incarnate state or sphere is the sum of those particular relationships which, being alien from Him, He assumed Godward and manward, Himself basing them upon His self-consciousness as God-in-manhood. They are all alike relationships formed by the one eternal Logos, One and the same Person; and those that are assumed are at every moment dependent upon His divine good-pleasure, and are only possible because of His divine self-restraint.

The Incarnate lives under the conditions of manhood, in the particular relationships that He assumed, thereby limiting His divine powers; but there is no wall of partition. Behind all the special relationships that make up the sphere of the Incarnation lies the divine Will, unlimited, powerful, and free, of the eternal Son, dwelling in the bosom of the Father. But within the sphere so constituted, within those special relationships, we find no signs of the presence of divinity unconditioned by manhood.

Thus in fact there is a link between the two spheres, and no gulf at all; and the link is the divine Will of the eternal Son, willing to manifest Himself only in the measure in which manhood can reveal Him.

Further discussion of the points raised in this chapter will of course be necessary when we come to the positive work of constructing a theory. But enough has been said to shew in what direction a refutation of the extreme Kenotic view is most possible.

In all matters of this kind arguments depend for their value chiefly upon the mental bias or theological predilections of the disputants. It will be better therefore at once to advance against so-called Kenoticism a rival theory; one which will attempt to provide for all that Kenotists have rightly established, and to meet the difficulties with which they have failed to deal. To do this is the purpose of my book.

PART III

AN ATTEMPTED SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

CHAPTER VI

THE SOLUTION

THE task that lies before us is to frame a theory that will account for all the facts with which the Gospel narrative has furnished us; keeping within the limits set for us by the dogmatic Creeds, and avoiding as far as may be the mistakes we have noticed in the theories which we have been considering.

It will be best, and make most for clearness, if the proposed solution be stated point by point, each point being treated as a whole. But in so doing I must beg that no point shall be judged apart from its context in the theory as a whole; and that no opinion shall be expressed upon the solution I offer until each point has been weighed.

I

In the first place, then, the Person who became incarnate is purely divine. In His eternal essence He is of one substance with the Father, God of God; possessed of all divine powers, prerogatives, and attributes. His Incarnation in no way interfered

with His true life in the eternal Godhead, or hindered Him from His divine activities in the universe. He remained true Word of God, "upholding all things by the word of His power." Nor on the other hand did His Incarnation involve Him in the absolute abandonment of any one of the attributes of His divinity. Whatever of self-limitation was necessary, He always remained in possession of His powers, recognizing a law of restraint where restraint was necessary. His continuous respect for this law of self-restraint constituted His act of self-sacrifice and obedience.

He is not in any way to be conceived as a divine-human person; He owes nothing to association with a human individuality, nor is His self-consciousness in any the least degree composite, in part divine and in part human.

His Incarnation is a theophany: the revelation of God to men, the unveiling of the divine Nature, an unveiling for which the Old Testament had prepared.

On the other hand, the Incarnation is an anthropophany: the perfect exhibition before God of the beauty and excellencies of manhood when framed without sin, developed without flaw, and continuously maintained in personal union with the eternal Son of God. To the end that manhood should be so aided to perfection the eternal Son assumed it into personal union with Himself. He did not take a manhood, in the sense that He associated with Him-

self one human person; for that would have been to redeem one at the cost of the race. But in Mary's womb He took human flesh which, with its own proper and complete soul, He constituted in Himself so that He became truly man, living as the subject or ego of real manhood.

Thus His human nature He united to Himself personally. It is manhood assumed by God the Son; and may not be thought of as if it were joined to His divine nature, He Himself being as it were apart from both. It is His own proper nature, constituted in His own divine person as self-limited; it is not merely an instrument of His power, nor a medium of His revelation, nor a veil of His divine glory. Hence the supernatural power of the Incarnate is on a unique level, and may not at all be likened in kind to that exercised by the saints and prophets of old.

The Incarnate is the Son of God, in whose image man was made. He has come Himself, and by an act of supreme love and power He so limits His divine power that He can adequately serve as the proper subject or ego of His assumed manhood. In this sense He was made man, for us men and for our salvation.

II

His manhood is in all points like our own except in the matter of sin. Taken from the womb of the Virgin Mary in the power of the Holy Ghost, by a miracle, it came into the world sinless; and being

from the moment of its conception united with the eternal Son of God it remained without spot of sin. But in every other respect His manhood is like ours, having the same natural weaknesses and limitations that hinder us. We cannot at all set a limit to the capacity of manhood for union with God, nor do we know at what point the human soul ceases to be able to advance in the comprehension of God. Limits there must be; but they may be wider than we think. At any rate we have no reason to doubt the evidence of the Gospels to the wonderful capacity of Christ's human soul for mediating His knowledge of divine things. To doubt this would be to doubt our capacity for the Beatific Vision.

But on the other hand we do know very well the limits of our ordinary human faculties; and we recognize the gulf that lies between the divine and human natures and powers. It seems therefore natural for us to find in the Gospel the record of the limitations under which the Incarnate lived and worked.

He had come to exhibit manhood to God: therefore He was content to accept the limitations that are proper to and normal in man. At the same time this manhood was to be exhibited at its best; exhibited with those excellencies that are possible to it when constituted in God the Son, the creative Word. Ideal manhood is manhood dependent upon God, and God-aided.

Taking, then, these opposite truths into our con-

sideration we can see that the Incarnate Son must at every moment live under a law of self-restraint as to all His divine powers, in some real measure; while at the same time He must retain the ultimate possession of them, so that He may communicate to manhood divine aid in the degree that it requires and is able to assimilate. The measure of the self-restraint is the capacity of the perfect manhood to receive, assimilate, and co-operate with divine power. There could be no absolute abandonment of divine powers; for in that case manhood must have made its way to God unaided: a supposition which, if true, would rob the Incarnation of its motive.

But, on the other hand, the Incarnate must not think or say or do what is beyond the capacity of manhood, sinless, perfect, and constituted in Himself. Not only must He not so think or do or say, but we must conceive of Him as so respecting the law of self-restraint as to be unable to pass the limit of manhood's capacity. Within the sphere of the Incarnation we think of the law of self-restraint as applied continuously, as it were momentarily; but none the less it is absolute, putting out of action whatever of divine power that manhood cannot mediate. It is not for us to measure *a priori* the possibilities and capacity of that manhood: we know them only from the Gospel story, wonderful in their extent, but existing side by side with very real limitations and hindrances.

In such a manhood, under such conditions, the

Incarnate Son lives completely. He has as Incarnate no existence and no activity outside the conditions that manhood imposes upon Him.

It would appear that the measure of His self-restraint was not one and the same at every period of His development. It varied as the capacity of His manhood varied. As His human soul grew and developed, so did its capacity widen, and the degree of His self-restraint was always determined by the state of His human soul; it was never arbitrary. For the act of self-sacrifice was not merely a single choice, made once at the moment of His Incarnation. Rather it lay in His determination to possess Himself and His powers within the conditions of manhood, and to allow the needs and the capacity of His manhood to determine at every moment the limits of His freedom. Thus the Incarnate state is one of progress at every moment; beginning with the life of the unborn child and looking for its consummation to the day when He shall mediate to His mystical body the beatific vision of the Godhead.

Such, then, is the manhood of the Incarnate. And in it He set Himself to relate to Himself in terms of manhood and through human faculties all the creatures of His divine wisdom and power. They were known to Him from all eternity, intuitively in their essence; known as they were meant to be, as they were, and as they would become. But this knowledge was His only in His universal, eternal

relationships as Word of God. Now it behoved Him, as Incarnate Son on earth, to come to know them as the objects of new relationships, as men know things; experiencing their action upon Himself through His manhood, and summing up by His human faculties their interaction one upon the other.

As Incarnate He can have no contact with anything in the universe except through the medium of His manhood.

III

Hence it seems to follow of necessity that as Incarnate the Son has no communion with His Father except through the same medium of manhood. He holds communion with His Father through His human soul. For He is one person; and His manhood is, in the fullest sense, His own nature, although it is assumed. He took it to Himself not as an external organ through which to touch the world of matter and dwell in space, but as the very true and real nature through and in which He might mediate between God and men. It is not enough that the mediator be in contact with our nature; He must make it really and entirely His own.

Thus in some mysterious way the manhood must be regarded as mediating the relations of the Incarnate to His Father, that hereafter it may mediate the relations of the many members of His mystical body to the same Father.

The manhood would not be real, it would not be His very own, if it might be left out of account when He is alone with His Father.

In fact, our Lord Himself often spoke of the activities of His manhood in connection with His personal relations to His Father. He speaks of the vision of the Father's work,[1] of hearing the Father's judgements,[2] and of receiving the things of God, that He may reveal them to His friends.[3] It is not a figure of speech this seeing and hearing. On the contrary, it expresses exactly the place that the manhood holds as the medium of communion between the Father and the Christ. To interpret the passages to which reference is made as alluding to the divine, supermundane communion of the Father and the Son is to declare that God took flesh in order to make a revelation that cannot be unfolded in or through manhood.

This is one of the great marvels of the Gospel story, this record of the wondrous power of manhood when constituted in God. Who would have dared to predict that the Incarnate Son could, and would, hold communion with His Father through a truly human soul? Yet, in fact, it is just that which we ought to have predicted. For, if the revelation can be received by us men, it must of necessity be such as a human soul can assimilate; and if we are to behold in Christ the beatific vision of the Father, His soul, even upon earth, must have been capable

[1] John v. 19. [2] *Ibid.* v. 30. [3] *Ibid.* xv. 15.

of rising to immeasurable heights in contemplation of the Godhead.

So Christ's soul is shewn to us in the Gospels: always growing, always developing, always advancing; and being at every stage capable of mediating such communion with the Father as was possible to the Son in manhood's bonds, and proper to Him as child, and youth, and man. Of course, the communion of the Incarnate with the Father when He was but twelve years old was not that which he had in the Transfiguration or on Calvary: each stage was rightly ordered: but always the determining factor was the natural limitation of the human soul.

IV

It is necessary now to describe the inner meaning of the state of the Incarnation.

The relation of the Incarnate to His manhood is seen to be very real. He does not enter into manhood with one fixed quantity of divine power at His command, waiting the development of His human faculties for its manifestation; becoming, as it were, gradually and increasingly incarnate. Rather He entered once for all into manhood, willing to begin His new life as the conditions of existence in Mary's womb should make it necessary. From that moment He grew as His manhood grew; realizing Himself more and more as His human soul opened up to Him the paths both of self-

knowledge and knowledge of the universe. He became man truly, passing through every stage of human growth. The gradual development is not a mark of gradual incarnation; it is of the very essence of a real incarnation. Had He not been truly God in babyhood He would not have been truly God in manhood.

The limits of His self-manifestation at every moment were fixed by the capacity of the human soul that He had made His own; for He had become man really, wholly, and perfectly, without any the least reservation. Thus the content of the ego or subject of His manhood increased, developing power and self-knowledge, just as the ego in every man developes increasingly and, so to speak, finds itself as the years go by. The difference that was evident cannot be measured by us; for His ego is divine. But we may not doubt the process of development in the face of the evidence of the Gospels.

This view is far truer than that of the Athanasians and Cyrillines who postulate as ego the unlimited Logos, or Word, arguing for an unreal relation of Him to a growing manhood; suggesting a fully-equipped God waiting for manhood to grow to His purpose, and thus requiring two centres of activity within the one Incarnate being.

So, again, it is far truer than the advanced Kenotic view which merely substitutes for the unlimited Logos the self-abandoned Son of God. Such a

theory leaves too much to manhood to accomplish in its own power, while it does not save us from the dual centre of activity.

The view for which I plead allows best for the growth of the Christ to which St. Luke bears witness; it is Scriptural, and it accords with what we know of personal development. But if it is to win acceptance it must be most clearly seen and strongly maintained that the action by which the eternal Son restrains Himself, while allowing divine aid to reach the manhood, belongs not to the sphere of the Incarnation, but to the sphere of His universal activities. The sphere of the Incarnation is where the self-limited Logos can at every moment exercise only such powers as manhood can mediate. He lives under a law of self-restraint that He imposed upon Himself as unlimited Logos. For, since the measure of the divine power in the sphere of the Incarnation is neither fixed nor constant but always increasing, we must conceive the sphere of the Incarnation to be so in the power of the unlimited Logos that He can Himself continuously will its existence: the Incarnation being His continual movement in manhood towards men carrying them thereby to God. There can be no wall of separation and no gulf between the two spheres. The eternal Son gives the motive-force to the sphere of the Incarnate at every moment; the Incarnate is the eternal Son under conditions of manhood.

I do not mean for a moment that the two spheres

can be figured as concentric circles: for that would be to lend to the Incarnate the aid of deity apart from the limitations of humanity. But I do mean that the two spheres touch, meeting in the person of the eternal Son; and that the content of divine power of the lower state cannot be fixed, for it varies with the growing power of the manhood to receive and to communicate it. Thus the divine power mediated by the Incarnate when an infant was almost immeasurably less than was His power when going forth to His death; but the difference was due not to the arbitrary will of the Logos but to the inferior capacity of an infant's soul when compared with the soul of a full-grown man. Never for a moment may we say that the Babe Jesus ruled the universe from His mother's knee. But neither may we say that the eternal Son was to the same extent self-limited when man as when He was an infant. For in considering the self-emptying of the eternal Son we have not to discuss how much of His power He retained, but how far at any stage of His life the manhood that He had assumed was able to exercise His power.

Thus it will be truest to fact if we speak of the Incarnation as being a real coming of God the Son into manhood, with a view to developing His self-knowledge under conditions of infancy, boyhood, and manhood.

On these lines it will be well to consider here what exactly we mean by the state of the Incarna-

tion as opposed to the state of the universal activities of the Logos.

Surely the word state in this connection means nothing more than the sum of the relationships of the Logos. On the one hand He lives in universal creative relationships with the whole of His creation, such relations being based upon His own eternal relation to the Father. On the other hand He lives on earth in special, redemptive relationships with a few chosen souls, such relations being based upon a new, limited, human relation to His Father. But He Himself is one and the same person: He is the one term of all the relationships universal and particular: and those that are particular are the result of, and are ultimately based upon, those that are universal. Thus at every moment the measure and content of the special relationships, while fixed to suit the needs of those to whom He comes, are yet fixed by Him who is the source of all, the Word conceived of as universally powerful. He it is who imposed upon Himself the perpetual law of self-restraint according to the measure of the capacity of the manhood that He should assume.

We ask why such special relationships involved the assumption of human flesh. The introduction of the manhood into the one set of relations seems to place them on a level entirely different from that of the other set. To which it may be answered, first, that we are far too ignorant of the nature of God to be able to measure the effect upon Him of the

assumption of manhood; but that we have no reason to suppose that the human soul, made in His own image, is in itself unfitted to be the medium of permanent though limited relations between Himself and His creatures. The Infinite is not bound by anything except His own will.

And, beyond this, we have positive reasons for conceiving these relations to have been made visible and permanent in manhood. For, in the first place, God desired the establishment of both parties to the new relationship upon a level common to both. Hence God the Son descended to that level up to which He could raise and on which He could maintain the other; that is, He became man. And, in the second place, God desired the establishment of both upon one common level before Himself, the Father, a level on which the Son could truly act as priest upon behalf of and in the name of man. Therefore, again, the Son came in manhood. It is plain, then, that the new relationships demanded a real assumption of manhood by the eternal Son, and an assumption such as should be permanent. Only as man could He meet men on a common level, and only as communing with the Father through a human soul could He adequately serve mankind as priest. In fact, the eternal Son could not assume the required relation to the human race unless He also assumed a new relation to His Father.

Viewed in this way it becomes increasingly clear that the Incarnation stands for a growing manifesta-

tion of the Son through manhood. For at the one term it is seen as being a new relationship through infancy, under conditions of infancy, with Mary and Joseph; while at the other term it is to be conceived as a new relationship between the Word through glorified manhood, under the condition of glorified manhood, with the whole company of the faithful, and with His whole creation, which He carries onward to its perfect destiny.

The isolation of the relationships that make up the sphere of the Incarnation is not only possible and legitimate; for us men it is necessary. It is done for us in the Gospel story: for the Incarnate is the centre of them all, and He is in no sense concerned in any other relationship at all. No other relationship concerns us as objects of the Christian revelation; no other has to do with our redemption and sanctification. We know God through the relationships that make up the sphere of the Incarnation.

But, on the other hand, looked at from above, this isolation has no existence in the eternal order; for the person who constitutes each set of relationships is one and the same, the eternal Son of God. To Him these relations are additional to those that are universal: additional, formed for a special purpose, for our salvation, at the cost of His self-humiliation. For it is necessary to bear in mind that although the sphere of the Incarnation is merely the sum of new relationships, yet it was only entered at the cost of very real self-sacrifice, and continuance in it involves

very real self-humiliation. God cannot be related to sinners through manhood and in manhood without a sense of humiliation that passes measure. We must not think that in setting aside the idea of self-abandonment, we have robbed the Incarnation of its element of sacrifice of self. This could never be. For call it what we will, a relationship between God and man that requires God to bind Himself in manhood's cords can only be formed at great cost. God must empty Himself of His glory, strip Himself of His freedom, and enter the region where sorrow reigns, if He wishes to live as man.

Therefore, as a last thought upon this subject, we must face the difficulty of the co-existence of a dual relationship between the Logos and His chosen people. The difficulty is not peculiar to the view of the Incarnation that I am advocating: it is common to all theories. But it is, I think, necessary to try to estimate it at this point, and to see if it cannot be relieved of some of its weight.

The main weight of the difficulty is carried for us by our confidence in the power and love of Almighty God our Father. But the puzzled mind may find some help in an analogy. And for my analogy I will ask pardon from those of my readers who may be unfamiliar with, or opposed to, the usages that accompany the administration of the rite of absolution. It seems to me, however, better to risk the displeasure of a few than to lose the help of what seems to me a striking analogy.

St. Francis de Sales came to act as confessor to his own father and mother. As son of his parents he was famous for his loving affection and filial devotion, and for his constant interest in all that made up their life. But the moment he entered the tribunal of penance with one of them he found himself unable to exercise filial love or to make use of his knowledge of their lives. He was merely a priest; shriving their souls; related to them only in and through his priesthood. He was the subject of two relationships with them, of both he as their son was the first term; but in respect to the particular, limited relationship of priesthood he was seen to be restrained in the exercise of his sonship.

It is an analogy only, and clearly it is very inadequate; but it does touch our problem at two points: it affords an analogy with the co-existence of two sets of relations in the one subject, the Logos; and an analogy with the limitation necessary to the second relationship.

And it is perhaps not the less useful that it gives us a faint hint of the possibility of locating the power of self-limitation in the subject of the wider relationship. It was as son that Francis willed to act as priest to his parents; it was as son that he put aside all such knowledge of them as his priesthood might not mediate. Yes, it is perhaps a fruitful analogy, though inadequate.

V

Thus we arrive at our conception of the self-consciousness of the Incarnate.

Within these special relationships that are so real as to demand signification by His assumption of manhood, the Son necessarily has a knowledge of Himself, in His relations Godward and manward, that does not belong to His universal life as Logos. The Incarnate is the Son of God existing only under conditions of manhood. In what sense, then, was He conscious of Himself?

We may arrive at an answer by a process of elimination. First, He did not know Himself as God the Son possessed of and exercising unlimited power. His state of universal power was, as it were, a memory to Him:[1] but He knew Himself as unable to exercise its prerogatives. Secondly, He did not know Himself as merely a man; for His self is divine. He was conscious of divinity.[2] And thirdly, He did not know Himself as divine-human in composite consciousness; for He had not associated any human person with Himself.

It remains therefore to say that He was conscious of Himself as God-in-manhood. He knew Himself as God just in so far as a perfect, sinless, God-assumed soul could mediate the divine self-consciousness. God the Son had become man, and knew Himself

[1] John xvii. 5.
[2] John v. 17; viii. 58; x. 30; xiv. 23, etc.

only so far as His human soul could mediate that knowledge. We have seen how truly He had taken manhood into Himself; how He had willed that it should mediate all His new relationships with the Father and the world. If then these relationships were those of an intelligent, personal being they must have been based in a consciousness of self as entirely limited and conditioned by manhood.

It is not that He knew Himself to be unlimited Logos, who had willed to respect the limitations of manhood. No, more than that. He knew Himself as Logos only in the measure that His human soul could be made to mediate that self-knowledge. But all the while in His universal state He was, nay is, the unlimited Logos who wills to be for evermore in such special relations of love to the redeemed that, in the sphere in which He meets with them, He is prepared to accept this limited content of self-consciousness.

The human soul, made in God's image, reaches its goal when in its true sinlessness it is constituted in the person of the eternal Son to be the ever-growing and ever-developing medium of His self-consciousness.

This is a startling statement; yet it appears to be inevitable. And the peculiar difficulty that it at once suggests is avoided by the refusal to posit a wall of separation between the universal and incarnate states of the Logos.

Difficult as it is, yet we cannot be content with the

rival theories. The Kenotic position is not satisfactory, for from it we see in one state the Logos conscious of Himself as unlimited God, and in the other the self-abandoned Logos conscious of Himself as self-abandoned-God, or not-quite-God; or as divine-human. Nor can we think of the Incarnate as possessing no special self-consciousness, unless we rob the Incarnation of its full meaning.

Although, then, my solution is at first sight full of difficulty I would crave for it a careful trial and a cautious judgement.

Let me suggest two analogies that go a little way towards making my meaning clear.

Imagine an African king defeated by a neighbouring tribe and reduced to a state of slavery. Suppose him to be kept in his own royal home, but now as the servant of his rival's representative. He is a king; and in his own mind, as he dwells in thought upon his surroundings, he knows himself as king and ruler of men. But within the sphere of his servitude he has to realize himself as a king in slavery. Not as a mere slave, for he is a king; but as a king in slavery. And everything in his accustomed environment he must relate to himself in a new way. To himself as a king in slavery he relates all that once was related to him as to a king. He has in a sense a limited self-consciousness; not a second one, for he is one and the same person throughout. But our analogy fails us here, because we cannot conceive the co-existence of the full and the limited consciousness

in one person. Nevertheless it points us in the direction of the truth.

Again, imagine a man, the favourite son of a commanding officer, enlisting in the army, and being transferred to his father's regiment. His self-consciousness as son of his father belongs to the sphere of his full, proper life; but within the particular, narrow relationships set up by his enlistment he is the subject of a limited consciousness; knowing himself only as son in conditions of military service. And it is only in the measure that the limited consciousness is allowed to prevail over the wider that his military life is really effective and tolerable. He is one single person; he has no dual consciousness; but the content of his self-consciousness as a soldier is less than the content of his consciousness as son, free in his father's house.

In both these cases there is a single person in a dual relationship to his environment; and in both cases each sphere of relationships is so distinct as to require a personal centre of activity. In both cases the centres of activity are filled by a single person, who in the one state knows himself as possessing his proper prerogatives and powers, and in the second state knows himself as so conditioned by his environment as to exercise only such powers as befit his new relationship, being compelled to try to forget that he has by right a larger liberty and a fuller life.

These analogies fail us just in the point where we most need help. In both cases the completeness of

the second state depends upon an act of forgetfulness; of deliberate, resolute shutting out from the mind of the memory of the former life. But with the Incarnate it is not an act of forgetfulness. Rather is it an act of supreme divine power that so orders the life of the Logos that within a certain sphere He wills to have no consciousness of Himself that is not mediated for Him by His human soul. It is a supreme exhibition of divine love and power; it allows for the gradual development of the consciousness of the Incarnate in the measure of the growth of His human soul; while at the same time it secures the divine character of the consciousness itself.

Looked at from above, as from the standpoint of the Logos Himself, His consciousness as man must surely bear the marks of self-sacrificing love, of powerful self-restraint. It is the result of the self-emptying of the Son; of His determination to accept, within certain relationships, the fashion of a man and the form of a slave. He willed so to relate Himself to the Father and to men that within these relationships He could not know Himself as unlimited Son of God.

But looked at from below, from our standpoint, His consciousness as man is that of the perfect Son of Man, who at every moment, in ever-growing clearness, realizes in and through manhood His divine Sonship; who knows Himself as God at every moment just in the measure that such self-knowledge can be mediated by the soul as it passes from perfect

infancy to perfect childhood, from perfect childhood to perfect youth, and from perfect youth to perfect manhood. And in this it is really human; the self-consciousness of the Man Christ Jesus, the self-consciousness of God in manhood.

It is in the light of such a theory as this that we best understand the saying of our Lord that His Father is greater than He is. For the Incarnate speaks of Himself as He was on earth in His Incarnate state, within the relationships made concrete by His assumption of flesh. He speaks not of His manhood, but of His Incarnate being and state. As Incarnate He is less than His Father. As touching His manhood, and the conditions that it has imposed upon His person, He is inferior to His Father.

The importance of arriving at a conception of a single consciousness of the Christ cannot be overestimated. The popular teaching that assumes in the Incarnate a full consciousness of divine glory side by side with a consciousness of certain occasional human limitations cannot be too strongly deprecated. We must not allow ourselves to speak of the Babe of Bethlehem as ruling the universe from His mother's knee; nor of the sacred Heart of Jesus as consciously embracing the whole race from the first moment of its existence. To do so is to require three states of the Logos: the first in which He is unlimited and unincarnate; the second in which He is incarnate, and unlimited except when He wills to allow some merely human condition to prevail over Him; and

the third in which He is self-limited in that human condition. And the result of such a conception of the Incarnate is to make His manhood unique not only in the degree of its perfection, but also in kind. It makes it utterly unlike ours, and also removes it from all part in the mediation of His self-consciousness.

And, on the other hand, the Kenotic theories are equally to be deplored. For they picture the Incarnate as of a dual consciousness in the sense that they require two centres of activity in the lower state: a centre of His self-abandonment, and a centre of His divine-human or human activities after the self-abandonment has taken place.

For myself, the daylight shines most fully at the point in which I am able to assign to the universal sphere of Logos-activity all the self-limitation that was necessary for the mediation of Christ's consciousness by His manhood. The child Jesus was able to be a perfect child, not because He as Incarnate restrained divine powers lest they should overpower His boy-nature, but because as Incarnate He is at every moment observant of and obedient to a law of self-restraint which He as unlimited Logos wills should be imposed upon Himself. The child in Joseph's shop is the concrete expression of those relations of the Incarnate, Godward and manward, which depend for their reality at every moment upon the action of the Logos Himself in His universal sphere of activities. The Logos as able to limit

Himself and as conscious of that ability is to be regarded as in the sphere of the universal and eternal relationships; the special, incarnate relationships are to be conceived as those of the Logos self-limited, who knows Himself only as Logos limited in manhood.

The new-born babe, wrapped in swaddling clothes, has no more consciousness of self than may be possible to an infant soul, sinless, flawless, unburdened, and constituted in the person of God the Son. Nay more, the Incarnate as unborn babe has no consciousness that is not proper to the soul of an unborn babe, again sinless, flawless, unburdened, and constituted in the person of the Son of God. We must not let this thought stagger us. For in the first place it behoved God to condescend to the lowest form of human life in order to redeem it. If it were impossible for God to live as an unborn babe in Mary's womb, the Incarnation as we have conceived it never took place at all. Sadly we must then admit that God did not become man: He merely took manhood at a certain stage of its growth and made it the medium of His self-manifestation. But if God became man, it is true that He first became self-conscious as Incarnate through the soul of an infant! And in the second place, let us remember that we cannot measure the consciousness of the unborn nor of the infant. Of John the Baptist we know that he leapt in his mother's womb at the approach of Mary immediately after her conception of Christ;

a fact that may perhaps imply some kind of consciousness which, even if we ascribe it to some special action of the Spirit or to some extra endowment of holiness, points to the possibility of extraordinary capacity in the soul of Jesus. But in the last resort we must be content to leave the matter unexplained, knowing that we are moving in the region of mystery.

In any case this difficulty is not so great on the theory that I advocate as on some others. For as I plead the matter, looking from beneath we see the Incarnate almost unconscious because the soul is not yet able to mediate self-knowledge; but looking from above, the acceptance of practical unconsciousness is seen to be the momentary expression of the will of the living, unlimited Logos. Practical unconsciousness does not mean actual non-existence, for there is no wall between the unlimited and the incarnate Logos. The Incarnate is the eternal Son in conditions of manhood, and therefore for the time in conditions of infancy.

But on the Cyrilline theory as developed in many writers the consciousness of the babe has no necessary part in the consciousness of the Christ, for He knows Himself as God Almighty; while on the Kenotic theory the self-abandoned Logos must lie not only practically unconscious in manhood, but with a gulf separating Him from His eternal activities. In which case the difficulty is to see in what sense we may predicate life of the Incarnate in the earliest

stage of His existence. For though His manhood was alive in the life of Mary, the gulf between the two states of the Logos implies that He Himself, as Incarnate, had no life.

To sum up then, the Logos possesses a true consciousness of Himself as God the Son, omnipotent and omniscient. In virtue of His omniscient wisdom, by His omnipotent power, He has imposed upon Himself a law of self-restraint, so framed that His exercise of His own proper powers is at every moment adapted to the measure of the capacity of His ever-growing manhood. As living under this law, within the conditions of manhood, He knows Himself not as God the Son omnipotent and omniscient, but as God the Son limited and conditioned in manhood; and unable to act or speak or think outside the limits imposed upon Him by His manhood. So living and so conforming to the law of self-restraint He is the centre of the sphere of new relationships with His Father and His creatures that make up the life of the Incarnation; the existence of this sphere depending upon the indwelling of all creatures by the unlimited Logos in virtue of His omnipresence, and upon the reality of the limited self-consciousness of the Logos as Incarnate.

Thus in the eternal sphere the Logos is found performing an act of immeasurable self-sacrifice, in which the Father who sends Him into the world is seen to share; and within the special sphere of the Incarna-

tion the Logos in manhood is found offering at every moment an act of consummate obedience to the original law of self-restraint. The initial act of self-sacrifice belongs to the eternal sphere, being based upon His self-consciousness as omnipotent Logos; the continuous act of obedience is the expression in terms of humanity of the primary act of self-sacrifice, and is based upon His limited self-consciousness as Logos in manhood. The latter alone has to do with the life of the Incarnate; and it alone concerns us in our estimate of the self-consciousness of the Christ. In fact, self-sacrifice in God is only intelligible to us after it has been translated into the terms of human thought.

VI

It is evident from the Scriptures that the Incarnate, the self-limited Logos, God in manhood, is a very real and adequate centre of the activities of His humanity.

We have emphasized the inseparableness of the universal sphere of the Logos from His state of Incarnation, seeing that both are sums of relationships based in one and the same person; we have argued for Him a self-consciousness that is merely a limited self-consciousness, conceiving of Him as One who knows Himself to be God conditioned in and by manhood; and we have found the motive-power of the relationships of the Incarnate in the divine love and power of the Son of God.

But we must be quite as emphatic in postulating the reality and the entity of the sphere of the Incarnation, and in acknowledging the Incarnate to be the real and personal centre of all the activities of that state.

Herein lies the final problem of the doctrine of the Incarnation.

How can the Logos as self-limited be the subject of the passion, the agony, the desolation and death upon the cross, and yet at the same moment be the living and life-giving Son of God?

No one has answered the question, no one can answer it. The Athanasians and Cyrillines avoid it by separating the human nature from the divine to the extent that will enable them to say that He suffered all these things in His manhood, He Himself remaining in full possession of His divine powers. Either He merely became inactive, leaving His manhood to its natural fate, or He willed to allow His manhood to suffer what apart from His divine will it could not have been able to suffer. The Kenotists have no answer to give. They only plead the infinite power of the divine love. They wisely refuse to limit the divine power by the measure of what is possible to man. And with them we may well pause: fortifying our faith by the contemplation of the Father's love and omnipotence, in the face of the supreme mystery of redemption.

But there are considerations to be advanced that may help us to see our way a little clearer.

First then let us notice that the self-consciousness of the Incarnate as God in manhood is so real that He cannot receive anything except in and through His manhood. He may be in another sphere the unlimited Logos, but as Incarnate He cannot receive or use or know what His manhood cannot mediate.

It is as if a king's son were to will, for purposes of his father's policy, to leave his palace and to dwell a workman among workmen; to pass through all the troubles and vicissitudes of the life of a manual labourer, and to refuse to receive anything from others that he could not naturally receive and use as a working man. Those who recognize him and in their hearts bow before him are forbidden to acknowledge him or to help him in any way. Imagine a time of distress, and the king's son numbered among the unemployed and chosen to be one of their leaders. He goes with them into the king's presence; he is as they are in the king's sight; and the answer that he receives is that nothing can be done for any one of them. Outside the palace he shares the grief, the distress, and the hunger of the unemployed; and none may help him apart from the whole body of weary sufferers. He is, by a primary act of will, one of the unemployed. As the days pass the distress deepens; and finally a riot ensues. In the riot he is severely handled: he lies at death's door in the prison infirmary. He is recognized, but must be treated only as an unemployed workman, now a prisoner awaiting his trial. Yet all the while he is a

king's son. However, he is resolved only to know himself as king's son in conditions of manual labour. The law of self-restraint that he imposed upon himself when in his father's palace must hold. He will not, must not break it.

Who will say that such an one is not a very real, personal centre of his activities in his sphere as workman? Never for a moment does the fact of his essential royal sonship detract from the reality of his personal life as a workman.

The main point in which the analogy fails us in this connection is that, of course, the son could not be at one and the same moment in his father's house as royal son and in the streets as unemployed. But it does point to the possibility of one and the same person being able to act as the true and personal centre of the activities of two sets of relationships, even when the content of one state is far less than the content of the other; and it helps us to see how wide and deep is the effect upon the personal self of complete surrender to an alien environment. Also it suggests that a man may live truly in a state not his own and endure all the evils that spring from it, while all the time he is only separated from a power that might save him from harm by a previously fixed act of will.

We may not see how the son in our parable could be in two places at the same time; but after all, what is place to God? And we have seen that the son could exist in a dual relationship with his father at

one and the same moment. I think that the more we emphasize the possibility of dual relations the less burdensome will our difficulty become. And of course we can all quote cases of such duality in relationship. For example, every holy man realizes a dual relationship: for on the one hand he is the centre of the activities of his earthly, human life, and also at the same time he is becoming more and more a real centre of a life in God that is independent of time and space. Or we may revert once more to the analogy afforded by the priesthood. We can imagine the case of a priest who is called to give evidence against a man accused of murder; the looked-for evidence being the matter of the actual confession of the accused. The priest may not divulge any the least word. For the work of confession he is isolated from his normal human relationships; he cannot recognize them or have anything to do with them except in so far as his office as confessor will allow. The priest has a dual relationship to each member of his flock, the one inside the other, and less than the other; but he is the real centre of the activities of both.

But when all is said these analogies have not taken us very far towards seeing the possibility of the coexistence of the two states of the Logos.

We have seen that duality of relationship is possible; a simultaneous duality. We have also reminded ourselves that the fact of one set of relationships binding God to time and space through

manhood must not be allowed too much weight; since we do not know how their laws affect Him Whose mind they express. It is possible that the effect is less than we suppose. And again we have no means of determining the effect on spirit of a sinless body; we only know the rebellious flesh.

But let us look up to God Himself and see whether there is nothing in our conception of Him that may serve as a parallel with the dual measure of the self-consciousness of the Incarnate.

It is true that God's relationships are innumerable and simultaneous; but surely the content of His self-consciousness is fixed and constant? This of course is true. Yet there is room in the divine Father for some measure of self-limitation in respect to different relationships. He is to many of us the Love that is revealed in Jesus through the Blessed Sacrament; and He is merely Yahveh to our brethren the Jews. In some mysterious way He can reconcile the constant content of His self-consciousness with a varying self-manifestation; He shews a power of adapting Himself that is the highest mark of His love. He seems to allow the measure of our faith to condition His self-manifestation.

Can we get closer than this? Hardly, I think, without great danger and presumption. But on the whole we have gained some help towards lightening the load that faith has to carry: and we may well remember that for the majority of Christians faith bears the whole weight of it without complaining.

In the second place, we may dwell upon the importance of emphasizing the reality of the conditions of manhood under which the Logos chooses to dwell. The more we assert their reality, their extent, and their binding force the more easy it will be to see the ability of the limited Logos to be a real, personal centre of the human activities. So long as the external limits of the sphere of the Incarnation are as real as those of our manhood, so long will the person who lives within them be as really subject to manhood as we are. The problem can only be partially solved, but the solution lies for us at present not in the psychological and metaphysical regions, but in the recognition of the plain facts of the Gospel narrative. The Holy Spirit has not given us a revelation concerning the conception of a single person as the centre of two sets of relationships at the same moment: He has, however, revealed to us the actual relationships themselves. And if we follow the method of the New Testament we shall concentrate all our attention upon the very real human conditions that hemmed in the limited Logos; upon the human soul which is for ever the medium of His self-consciousness as God in manhood; and upon the humanity that is between Him and His Father, and between Him and mankind.

Thus it is that we shall come to see how in fact the Incarnate was really tempted, really in agony, and really desolate. Between Him and His impassible glory there was only one act of will; that act

by which He as unlimited Logos had imposed and as limited Logos had accepted the law of self-restraint. But mere act of will as it was, it had been signified, manifested, and made permanent by the assumption of manhood, and that manhood such that it could never be laid aside.

VII

In postulating a single self-consciousness of the Christ as God in manhood, we must not be taken to mean that He was possessed of only one will.

We have seen that His self-consciousness was in no way composite: and we must be on our guard against attributing to the Christ one composite will. The danger of so doing arises from the tendency to isolate the divine person from the divine nature and functions; and so to think of the divine will as apart from His person that we can conceive it either becoming associated with the human will by some kind of moral identity, or serving Him as an instrument by which to subdue His human will. All this kind of thought could be avoided were we to bear in mind that the will is a function of a person, inseparable from him. It is not a part of him: it is a mode of his self-manifestation.

Hence the Incarnate who lives and acts in manhood must either cease to be God, or He must exercise His divine will. The Incarnate speaks, but what is the motive-power behind His words? His human will? Yes: His human will, one of the

functions proper to Him as Incarnate. But as a function it expresses the Person. And the Person must express Himself through His own personality, that is through His divine will. He cannot express Himself as God in manhood except personally and humanly: that is, through His divine and human wills. He is the ego of the manhood: and a human will is an essential function of such an ego. But He is the ego of manhood because He is divine, and a divine will is an essential function of a divine person. So that the two wills of Christ must always be confessed, for they are two essential functions of God in manhood. Notwithstanding, it is well to remind ourselves that the divine will is as inseparable from the person of the Incarnate as is the divine love; lest we form a wrong picture of the relations of the Incarnate to His two wills.

VIII

The Incarnate lived truly under conditions of manhood upon earth, and therefore came to have a truly human experience.

He was able to relate to Himself humanly, through human faculties, all that met Him in His life on earth, and all objects of His thought. Again, He was able to feel humanly, through human flesh, all that goes to make the pain and suffering of the world; and He was, yet further, able to be tempted humanly through His human faculties, and to taste to the full the bitterness of the spiritual conflict.

Finally He was able to die humanly, abandoning His flesh to the will of His enemies, and His life to the power of death.

Yet in all these things His experience was human in a sense in which we do not normally use the word. For human experience may be of two kinds. It may be an experience of which the subject is merely human as in our case; or it may be an experience of which the contents are in terms of humanity, the subject being not merely human as in the case of the Incarnate.

This distinction is important. It does not at all detract from the reality of Christ's human experience; for we have seen that He in whose image man is made may adequately and fittingly serve as manhood's ego, and manifest Himself in manhood. But it does lend a value to His experience that it would not otherwise have. For it assures us that truly and really God became man, tasted of our troubles and sorrows and griefs, bore our pains, met our temptations, conquered our enemies, and passed triumphantly before us in the path that leads through death to the glory of eternal life.

Such was the experience of the Christ, truly human in its content. But the subject of it is divine; it is He who having been tempted is able also to succour us who are tempted. He came to know as we know that we might become able as He is able.

IX

The Incarnate not only underwent a truly human experience: He also left us a truly human example. Modern Christian thought lays the very greatest stress upon this point; and much of the extreme Kenotic teaching is due to a desire to minimize the divine and to exalt the human in Christ with a view to securing His human example. The danger lies in regarding the example as merely human; as being the result of the action of the human faculties of the Christ inspired and enabled by the Holy Ghost. This view of the matter must be steadfastly rejected both on scriptural and doctrinal grounds. First, on scriptural grounds because the example set before us in the New Testament is that of the divine perfection.[1] The humanity of Christ is pictured as the mirror of the divine perfection; and as a fountain of life and power that issues in conduct like His. He shews us not what one man did in Palestine in the first years of our era, but what manhood can do and be when united with God. The Incarnate is not the Incarnation of Law, nor the personification of the categorical imperative. He is, on the one hand, a revelation of divine love and power; and on the other hand of the capabilities of manhood when indwelt by God and surrendered to the action of His will. The value of redemption lies not in the mere reproduc-

[1] Matt. v. 48. Luke vi. 36. 1 Peter i. 15.

tion by the Redeemer of the weak nature that He assumed, but in His using that weak nature truly, rightly, and powerfully; making it first a sacrifice to God, and secondly a source of power to His people. This and all this we learn from Scripture; and in the New Testament we find that St. Paul does not hesitate to commend himself as an example to his disciples.[1] Any example will do, provided that it leads men to Him who not only reflects the divine holiness, but can also empower them to assimilate and practise it.

Secondly, on doctrinal grounds we reject the view that Christ's example is merely human. For in whatever degree He may limit His powers, or abandon them, He remains always and utterly a divine person. He can never be merely human.

The truth of course is that being divine He is, in respect of the attributes of personality, by inclusion also human. He possesses every positive attribute of human personality, in a degree that is superhuman but of a kind that is truly human. Thus by self-limitation He became the subject of manhood, truly and personally; and as entirely conditioned by His manhood He acted at every moment quite humanly. His actions express the highest excellence to which human faculties can rise. He never leaves the level upon which men and women at their best can move and act. His example shews exactly what

[1] 1 Cor. VII. 7; XI. 1. Phil. III. 17. Cf. James V. 10, 11.

the ideal of manhood is. But, equally truly, He is always on the level to which men and women can only reach in the power of divine aid, being themselves filled with divine life and power. His manhood is ideal because it is God-aided; and it is a true human example to all who in their measure are God-aided, through their union with Him. In this sense and in this sense alone is the human example of Christ valid and effective.

Surely it is for this reason that the New Testament emphasizes the redemptive work of Christ rather than His example. It conceives Him as a teacher of the divine perfection and a saviour of men from their sins, rather than as a mere example of godly living. The claim of Christ upon men is emphatically directed towards their acceptance of Him as their new life and light; the light that opens to their gaze the way to God, and the life that enables them to follow it. The following of Christ involves far more than imitating His example by the denial of self-love. And it does so just because the man Christ Jesus who goes before us in the way is not merely man, but God in manhood. God our Saviour, God over all blessed for ever, is He who can communicate to us His own power of divine holiness.

X

Lastly, the manhood of the Christ is His proper, assumed nature to all eternity. The state of the In-

carnation is permanent. "Jesus Christ the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever."[1]

The Incarnation may be viewed as an act, and as a state. Viewed as an act it is the one single movement of the divine Son in subjecting Himself to all the conditions of our manhood. As an act it was complete in the moment that the Logos was conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary by the power of the Holy Ghost. It was a complete and perfect act; and from that moment the Logos lived in all the successive stages of humanity from that of the unborn babe to that of the full-grown man.

But viewed as a state it is never completed, never finished; for it is the sum of the relationships of the Incarnate with manhood, with men, and with His Father in heaven. These relationships will never cease: they are everlasting in the Father's love. Neither are they fixed and constant, for the souls of the saints are never able to comprehend the divine Being fully, and must always be moving nearer and nearer to God, while never arriving at the fixed point of complete apprehension of Him. Since therefore they all depend upon the manhood of the Incarnate it is plain that the relation of His manhood to the Father is permanent and permanently human. We conceive it as glorified with the glory that is proper to God; we worship Jesus at God's right hand, but we also remember that His manhood is still human,

[1] Heb. XIII. 8. Rev. V. 6; VII. 10; XIII. 8; XXI. 22; XXII. 1, 3.

hoping as we do to sit with Him on His throne,[1] our manhood in and with His manhood at God's right hand. That is to say we do not ascribe to the manhood of the ascended Lord anything that is essentially alien from manhood as we know it.

Thus to all eternity the Incarnate lives in and under the conditions of a glorified humanity, unburdened it is true by the earthly limitations of humanity, yet still in some sense limited; unless it be that manhood can become equal with Godhead, which were absurd.

Thus whatever self-consciousness we attribute to the Incarnate upon earth we must ascribe to Him as He is in heaven, the Firstfruits of the redeemed race, the Head of the mystical body, the Church. We may not change our fundamental conception of His self-consciousness: we may only conceive an immeasurable increase in its content. For the ascension caused no break or violent change in the life of the Incarnate. It only marked the elevation of manhood to the sphere in which the limitations of manhood are reduced to a minimum, and the enabling powers of the divine life and glory are set free to aid the manhood in a measure that passes our thought. There remained after the ascension just those limitations that are the measure of the ultimate difference between Godhead and manhood: limitations which we lose sight of perhaps as our eyes are dazzled by

[1] Rev. III. 21.

the divine glory, but which none the less are real and permanent, and in our counting infinite.

Therefore it is that in estimating the manner of the self-limitation of the Incarnate we must be most careful to predicate of Him upon earth no mode of self-restraint that may not be equally predicated of Him in heaven. For this reason, among many others, the extreme Kenotic position has appeared to me untenable. I do not see my way to a doctrine that maintains that there can be no union of manhood with the Logos on earth unless the Logos be self-abandoned and self-deprived of divine attributes; while maintaining that in heaven manhood can exist in the Logos conceived of as having resumed all His powers and prerogatives. This doctrine seems to me, if true, to require an actual deification of manhood; an elevation of Christ's human faculties to the divine level; a demand which seems to be inconsistent with the permanency of the work of mediation between God and man. Either manhood is essentially fitted for union with the divine nature in its entirety, however limited the divine powers may be in action, or it is essentially unfitted. In the former case extreme Kenoticism is unnecessary; in the latter case it is unavailing.

It seems therefore safer to lay stress upon the permanence of the manhood, and the true humanity of its faculties even in glory; and to set aside the Kenotic view of the Incarnate upon earth as requiring in Him two modes of self-emptying.

The Athanasian and Cyrilline positions are not any more satisfactory. We saw that in them we had no definite conception of a permanent subject of the manhood of different content from the person of the unlimited Logos; so that after the glorification of the manhood we are still at a loss to know exactly what the subject of the manhood is. As these teachers tended to minimize the limitations of the humanity upon earth, so they tend to exaggerate the effects of the glorification of the manhood in heaven. In fact they dispense with a really permanent ego of the manhood, and have no conception of any mode of continuous, permanent self-restraint.

But in the theory that I am venturing to advocate the glorified manhood has its proper place in the life of the redeemed people just because its relationship with the limited Logos has remained the same throughout the glorification of both. It exists as it were upon the same plane as before, but the plane is inclined and the movement is upwards, heavenward.

Therefore it is that the glorified Incarnate remains the mediator of the divine revelation; for knowing Himself still only as God in manhood, God in glorified manhood, He is able to be the mirror of the beatific Vision to the whole mystical body of which He is the Head. The saints see God in Him, through His manhood; and this because the human soul of the Incarnate is still the medium of His limited self-consciousness.

And again, He remains the mediator of men's

approach to the Father, for His human soul abides in Him as its ego, which is made the link between Him and all who are His, and opens a way for them all to pass in Him to the Father.

The permanence of the relationships that make up the sphere of the Incarnation is, then, a point of the very first importance in Christology; and I suggest that on no theory is it so adequately accounted for as on this that I have now advocated and developed.

Such then, point by point, is the solution that I have dared to offer to the problem as to the manner of the Incarnation. What remains is to test it by seeking to explain certain elements of the Gospel story in the light of my solution. If it will afford a not inadequate explanation of the many problems that arise from a study of the life and work of the Incarnate, I shall feel still more bold in advocating its acceptance.

One thing at least I do claim for it. It preserves the very true humanity of the Incarnate in its fulness, without in any way detracting from His true deity; and in so doing it may possibly help some minds to reconcile the modern craving for a human saviour with the ancient and catholic belief that the Saviour is and can be none else than the only-begotten Son of God.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF CHRIST

THE Incarnate Son was conceived in the womb of Mary by the powerful co-operation of the Holy Spirit.[1] For nine months He was in His mother's womb, living under the conditions proper to the unborn child of the human family. In the restraint that made this state possible to Him, we find at once the divine love for men, the desire to redeem manhood in every stage, and the self-emptying by the Son of His glory.

I

The Gospels do not help us to any conception of the consciousness of the Incarnate before His birth. Only one hint do we receive that the Incarnate may have been capable of a consciousness of which the ordinary child is incapable: we find the Baptist in his mother's womb enabled in the Spirit to be conscious of the presence of the Incarnate in Mary's womb.[2] It is perhaps a precarious argument, and I would not press it, beyond pointing out that it is not

[1] Luke I. 35. Cf. Matt. I. 18. [2] Luke I. 41, 44.

safe to apply to such a matter any measure that must at the best be based on ignorance. In fact I do not know that it would be dangerous to the dogma of the Incarnation to allow a practical absence of self-consciousness in the Incarnate during these first months of His life on earth, provided always that we shut out the Kenotic view of a wall of separation between the Logos in glory and the Logos in manhood. And in any case the medium of His self-consciousness in Mary's womb was only an unborn soul, informing an undeveloped body not yet independent of its mother. No theory of the Incarnation has any satisfactory explanation of these nine months of mysterious life. We cannot believe that from the moment of its conception the heart of Jesus was a conscious centre of love for the universe; we cannot put side by side an unconscious manhood and a divine person fully conscious of His unlimited deity; nor can we allow that the divine person was to all intents and purposes absent, the unborn child being regarded practically as merely human.

We seem committed by the Evangelists to the opinion that the Incarnate did really and truly become man, following the law of human life from its very beginning; so that the law of self-restraint, self-imposed before the act of Incarnation, required of Him that He should taste of the unconsciousness or practical unconsciousness of the unborn child. But on the other hand we are to recall St. Luke's record of the small measure of consciousness found in the

unborn Baptist, and to be prepared to allow to the full for some small measure of consciousness in the Incarnate which could be mediated by His soul as yet unborn; His soul perfect, sinless, flawless, and essentially united with the person of the Word of God.

Thus we are prepared for the Evangelist's picture of the child of Bethlehem: a perfect, flawless child: but in all respects natural in His weakness, in His dependence on His mother,[1] and in His inability to preserve His life from His enemies.[2] As child the Incarnate was limited by the conditions proper to a perfect, sinless, God-assumed childhood. The neighbours in Nazareth watched His life and His growth, seeing nothing essentially unnatural or supernatural. He was marked by a wisdom that was beyond that of other children, but never for a moment did He manifest a divine wisdom that would startle men into doubting if He were indeed a child. As a child the Incarnate was wise, but His wisdom was limited by the conditions of perfect, sinless, God-assumed childhood.[3]

II

How wide these limits were St. Luke has been at pains to shew us. He tells us that the boy Jesus was at every moment being filled with wisdom: His human faculties exhibiting, that is, an under-

[1] Luke II. 7. [2] Matt. I. 13–23.
[3] Luke II. 40; IV. 22. Matt. XIII. 55.

standing and power that was the highest possible to a boy.[1]

As an instance he records the astonishment of the learned teachers and their followers in the Temple at the understanding and answers of the boy at the age of twelve. Our Lord seems to have exhibited an insight into the divine law that was beyond the power of the ordinary child. The cause of this extraordinary understanding, which no one suspected to be more than human, and which was, in fact, truly and perfectly characteristic of this perfect, God-assumed boyhood, the Evangelist traces to the underlying self-consciousness of the Incarnate.[2]

The boy Jesus, through His human soul, had come gradually and increasingly to a certain measure of self-knowledge: He knew Himself as divine Son conditioned in and by the limits of boyhood. He did not know Himself apart from boyhood; but He did know Himself as essentially independent of the world's relationships and claims. He knew His Father; and He expected others to recognize that His relation to His Father was unique.[3]

Yet we are not allowed to forget the real limits of this self-knowledge. For in the first place, Mary and Joseph were astonished at His words, being unable to fathom them; having in fact for the first time become aware of His inner knowledge of Himself. His normal life had not prepared them for this.[4]

[1] Luke II. 40.
[2] Luke II. 41–7.
[3] Luke II. 49.
[4] Luke II. 50.

And secondly, He Himself was quite naturally able to return with His mother and her husband, and to subject Himself to them.[1]

For eighteen years more the Incarnate lived among the people of Nazareth, remarkable for His wisdom, but not for His learning or His miraculous power. As man He was limited by the conditions of a sinless, perfect, God-assumed manhood. Of His inner life we have, of course, no record. We can form no conception of the ever-deepening communion of the Christ with His Father through His human soul; and we know too little of our own growth in self-consciousness to be able to speculate upon that of the divine Son conditioned in and by our manhood. Only we have St. Luke's word that the young man Jesus increased in wisdom as He grew in body; and that this wisdom won for Him favour among the people round about.[2] As a young man the Incarnate actually possessed and displayed a wisdom that was in no sense His in the years of His childhood. The growth in wisdom was the development of the Incarnate Himself—of the Son of God in manhood, who has no existence, as Incarnate, apart from His human soul.

The law of self-restraint taken upon Himself by the Logos in His state of glory made it both necessary and possible that in the state of His humiliation He should have no consciousness that His assumed, human soul could not mediate. Hence the acceptance in their due order of the limitations of baby-

[1] Luke II. 52. [2] Luke II. 52.

hood, childhood, and manhood. And hence it is that we truly speak of the growth of the Incarnate in wisdom and stature.

III

The next decisive record of our Lord's consciousness is given us in the story of His baptism.

In His thirtieth year, in the prime of His perfect manhood, the Incarnate was able to exhibit His true self in and through perfect human conditions. He had exhibited Godhead in babyhood, in childhood, and in youth; now He would exhibit it in complete manhood. And in the measure that manhood exceeds childhood, the revelation made by Christ in His manhood was more full and complete, though not more wonderful, than the revelation made in childhood.

As I have said, we are not shewn the steps that lay between His consciousness as a child and His consciousness as man. At His baptism He is seen to have attained that stage of self-knowledge in which He could say of Himself, "I and My Father are One";[1] "I came out from the Father, and am come into the world";[2] "Glorify Me with thine own self with the glory that I had with thee before the world was."[3] Of the intervening stages we are told nothing.

Again, at His baptism we see His manhood so truly developed that it could be the medium of His sufficient communion with His Father, that He might

[1] John x. 30 [2] John xiv. 28. [3] John xvii. 5.

receive from the Father that which was to be humanly translated and revealed.[1] For how many years it had been so sufficient we are not told, nor can we guess; but we are led to believe that so had the eternal Son humbled Himself that as Incarnate He did actually depend upon His human soul for His self-knowledge as God, and for His communion with the Father.

And on the day of the baptism the Incarnate was able to begin His work. His acceptance of John's baptism was an act of obedience,[2] a self-surrender to the divine law; and He accompanied it with an act of self-union with the Father in prayer.[3] Knowing Himself as Son in manhood, He approached His Father in manhood; surrendering Himself to the divinely-ordered dispensation of repentance.

Then it was that the inner self-consciousness of the Incarnate Son was at once exhibited and vindicated by the power of the Father. The opened heavens bore witness to the presence upon earth of the divine Son; the descending Spirit by His coming proclaimed both the reality and the wonderful capability of the manhood which the Son had taken; while the voice of the Father made it clear to all generations that Jesus the Son of Mary is truly and essentially God the Son, dwelling in and under the conditions of perfect, sinless, flawless manhood, such that in Him as in it, the Father is always well pleased.[4]

[1] John v. 19, 30; vii. 16; viii. 8, etc.
[2] Matt. iii. 15. [3] Luke iii. 21.
[4] Matt. iii. 13–17. Mark i. 9–11. Luke iii. 21–2. John i. 32–4.

Upon the level of self-consciousness on which the Incarnate went to His baptism He appears to have performed the works of His ministry. He never for a moment shews Himself independent of manhood's conditions. One with the Father, mindful of His former glory, conscious of all to which He is moving, He seems never to have realized Himself apart from His manhood. Always He reminds us that His Father is greater than He; that He must still go to Him with whom He is one, and in whom He is. Manhood makes the difference. The going to the Father is the uplifting of His manhood from the earthly level to the heavenly; the stripping it of its weaknesses; the setting it free from limitations; and thus enabling it to mediate a fulness of self-knowledge that is not possible upon earth.

That this is the true explanation of much that is mysterious in our Lord's words seems clear from the study of the Transfiguration of His manhood in the sight of His chosen apostles.[1]

In that wonderful incident we are shewn the capacity of the Incarnate's manhood for spiritual activities, as the divine glory is focussed in the face of Jesus: while at the same time we are told that the transfigured Lord holds communion with Moses and Elijah through His human faculties.[2] It would seem that He could not manifest His divine power for the comfort of the disciples, nor taste for a

[1] Matt. XVII. 1–8. Mark IX. 2–8. Luke IX. 28–36.
[2] Luke IX. 31.

moment of the divine glory, except through His manhood. For this reason was the divine assurance necessary, "This is my beloved Son." As if it were a danger to the Apostles to think that He who is bound by human limitations must in fact be merely human.

IV

Finally we must not fail to notice how the triumph of the Transfiguration was undisturbed by the Saviour's certain foreknowledge of the cross and passion.[1] For this consideration helps us to realize how truly limited was the divine self-consciousness of the Incarnate. Knowing Himself to be the divine Son He is mindful of His eternal glory; but knowing Himself only as divine Son in manhood He has, as Incarnate, no knowledge of a self that cannot really and properly be the subject of human suffering and death. The Transfiguration explains at once the divine heights of the Saviour's great prayer,[2] and the human depths of the Passion and Crucifixion.[3] As the time of the Passion grows nearer we become more and more aware of the limitation of the Saviour's self-knowledge.

He is pictured as anticipating His glory,[4] as moving calmly forward to His glorification with and by the Father;[5] but always His language and His actions are tempered by a recognition of limitation.[6] He

[1] Luke IX. 31. [2] John XVII. 3, 5, 20, 24.
[3] Luke XXII. 44. Matt. XXVII. 46. [4] John XVII. 1, 5.
[5] *Ibid.* XIII. 1. [6] John XVI. 7. Cf. XIV. 28; VII. 39.

cannot escape from the sense of trouble that possesses His soul;[1] He cannot avoid the prayer of the agony in the garden;[2] nor the feeling of desolation on the Cross.[3] Son of God He is, and Son of God He knows Himself to be: but it is Son of God in manhood. He does not know Himself apart from manhood. It is He Himself who is troubled; He Himself who is in bitterness of soul; He Himself who prays in agony and cries aloud in desolation; it is He Himself who cannot come to the Father except in and through His manhood.

Make what allowance we can for His foreknowledge of the Passion, His calm certainty of victory, and His miraculous power, we are still compelled to face the Gospel picture of the Incarnate who because He was man must suffer in His soul, must know the sweat of blood, and the darkness of the desolation.

To differentiate in this particular between the eternal Son and His manhood is to postulate soul-agony of an impersonal manhood, which is impossible; while to emphasize the human character of the Saviour at the cost of His deity is to rob the Passion of its value. While then we strongly maintain that the Son of God suffered only in respect to His human nature, we must not minimize the truth that He who suffered is actually the Son of God Himself. We must not think of the Incarnate as if

[1] John xii. 27. Matt. xxvi. 38.
[2] Matt. xxvi. 39-46. Luke xxii. 40-6.
[3] Matt. xxvii. 46.

He is two selves: the one divine, standing aloof from the passion; the other human, or divine-human, the subject of the sufferings and death. The Self of the Incarnate is one and one only. He who was mocked, scourged, and crucified was not conscious of another self that could not in any way be mocked or scourged or crucified. He knew Himself as divine; but as divine in manhood. And as divine in manhood He was able to experience all that belongs to manhood's state.

This way of putting the matter seems to me to be most true. The Gospel does not authorize us to regard the Saviour as being conscious of a self that could not be, and that, in fact, was not, the subject of the sufferings and mockery and death. There was not, within the sphere of the Incarnation, a second, larger, more powerful self in the background; restrained from interfering with the suffering of a lower, less powerful, limited self. Such a view does seem to hold possession of the minds of many who have been brought up in the lines of Cyrilline thought; but it has no authority in Scripture and cannot be reconciled with the dogma of the unity of the Incarnate Person.

The Christ of the Gospels is the Incarnate Son: the Son of God self-restrained in conditions of manhood. His self-consciousness as divine Son is at every moment to be measured by the capacity of His human soul to mediate it. Which measure, as being that of a soul flawless, sinless, perfectly

developed at every stage, and essentially united with the Son of God, no human intellect can rightly gauge; it is to be known only from the Gospel record. And in the Gospels it seems clear that the Incarnate possesses one single consciousness of such a content that He can really and truly be the personal subject of the most shameful treatment, spitting, mocking, crowning with thorns, scourging, and crucifixion.

So the Gospel story tells us; and as we allow the plain statement of the truth to sink into our minds, apart from any modifying explanations of the teachers whose schools we have noticed, the real meaning of the Passion of the Son of God becomes more plain, more startling, and more convincing. The horror of sin is indeed felt when we can understand that He who bore its penalty and faced its power was so limited as to be entirely at the mercy of His manhood! In manhood He had willed that the battle should be fought, in manhood He must suffer, and it was as burdened by our manhood that He went into the battle. There was no reserve of unlimited divine power in the consciousness of which the Incarnate might face His death. Divine power He had, for He is divine. But He could use no divine power that was not truly mediated by His manhood. Hence his apparent helplessness at the seat of judgement: a helplessness not personal and proper to Him as God, but assumed in the sense that it was most proper to God in the manhood that He had taken. The Incarnate really felt all the suffer-

ings Himself, in His divine self: and the medium of His suffering was the manhood in which He had willed to live a life of limited self-consciousness.

To labour this point is not, I think, to waste time. It is so very important that we should have a clear notion of the relation of the person of the Incarnate to His sufferings. And the Gospels certainly require that on the one hand we avoid the extreme Kenotic position, in which we can see no divine power at all; and on the other hand the extreme Cyrilline view of the Christ as being so nearly dual in personality that the divine person, as it were, watches Himself as man suffering. In the one case the Incarnate is deprived of the power in which He redeemed the world; in the other He is said to possess a power that has no relation to His incarnate state at all, the presence of which gives an air of unreality to the whole story of the Passion. For while it is true that He who was mocked could have slain His foes by a word, yet it is also true that the power to do so was not within His use as Incarnate, and had He exercised it He would at once have passed from the limited state of the Incarnation into the full, powerful state of the glory of the Logos. As Incarnate, as obedient to the law of self-restraint, He could not have exercised such a marvellous power. In fact, as He Himself said, had He needed help, angels would have come to His side.[1] So truly was He as Incarnate dependent!

[1] Matt. xxvi. 53.

V

This that I have claimed as a truth becomes to my mind more and more certain as we pass to consider the knowledge of the Christ.

It seems possible to classify with some definiteness the passages of the Gospels which bear upon the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ.[1]

(1) In the first class I would place all evidence for the Master's moral insight, and for the knowledge that seems to follow from that insight.

The Evangelists emphasize the insight. It was more normal than other superhuman activities; more normal to Him than the healing of the sick. He appears to have read the hearts and known the thoughts of all who were with Him. He could separate the guileless Nathanael from the self-deceived Simon the Pharisee; He could read the grumbling hearts of the scribes, and could tell the plots that were laid against Him.

Parallel with the power of insight we find His claim to be able to enter into mystical relationships with all who will come to Him; a relationship so wonderful and so intimate as to be expressed by no word so well as mutual indwelling.[2]

And as we ponder this power of the soul of the Incarnate to win by sympathetic insight a knowledge of the heart and by sympathetic love to establish a

[1] See note VI in Appendix.

[2] Matt. XI. 28. John XV. 1–8, etc.

union of the soul with Himself, it becomes clear that in fact this insight is a characteristic not of the mind but of the heart. It is not knowledge, as we estimate the knowledge of facts and events, but knowledge in the sense in which by sympathy the loving heart apprehends the heart of the beloved. So that we come to see that the moral insight of the Incarnate is most truly explained as the power of divine omnipresence, conditioned by its incarnation in true manhood. Does this sound strange to us? What is the omnipresence of God except the attribute of being able at every moment to maintain single, particular relations with each creature of His love and power? And in the Incarnate Son the measure of omnipresence that is possible to Him as true man is manifested to us in His ability through human love and sympathy to attract to Himself those who are destined for union with Him, just as He is able, on the other hand, to repel those whose hearts are turned from Him.

To this conditioned, limited power of omnipresence, then, would I ascribe all the examples of insight of which the Gospels speak. And I think we may include in these examples the foresight that made Him aware of Peter's fall, as well as the heart-sympathy that made Him aware of the death of Lazarus.

What limits there were to the action of omnipresence in manhood it is difficult to determine. We may, perhaps, guess that inanimate objects, as being outside the scope of mutual human love or

hatred, were normally outside its sphere of exercise; at any rate, I find no evidence to the contrary in the Gospels.

Beyond this, it is to be remembered that the Incarnate is pictured by the Evangelists as entirely unrelated to any one outside the environment in which as man He moved. There is every reason to say that outside the sphere in which men came into contact with Him through His manhood the Incarnate did not exercise any power at all. The wider relations are His as the glorious Logos. The conditioned omnipresence was exercised only in the environment of the Incarnation of which the Gospels give us the history. The Incarnate was troubled by the death of Lazarus; but the thousands who died daily in the Roman Empire did not affect the manhood of the Christ: they were outside the scope of the conditioned omnipresence: they affected Him only in His universal sphere as Logos unlimited.

But no one who came within the sphere of the activity of the Christ could escape from the insight that He possessed.

(2) The second class of instances I find to have reference to His Passion.

Christ is pictured as having a very clear and definite foreknowledge of His Passion and glorification. He moves towards it as one who knows each step of the way, taking each step at its appointed moment.

And parallel with this foreknowledge we find a supernatural power of self-preservation, by which He

prevents His enemies from harming Him before His time.[1]

This foreknowledge is so mediated by His human mind as to be compatible with a very real bitterness of soul and trouble of heart, just as His power of self-preservation is always exercised humanly, never passing the limits of human possibility and in no way rendering unreal His final self-surrender to His enemies. At least it was so humanly mediated as not to betray His real nature to His enemies.

Here then I feel we are in the sphere in which conditioned omniscience is at work with conditioned omnipotence. I mean we are in sight of what from the normal standpoint must be regarded as miraculous.

It seems to me that just as He who was normally subject to human weakness did, on the right occasions, for fitting reasons, manifest divine power through His manhood; so did He who was normally subject to human limitations of mind, on the right occasions, for fitting reasons, manifest a divine knowledge under conditions of human thought. Being who He was there can be no doubt that His human mind was always mediating divine knowledge according to its powers; but on occasions some special exhibition was made for some special purpose.

(3) This becomes clearer if we examine the types of knowledge that I would put in a third class. Thus the incident of the coin-bearing fish, the vision of the ass and the colt at the cross-roads, and that of

[1] Luke IV. 30. John VIII. 59; X. 39.

the man carrying the pitcher of water may all be described as supernatural. It is possible to explain away the two last cases: but even so the case of the fish must be accounted for. And in it I see a special act of Incarnate divine knowledge, in which the manhood could co-operate. Examples of prophetic knowledge of the kind are sufficiently numerous to justify our view that the manhood could in Christ mediate such special knowledge; and the fact that He Himself is the Word of God, the Lord of the prophets, will keep us from regarding His knowledge as due to a mere inspiration by the Spirit as in their case.

There seems, then, to be no reason to doubt that conditioned omniscience was mediated by the human mind of Christ in the measure that was compatible with His true human thought; that a special knowledge was manifested in respect to the Passion as being the very goal of His incarnate life; and that on occasions, for special reasons, He did exercise a knowledge that astonishes us.

But there is no kind of evidence that the normal knowledge exercised by our Lord was superhuman. We should expect the perfect man, the man who lives in the power of God, to possess a mind far higher and clearer and more informed than the normal human mind; but we do not associate with human knowledge however perfect a miraculous power of reaching the truth by short cuts. And in the Gospels there is no evidence that our Lord

ever did so. Whatever of divine knowledge He brought into play it was always humanly appropriated, humanly assimilated, humanly mediated, and humanly communicated. It was always on the level on which men could rise to grasp it. It was, in fact, made subject to the laws that rightly govern sinless humanity.

(4) The fourth class of evidence to Christ's knowledge makes this quite certain, I think. There is a set of passages that require for their interpretation a certain limitation of knowledge in our Lord. Not, I think, that they argue ignorance of what a human mind ought to have known. Not that! But they do argue a very true acquiescence in that ignorance which is proper to the mind of man.

The passages in view consist of several questions which on the surface suggest that they are sincere requests for information, and of the declaration of our Lord that He did not know the day and hour of the last judgement.[1]

With regard to the last saying, we may set on one side those interpretations that seek to save our Lord's omniscience as man by arguing for an assumed ignorance, or by differentiating His divine and human knowledge as Incarnate. We must believe that the Incarnate Son, speaking as the Incarnate Son, did not know the day. He was not acting a part, pretending not to know; nor was He Himself aware of the day while His human mind could not

[1] Matt. xxiv. 36. Mark xiii. 32.

or might not receive the knowledge and communicate it to others. The truth is that the Incarnate knows nothing that He cannot receive through His human soul. He exercises divine omniscience conditioned in manhood. And here we meet the one great fact of human life that no human mind can conceive. To know the day and hour of judgement is to know each single soul, to trace the history of each family and tribe and nation, to see all men and nations in one whole, and to become conscious of the exact moment of time in which the lines of opportunity of individuals and nations come to their end, meeting in the single point of completed destiny. In fact, it is to have universal relations to the creation: the very thing that the Son of God renounced, within a definite sphere, when He became incarnate. The Incarnate lives in a set of particular relations with a selected few; and those relations depend upon His manhood. How, then, could He know the day of judgement? He knew it only in His universal sphere as the glorious Logos, and of Himself as glorious Logos He never spoke to men. He knew Himself only as God in manhood, within the sphere of the Incarnation.

To sum up then—the knowledge of the day of judgement is not possible to one who is living under conditions of manhood; no human mind can receive it; and therefore the Incarnate Son did not know it.

The Incarnate Son in manhood, conditioned by

manhood, self-conscious through manhood, is the Son who did not know the day of the last judgement. And in the Gospel the word Son has no other connotation. If then we can so think of Him this most difficult passage of Scripture is found to yield a meaning that commends itself to our moral sense as well as to our reason. We can take the saying as a simple expression of fact, without any reservation.

Let us now turn to the questions that seem to expect and require information.

At the outset it is right to say that very various explanations of our Lord's questions have been given. There is, for example, no doubt that He constantly employed questions as a means to instruction; He often tempered His rebukes by throwing them into the form of queries; and He was so naturally human as to use questions as a means for opening up or carrying on a conversation. But in the last resort there are a few questions that He asked which are not patient of any such interpretations. And I propose to discuss two or three of them with a view to establishing the truth that Christ did depend upon others for information. It is not to the point to discover how often He did so: that He did so on two or three occasions is enough for our purpose.

In the first place, then, there is the startling query, "Who touched Me?"[1]

Our Lord's strength had just healed a woman, who had come behind Him in the crowd and touched the

[1] Mark v. 30. Luke VIII. 45–7.

hem of His garment. Christ at once stopped, and demanded who it was who had touched Him. Many students say that He asked the question for the sake of the woman, He Himself knowing quite well who it was that had touched Him. They argue that He who was able to heal must have been able to know; suggesting, that is, that a special exhibition of His conditioned omnipotence through His body would necessarily be accompanied by a special exhibition of conditioned omniscience through His human mind. But against this view is the whole tenor of the story as told by the Evangelists. It is more than clear that the Apostles did not expect our Lord to know who had touched Him. They were surprised not at His ignorance, but at His supposing that He could find out the truth! In so large a crowd no one could be discovered who wished to conceal himself. Why, then, did the Master ask? The disciples assume that He must remain in ignorance. They are familiar enough with His manifestations of conditioned omnipotence, but special exhibitions of conditioned omniscience were not so common as to be expected. Surely they would, otherwise, have answered, "Master, thou knowest." But they said, "Thou seest the multitude thronging thee, and sayest thou, Who touched me?"

It seems certain that the disciples judged our Lord to be ignorant upon this point; that His ignorance did not astonish them or worry them; and that they meant to convey to us the fact of His ignorance.

If we ask for an explanation it is perhaps wisest to deny ourselves. We must not complain that the facts are what they are: we must merely account for them in any theory we advance. But in view of the peculiar nature of the problem before us it may be well to suggest that perhaps no power of conditioned omnipresence could supply insight in the case of one of whom our Lord as yet had no ordinary, personal knowledge in the sphere of the Incarnation, or who had not as yet by faith opened her heart to Him as did Nicodemus. Or we may say that it was a case for the omniscience of the Christ, conditioned by His manhood, and that there was no sufficient reason for a special manifestation of it. But of such explanations I am myself inclined to be shy: it seems better to take the facts as the Bible gives them to us, without any attempt to fathom their hidden cause and meaning.

In the second place there is the query: "How many loaves have ye?"[1] It is said that this question is merely a means of testing the faith of the disciples or of opening up the incident. But St. John is careful to tell us that Christ tried their faith by the earlier question: "Where shall we buy bread, that these may eat?"[2] The question about the loaves is taken simply and naturally by the Apostles, and is answered by one of their number. They are not surprised at being asked for information; they do not give it as men who are acting a part. No! He

[1] Mark vi. 38. [2] John vi. 5, 6.

asked and they answered because He needed to know. As I have said above, there is no evidence that inanimate creatures came within the limited scope of the conditioned omnipresence of the Incarnate: His insight could not give Him a knowledge of loaves. Again, it is evident that the disciples were not accustomed to find in our Lord an exercise of superhuman knowledge such as would make His question unnecessary. Nor may we assume that a special output of His conditioned omniscience would accompany a special output of omnipotence. Where there is no special need there is no sign of the abnormal: and always the limits of the abnormal are fixed by the measure of His perfect, God-aided manhood. Thus it seems wiser to accept the story as it stands, and to see in our Lord normal human ignorance of the number of the loaves. Had it been necessary for Him to know it then, if we assume that such knowledge could be mediated by a human mind we say that undoubtedly He would have known it.

In exactly the same way would I explain a third question, that uttered before the raising of Lazarus. "Where have ye laid him?"[1] The Incarnate knew that Lazarus was dead by the exercise of conditioned omnipresence, drawn out by His love for His friend; He would raise him by an act of conditioned omnipotence for the glory of His Father; but there is no evidence that He exercised supernaturally His conditioned omniscience. What He

[1] John xi. 34.

could easily discover by asking He would not otherwise come to know. To have done so would have been to break the law of self-restraint which is the door of the state of Incarnation.

Nor was any one surprised at His question. Mary and Martha had thought it necessary to inform Jesus of the sickness of their brother; they did not hesitate to warn Him about the state of the corpse in the grave; and they clearly regarded the query as to the place of the grave to be in keeping with what they knew of the Master and His powers.

This cannot, I think, be too strongly urged: the impression made by our Lord upon His disciples and friends. So far from refusing to allow one single question to be a request for information, I think the true view is that our Lord's extraordinary exercise of His conditioned omniscience was of somewhat rare occurrence.

This is not difficult to explain on the theory that I am advocating. The Incarnate is God the Son conditioned in and by manhood. His divine powers are always in His possession; but the conscious exercise of them is controlled by the law of restraint which He imposed upon Himself at the moment of the Incarnation. Within the sphere of relationships that are His as Incarnate this law is valid and binding for ever. It is the self-sacrifice of the eternal Son for our sakes. And by this law the Incarnate has no possible means of self-knowledge or of the exercise of His divine powers that He cannot find in the

manhood that He has assumed. These means are not of fixed content, for as the manhood grows and moves onwards to its glory its power of mediating the divine must necessarily increase. But for ever the manhood is the measure of the self-consciousness and self-manifestation of the divine Son as Incarnate.

Thus the divine power of omnipresence, conditioned by manhood's limits, provides Him with the love that opens to Him the secrets of men's hearts and the way to union with their very souls. And since love is the motive and union with men the goal of the Incarnation, this power is normally in action; to a degree that seems to us supernatural, but which, in fact, was compatible with a life that men recognized as human.

His divine power over His creatures and their destiny that we call omnipotence, conditioned by manhood's limits, establishes Him as master of all circumstances, and is specially exhibited in many works of power and mercy; as He reasserts the supremacy of the divine law in a world ruined by sin. Such works or miracles are many, but they are not strictly normal, occurring only within the last three years of His life on earth. But we see that they were necessary to His mission, and we find that they were so performed as not to destroy for a moment the impression of the true humanity of the prophet of Nazareth.

His divine power of omniscience, conditioned by manhood's limits, provides Him with the infallible

knowledge that is the basis of His teaching, and with all the knowledge necessary to His work. He is never for a moment at the mercy of any one: He is always supremely the Master. And on occasions, in as far as there is need and His human mind can mediate it, He makes a special exhibition of divine knowledge. Such exhibitions are to be ranked as on the same level with His miracles of healing; but they were so rare that a repetition of them was not expected by the disciples.

VI

This explanation of the Gospel picture of the Christ's consciousness helps us to understand how it was that He was able to feel and express astonishment.

We are told that He was surprised at people's unbelief; that He was astonished to find no figs upon the tree just before His Passion; and that His disciples were so slow in developing faith that He wondered at them.[1] Again, when He came out of retirement with His disciples He found a crowd of people whom He evidently did not expect.[2]

It would of course be impossible to account for these facts were we to suppose that our Lord habitually exercised even a conditioned omniscience in such a degree as to have a miraculous knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word. But if it be true

[1] Mark VI. 6; VII. 18; VIII. 19; XI. 22; XIV. 37.
[2] Mark VI. 34.

that normally His knowledge of others is really insight, and if we are right in basing this insight upon the power of conditioned omnipresence, we are able to see how it was that He who read so much of man's heart could yet truly marvel at the absence of what He had expected to find in it. And if so be the conditioned omnipresence was specially limited in the direction of inanimate creatures, as I have suggested above, the incident of the fig-tree becomes intelligible and plain.

So that the presence of wonder and astonishment in the soul of our Lord seems to me to be evidence on the side of the explanation of His consciousness that I have tried to elaborate. It is at once the proof that insight and not mere apprehension of facts is His most characteristic form of knowledge; and that the limits of His insight were formed by the limits of His human mind, in itself perfect and aided by its union with the divine person of the Son of God.

VII

How, then, are we to account for our Lord's authority as a teacher? In what light are we to regard His infallibility?

As our teacher, He is the infallible guide of mankind. For He is the Incarnate Word of God, the very true Word in conditions of manhood. He brings to men all divine truth that can be assimilated by Himself as perfect man, through a perfect

human soul that is essentially the soul of Him who is perfect God. All that He can receive and teach through such a soul He knows and teaches. What He cannot so receive He cannot so communicate; and even were He able to do so, lesser human souls would not be able to receive the revelation. Thus He is the perfect truth of God; the Mirror of God's Being for us men.

Apart from this sphere of the revelation of divine truth, we do not see in Him any supernatural knowledge that is not either necessitated by His work or essential to His state. He does not, in fact, reveal to us what men are able to acquire by their own faculties, nor does He normally exhibit such a supernatural knowledge as to make His followers marvel. On the other hand, there is no evidence that He was ignorant of anything that His followers expected Him to know: except that one particular fact which we have seen to be outside the human sphere.

But men ask, Could He err? Did He, in fact, make mistakes? Did He accept the errors of His age, as well as the limitations of manhood? To all such questions we give a definite, decided negative. He could not err. Every word He spoke is for ever true.

It is to me plain that the Incarnate could not relate to Himself through His human mind the day of the last judgement. His human mind was inadequate to the task. And it is equally plain to me that His dependence upon His human mind in His

Incarnate state was an act of His own will as eternal Son; an act based on love and performed through divine power. There is no element of compulsion about it. But none the less it is an act that He will not for a moment undo.

But nothing will ever make it legitimate to say that a matter was related to the Son as Incarnate as being a truth which at the same moment was related to the Son as unlimited Logos as being a lie. The unity of the person of the Word is the pledge of the infallible truth of every word He spoke.

The mind of Jesus was only Jewish in so far as the Jewish mind of His age reflected the truth. Every word that He uttered is for ever true. Human the mind was and is to this day: human, truly and completely; but whatever its limitations, whatever the measure of its ignorance, whatever the medium of its self-expression, it was and is infallibly true. We have no guarantee for the truth of the revelation of God to the saints in Heaven through the glorified Christ, which is not equally valid as a guarantee for the truth of every word He spoke on earth. The guarantee lies in the fact that He who speaks is God the Son.

We may, of course, argue concerning the extent to which He spoke parabolically, or in local idiom, or in the figurative terms of ordinary Jewish speech; we may even allow for interpolations by the Evangelists; but in the last resort, when we have arrived at a difficult saying that is clearly Christ's plain, de-

liberate utterance, we have no choice but to accept it as the last word upon the subject, and wait for the world to come round to His view of the matter. Some of us may feel, perhaps, that men go too far in minimizing the utterances that are to be taken as final. And all of us must at last face the choice of Christ's word or the world's wisdom. "Lord, to whom shall we go?" "I am the Truth."

VIII

It will have become clear that I am anxious to put side by side the phenomena that result from Christ's exceptional use of His conditioned omnipotence and those issuing from the exceptional exercise of His conditioned omniscience.

The parallel is extraordinarily exact. He possesses both qualities in His own right; the exercise of both is limited and conditioned by His acceptance of His own law of self-restraint; the exhibition of both at every moment requires the exercise of the corresponding faculty of His manhood, and strictly accords with the capacity of that faculty. There is no activity of the divine qualities apart from the human faculties; but there is a continuous activity of both up to the normal capacity of the human powers. The Incarnate is not manifestly omnipotent; but He exercises omnipotence under the conditions of human flesh. He is not manifestly omniscient, but He exercises omniscience under the conditions of human thought. Omnipotence and

omniscience were not abandoned: for they are not fixed quantities of power of energy: they are the symbols of the activities of the divine Will and the divine Mind.

So, again, the parallel holds as to the external causes that go to increase the limitations of these powers. The absence of faith hindered our Lord from manifesting His power; and it was the presence of human need that seems to have called out the special manifestations of the divine knowledge.

Parallel with the foreknowledge of the Passion is His power of self-preservation; and parallel with a measure of ignorance is the normal weakness of Christ's humanity.

The conclusion that is suggested to my mind is that our Lord only exercised His power in the degree that we call miraculous when He was in contact with those who had voluntarily come within the special set of relationships that make up the sphere of the Incarnation—coming either for their salvation or for the frustration of God's will; and that even within that narrow sphere His exercise of miraculous power was still further narrowed to those occasions on which it was demanded by His desire for God's glory and man's good. Thus it was that His miracles of healing are far more frequent than His miracles of mind. But let us remember that all these manifestations of power are miraculous only from our point of view. They are, in fact, the proper works of the Incarnate.

This parallel then I think is deserving of attention, together with my plea for a recognition of the action of the power of omnipresence in the Incarnate.

It is, I venture to think, in the acceptance of some such view as this of the person and consciousness of the Christ that we shall escape on the one hand from the duality that opposes divine nature to human nature, divine attribute to human attribute, finding no real unification at all; and, on the other hand, from the extreme views of Kenosis that remove from the sphere of the Incarnation the very powers of which our fallen nature stood in need.

One Christ He is: not only as being one divine Person, but because He lives personally in His divine nature entirely under the conditions of His perfect, God-assumed manhood. God of God: very God of very God: yet true man born of Mary: knowing Himself only as the divine Son in manhood. Truly "He is not ashamed to call us brethren." And all this because that which could not be mediated by manhood could never be received by mankind; even as that in manhood which He did not assume could could not be lifted up into God.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CHRIST AND EVIL SPIRITS

OUR Lord Jesus Christ was led by the Holy Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the Devil. This was the first pitched battle of the holy war, for which He had come in our nature, and it is as such that the Evangelists have recorded it.[1]

The Temptation of Christ is not to be regarded primarily as affording an example to sinners: first and chiefly it is the necessary meeting of God and Satan in the great contest for the kingship of the human race. Of course the manner of the contest, the methods of warfare adopted by our Lord, the craft of Satan, the nature of the temptations, all these serve us either as examples or warnings: but we are not to regard the knowledge of them as of primary importance. The Temptation would have been necessary, even if the story of it had never been made public.

For in the wilderness, during those forty days, the Lord Jesus in our nature and on our behalf met Satan; and for us He conquered him, and cast him

[1] Matt. IV. 1–11. Mark I. 12, 13. Luke IV. 1–13.

down from the earthly throne on which we, by our disobedience, had seated him. The Saviour won for us the decisive battle in a campaign that cannot cease until the glorified Jesus and Satan meet again in the day of God's wrath. Our part meanwhile is to lay hold of the power of Him Who conquered, and in that same power to strive to win our little battles day by day, keeping Satan from re-establishing his dominion in our corner of the earth.

So that it is with the power of the tempted Christ rather than with His methods that we are chiefly concerned. We need to know what it is in itself, and how we may come to share it. Knowing this, and being assured of His presence within us, we are able to put ourselves to school with Christ's methods.

I

What, then, is the exact meaning of Christ's Temptation? How was He tempted? What power had Satan over Him?

We have seen that the Incarnate Son in assuming our human nature willed to live entirely under the conditions and within the limits of manhood. Both Godward and manward manhood mediated His consciousness and His exercise of personal powers. In this world of ours He lived relating to Himself every circumstance in His environment through His human faculties. Thus in the measure that these faculties were really human, and not merely assumed organs

of divine activities, He laid Himself open to the action of circumstances that were, in fact, not fit to be related to Himself. He could not be really human if His human faculties only dealt with a select number of the forces at work in the world. His mind must come into contact with the thought of His age, selecting, differentiating, approving, and rejecting. And with the sinless Christ rejection implies the action upon Him of external forces. So with His will, if He be truly man His will must not only go forth to draw to Himself the good: it must also be a barrier against the action of what is evil.

Thus the moment that God the Son became truly man, conditioning Himself in manhood, He became an object of attack to the normal forces of evil. Thus Satan had at once the necessary handle of temptation in the Son of Mary. Satan found the Christ with a set of relationships with the Father and with men which depended upon His human faculties. To pervert these relationships by the misdirection of one or more of these faculties seemed to him to be possible. He had succeeded in doing so with every man from the days of Adam: he knew no reason why he should not succeed with the Son of Mary, the Prophet of Nazareth, whom he suspected of being the Messiah.

Satan therefore set himself to his task, apparently with a double aim. He wished to defeat Jesus; he also wished to discover the secret of the personality of one who had for thirty years avoided sin. There

can, I suppose, be no doubt that the sinlessness of Christ gave Satan pause, suggesting to him a mysterious personality, or a miraculous gift of strength from on high; while on the other hand His evident humanity prevented the adversary from apprehending the truth.

In the first instance,[1] then, the Devil framed a temptation that made its appeal to human lust, to the desire for food; but he put it in such a way as to shew that he regarded our Lord as being capable of working a miracle.

Secondly, he tried to reach human pride in our Lord, suggesting an act of self-advertisement in such a way as to recognize His supernatural relation to the Father.

And, lastly, he made the proposal to gratify our Lord's desire to reign over men in such a way as to make possible an escape from death, if so be He were the Christ of God.

In each temptation Satan provided against the possible presence of supernatural power and prerogative in Christ; but in each case he made his appeal to what is really human. The lust for food, the pride that loves adulation and independence, the craving for power, the fear of sufferings: to all these Satan made his offer. And in each case the acceptance of the offer carried with it the misuse of the supernatural power.

The Son of Mary remained unmoved, tasting the

[1] I follow St. Matthew's account.

bitterness of the struggle to the end, in a measure that no one else can ever reach. There are who have learned to hate the dregs of Satan's cup who yet loved the first draught, and were intoxicated by it. There are who have learned to hate the cup who yet have not the courage to dash it to the ground. Jesus alone perfectly hated the cup from the first; and in Him alone was found nothing that could make its bitterness seem sweet: He alone did not surrender to its fumes. He could gaze into the cup, hating it, shuddering at its contents, and leave it untasted. Therefore it is that the struggle was for Him most fierce. He never yielded, and He remained unyielding until Satan had exhausted upon Him all his craft and power.

II

As Satan tempted Christ through His human faculties so by the exercise of those same faculties Christ conquered Satan.

As we read the story we realize how entirely the Incarnate was confined within the limits of manhood. His human lust and desire He entirely controls in dependence upon His Father; and He defeats Satan by an act of dependence upon God. "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God."

His human will and heart He controls in profound self-subjection, pride having no part or lot in Him. The temptation to pride and self-exaltation He

meets by an act of humility. "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God."

And His mind and will are again perfect in their complete acceptance of the divine purpose and will. So that the temptation to acknowledge another as rightful king, and to fulfil God's design in a way that is not God's, was met by an act of adoration and obedience. "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God; and Him only shalt thou serve."

It is all quite natural: it is just what we should imagine in a perfect man. Every human faculty is tested: each is found true to its divinely ordered work: and each is found linked to the divine will by a voluntary choice that is expressed in the words of the Jewish law.

III

But when we go deeper and ask what exactly was the power that the Incarnate exercised in His contest with Satan, the solution of the question is not so simple.

In the first place, we know that no man ever conquered Satan completely from the first to the last except the Christ; and the world's experience goes to support the view that they who are most successful in resisting him now are those who in some way or another look for help to Christ. There is absolutely no evidence that merely human power ever conquered Satan; and there is no real justification for the assumption that unaided manhood ever could

have done so. Perfect Man conquers, but perfect man is not mere man: he is God-aided man. The whole dogma of the Incarnation starts from two postulates: that God can come to indwell the human race, and that the human race without the indwelling of God cannot become perfect. So that as Christians we seem committed to the view that the perfect man Christ Jesus conquered Satan just because He is not mere man.

And, secondly, in the view of the manner of the Incarnation that I am advocating we find a reconciliation of the ideas of superhuman power and human power. The incarnate is God the Son under conditions of manhood; and His divine powers He possesses within and up to the measure in which His human faculties can mediate them. This power is God's gift to mankind; it is itself divine, but unless it can be strictly mediated by human faculties, appropriated by and assimilated to manhood, it can avail men nothing. In its exercise, in its fulness, and in its limitations it must be completely measured by manhood's capacity. Thus the Incarnate was tempted as man, humanly, and He conquered as man, humanly; but He Himself is not merely man, nor was the power mediated by His manhood merely human. And therefore is He able to succour all who come to Him for help: communicating to them of His own divine power, but always through His manhood, and always in the measure of the varying capacity of their own human faculties.

The theory that constitutes the manhood of Christ in the unlimited Word of God fails us here; for it provides for the presence of an unlimited divine power that no human nature could either assimilate or mediate, and that the human race is unable to appropriate. Also it opens the way to the belief that Christ conquered Satan by an act of divine power that has no real connection with us; with which, in fact, no human being could ever co-operate.

While, on the other hand, the extreme Kenotists so deprive the Christ of His divine powers as ultimately to require us to regard His victory as due merely to human power, thereby rendering unnecessary the Incarnation of God and God's power in our flesh.

The humanitarian view, so popular to-day, that rejoices in the merely human character of Christ's victory and emphasizes the value of His human example, ignores the fact to which attention has already been drawn that Christ's example is not human in the sense that He Who set it is merely human. However much we may strip the Incarnate of His divine powers and attributes He is still a divine person, and His example is only human as that set by a divine person living under the conditions proper to man. If we go further and strip the Incarnate of His divine personality we render the word incarnation meaningless in connection with Him.

Humanitarian Christologians have failed to bring Christ near to men. For first they tell us that He

used no powers that are not proper to mankind; and then they are driven to admit that in the last resort there is a gulf between the personality of the Christ and our personality. How, then, can we be saved? Can we receive of the personality of the Son of God? Or shall we return to the Catholic conception of the Christ, acknowledge Him to possess divine power under human conditions, and in that divine power humanly mediated find our salvation and our strength?

Surely it is clear gain to Christian thought to discover in the Gospels the picture of the divine Son living within the limits of humanity as true subject of a complete manhood, and exercising in His conflict with Satan divine power conditioned by the capacity of His perfect human soul. For in such a Christ we see Him who through all the ages is as glorified Son of Man the fountain of divine strength to all who have become His members, bone of His bone, and flesh of His flesh; giving it forth to them just in the measure in which each one can receive, assimilate, and exercise it through his human faculties.

IV

In confirmation of this view of the Christ I would adduce evidence from the Gospel witness to the relations of the evil spirits to Him.

It is most striking that whereas Satan was very uncertain of Christ's personality before he went into

battle in the wilderness, after the conflict all the evil spirits, the angels of Satan, recognize Him as in some sense divine. They knew Him as Lord of their lord, as Son of God, as the Holy One of God.[1] But at the same time so truly was His deity conditioned in manhood that the full truth of His person was not completely apprehended by them. For we are told that Satan departed from Him only for a season,[2] and the devils whose name was Legion dared to adjure Christ in the name of God.[3]

It is difficult to say how far this evidence will take us. It is I think probable that Satan's return refers not to temptations as such, but to the trials of the ministry and the sufferings of the Passion and Crucifixion; or perhaps the battlefield was the hearts of men whom Christ sought to win. And there is no reason to expect that the devils would be able to reconcile the divinity of Christ with their own belief in the one God. But I do think that the evidence may fairly be held to prove on the one hand the presence of real divine power in the Christ such as no human person could exercise; and on the other hand the very true mediation of that divine power through the manhood of the Christ.

I think, then, that we are quite justified in saying that the Evangelists mean us to regard the victory of Christ as belonging to Him as perfect man; that they do not suggest the presence of any divine

[1] Mark I. 34; V. 7, etc. [2] Luke IV. 13. [3] Mark V. 7.

power that could not be mediated and exercised by God-aided manhood. While at the same time they also mean us to understand that the army of Satan discerned in the perfect manhood the true nature of the perfecting power, and knew it to be divine in essence.

In fact, the Scriptures depict Christ as the power of God for Satan's overthrow.[1] In them the Son of Mary becomes the ideal man: the man in whose likeness are found all those who by faith have surrendered themselves to His will and appropriated His life and His power. He is shewn to us as using to Satan's destruction the very human faculties which mankind had abused in weakness, thereby establishing that evil one as their king and lord. In that same power are we in our turn and in our measure to conquer and reach our perfection. The power in which we are to conquer to-day is the very same in which He conquered of old. There is no gulf between the power of the Redeemer and the power of the redeemed. He did not conquer in merely human power that we might have divine power at our command. No! The power is one and the same. Divine in essence it is yet truly human in the sense that it is available only in so far as manhood can assimilate it, co-operate with it through the will, and exercise it through human faculties.

[1] Matt. XII. 28; XXV. 31 ff. Cf. 2 Thess. I. 7; Rev. XIX. 11–16, etc. etc.

The modern mind suggests that Jesus Christ did not possess in His manhood the power that He communicates to each soul that turns to Him. But I think it will be found that the Son of Mary is representative of mankind not only on the sacrificial side but also on the side of human weakness. The manhood of Christ would not have been perfect had it not shared divine power in the measure in which it could make it its own; even as we have no life apart from the divine life of the Son of God.

The Christ victorious over temptations is not the type of the heathen man struggling towards the light: He is the type of the God-indwelt Christian who, in the power of God humanly exercised, seeks to rescue himself and others, soul and body, from the assaults of Satan.

CHAPTER IX

THE CHRIST AND HIS FELLOW-MEN

WE cannot regard as satisfactory a theory of the manner of the Incarnation that does not take account of the impressions made by the Christ upon His friends and neighbours, and of the relations that existed between Him and them.

I

At the outset we have to consider the family-life of the Incarnate. Born of Mary He lived under the charge of her husband Joseph, who treated Him as his son. The family of Joseph was not a small one: he had several sons and daughters by his first wife;[1] and they appear in Scripture always as the brethren and sisters of Jesus.[2] Thus from babyhood the Lord Jesus had lived in a large household, one among many. Whatever characteristics were His they were well known to all His relations, and the effect that they produced upon them must be noticed.

We gather that, apart from the astonishment of

[1] See note VII. [2] Matt. XIII. 55, 56.

His mother and Joseph at the behaviour of the boy Jesus in the Temple in His twelfth year,[1] there was nothing in their view of Him that can be called as evidence to any abnormal demeanour of the Christ as a lad and young man. He was famous for His wisdom; but His life was that of the son of a carpenter, and so far had He entered into it that His brethren appear not to have expected anything else from Him. When therefore the youngest son of the house began His ministry His relations were struck by wonder. St. Mark tells us that they regarded Christ as being beside Himself,[2] while St. John records that His brethren did not believe upon Him.[3] St. James, His step-brother, did not believe on Him until after He had risen from the dead.[4]

Thus we are well provided with evidence to the naturally human demeanour of our Lord in His home-life. For thirty years He lived at home, and during all that time He in no way exhibited any signs of abnormal power. His life afforded His relations no clue at all to the extraordinary manifestations of wisdom and power that mark His ministry.

There can, I think, be no doubt that the Incarnate was most entirely conditioned by boyhood and manhood in His home-life; and that He never betrayed any sign of being more than a perfect lad and a perfect young man. Of course, the actual evidence is slight. But the unbelief of the brethren and the

[1] Luke II. 41 ff.
[2] Mark III. 21, 31 ff. Cf. parallels.
[3] John VII. 5.
[4] Cf. 1 Cor. XV. 7.

doubts they had of His sanity must be allowed great weight. How far the family view of the Christ had become known to His cousin, John the Baptist, we cannot say; but it is possible that it may have been a factor in the doubt that overtook John in his prison-house.[1] Eighteen years of practical silence and self-suppression was a heavy trial to those who had hoped for Messiah's reign. It is even possible that Mary's wonder at her Son was just a little balanced, though not outweighed, by her experience of His normal, quiet life in her house. We can hardly believe that the message of the angel had lost its force, but it appears to be the fact that she went with her step-sons to induce our Lord to leave off teaching the multitudes.[2] She may have gone for His sake, to soften the blow of the family's mistrust; but I think we must admit that she had no such evidence of abnormal powers in Jesus as would avail to make her stepsons change their policy.

This being so, it seems impossible to accept the view that the Incarnate was living in manhood in the unlimited exercise of His divine powers; restraining them only on occasions to allow the human faculties to have their way. What is normal in Christ is the exercise of the human faculties.

On the other hand the extreme Kenotic theories find support in the evidence that we have so far adduced. The Christ in whom His brethren did not

[1] Matt. XI. 2 ff. and parallels.
[2] Mark III. 21 and 31 ff.

believe might be said to have abandoned His divine powers, were such a theory compatible with the rest of the evidence. Here and here alone do Kenotists find a slight basis for their position; but it will be found to vanish as we proceed.

The attitude of the neighbours agrees with that of the brethren. They appear to have known Jesus to have been very wise, but not exceptionally well taught,[1] and not possessed of any extraordinary powers. He had never impressed them as being of a higher class of intellect than His brethren and sisters. His great distinction was His wisdom.

When therefore He became famous throughout the land, they were troubled and offended. He called Himself the Messiah: He, the son of their village carpenter, who had given no sign of so high an office. They heard of His teachings and His miracles, but the life He had lived amongst them was for them decisive proof that He was not the Messiah.

II

Our Lord chose His friends from among His disciples; men who had faith in Him and His mission. With these friends He lived in the closest intimacy for three years, being almost always with them. They must have seen Him in every kind of circumstance, heard Him teach on every subject that could concern their souls, and received from Him the

[1] Luke IV. 22, 28. Cf. II. 52.

clearest indication of His work and its issues. Further than this He chose three from their number who were privileged to witness His inner life, to have a glimpse of His glory, and some insight into His life of prayer.[1]

Apart from His disciples He had special friends at Bethany in the house of Lazarus. There He shewed Himself in His hours of weariness, resting from His works, and seeking quiet and refreshment.[2]

What, then, was the impression made upon these friends by the Christ?

We have already seen that the disciples were not astonished at Christ's request for information, and that Martha did not regard it as superfluous to warn Him of her brother's illness, and of the state of his body in the grave.[3] Thomas could not trust his Master to save Himself from the Jews, although he knew Him so well as to wish to die with Him.[4] No! with all the experience they had of His miracles, His authority as a teacher, His sinlessness, and His personal power they were still accustomed to His true human life amongst them. They never ceased to regard Him as truly human. The Christ of God He was: the Son of God: but His manhood entirely limited and conditioned Him. Had it been otherwise, to have lived with Him day by day would surely have passed the power of the apostles.

[1] Matt. xvii. 1–8; xxvi. 37–46 and parallels.
[2] John xi. 1–3. Luke x. 38 ff. Matt. xxi. 17.
[3] John xi. 3, 39. [4] John xi. 16.

They believed in Him and His mission: their belief had been confirmed to some of them by a voice from heaven;[1] and yet so human was He that the moment He was bound by the soldiers His friends forsook Him and fled.[2] They were always more conscious of His manhood than of His divine personality. He was known to them as man; perfect man yet truly human. So slow of apprehension were they, so influenced by the reality of His human faculties, that each miracle seemed to them merely a disturbance of the normal in life. It was as if God were interfering by means of their Master, rather than as if the Master Himself were divine.

This I think is the impression that the Evangelists give as to the first faith of the friends of Jesus. They, of course, emphasize the other side most strongly: they strive to make clear to us how truly superhuman the power of the Incarnate is. But they do not conceal from us their own first thoughts.[3]

St. Mark is the historian of the miraculous works of the Christ; but he has made it clear that the miraculous power was so conditioned by manhood as to be compatible with an ordinary human life.

All that was needed for the confirmation of the faith of Christ's friends was to see Him conquer death in His own personal power, and to witness the exaltation of the manhood in order that it might still

[1] Matt. III. 17 and XVII. 1–8 and parallels.
[2] Matt. XXVI. 56 and parallels. Cf. John XIV. 9.
[3] Luke XXIV. 19–21.

mediate divine power. The divine person was glorified, raising His manhood to a corresponding degree of power and ability. Then it was that His friends were able to apprehend Him, the divine Son conditioned in manhood.

III

But the most striking point in the Gospel history of the friends of Jesus is their failure to be of use to Him. They were never on His level for a moment. No one of them really grasped His purpose, or understood that He must die. His kingdom was never comprehended, nor His spiritual reign over the souls of men. Never for a moment was He anything but a teacher to them. He made His own plans, taking counsel of no one. Alone He went to His prayers; alone He faced His sorrows and His dangers; alone He fought His battles with Satan and with men.[1] Freely He gave to all men: but He never received anything from any one. The precious ointment marks the highest response of men to Christ.[2] Misunderstood, slandered, deserted He stood alone, asking nothing from His friends. He was not alone, however. His Father was with Him.[3]

Just as He had publicly displaced Moses, and revealed Himself as the Teacher who stood before a disobedient world;[4] just as He had publicly called

[1] Mark I. 13. Matt. XXVI. 40.
[2] John XII. 7. [3] John XVI. 32.
[4] Matt. V. 21, 22, 27, 28, etc.; XIX. 8.

all men to Himself as their Refuge;[1] so He stood amongst men independent of them all.

To be truly independent of the human race, and yet to be truly human! It is wonderful, but it is the Gospel truth. And the reconciliation of the two facts is, I believe, best established in this theory of the Incarnate as the Son truly conditioned in manhood. For on the one hand His very true and perfect manhood secures for Him recognition as really human; while on the other hand His divine powers conditioned and mediated by His human faculties rendered Him independent of all except the Father in heaven.

[1] Matt. xi. 28.

CHAPTER X

THE CHRIST AND THE SPIRIT

IT may, I think, be said with certainty that the Evangelists intend us to see in the life of the Incarnate an exhibition of the weaknesses that are proper to manhood, side by side with His works of abnormal power.

I

While they magnify His power to heal they never regard it as being used to save His manhood from the burden due to hunger, thirst, weariness, and exhaustion.[1] They tell of how He required and accepted help from Angels;[2] but His divine powers seem to have been so restrained that He never interfered with His own laws of nature in order to save Himself from the common lot of mankind.

Again, His life of submission is not pictured to us as the result of a series of acts of will, as though He willed to restrain Himself at one moment that He might feel hunger, and at another moment that He

[1] Matt. XXI. 18. John IV. 6; XI. 35; XIX. 28.
[2] Mark I. 13. Luke XXII. 43.

might be weary. This view of His self-restraint, once so popular with Christologians, has no support in the Gospels. On the contrary, He is shewn to us as really and truly man, with man's natural weaknesses and limitations. He assumed this human weakness in the moment at which once for all He imposed upon Himself His law of self-restraint and was conceived in Mary's womb.

On the other hand there is nothing in the Gospels to allow us to hold the opinion that Christ was subject to sickness or to any weakness that is due to inherited sin. As He was Himself sinless, His manhood could not fall under the law of corruption in any sense.[1] Christ as man, taking His manhood from a race that had been separated from God, was by the divine law mortal: but death had no rightful power over Him as an individual. Both because He was sinless and because His manhood was constituted in the person of the divine Son, death had no power over Him that it did not receive from Him.[2] He met death as its lord and master; He raised the dead, and saved the sick from their pains and sorrows.

But since He had come to endure our penalties in our name He willed not to resist death. He would not use divine powers that mankind could not share; and as man it behoved Him to meet and conquer death. Hence from the first the law of self-restraint required that the Lord of Life should die. To see

[1] John xix. 36. Acts ii. 31. [2] John x. 17, 18.

corruption was neither possible to Him nor necessary to His work of redemption. For He came to conquer death, whereas corruption is the mark of the vanquished. He who would raise our corruptible bodies must Himself be incorruptible. Thus it is legitimate to say that the Saviour assumed the weaknesses that end in death, as He assumed all truly human weaknesses; but it is not true to say that there was anything in Him that could give death power over Him; nor is it true to say that He could see corruption.

II

Side by side with this power of resisting corruption we notice His power of self-preservation.[1] He saved Himself from His enemies lest they should kill Him before His time. Also we find Him displeased with His Apostles for thinking that the waves could be His master;[2] and St. John tells us how He compelled His enemies to do Him homage before He surrendered Himself to them.[3] There was manifestly a divine power in the Christ upon which He relied: a power of health, a supremacy over nature, a power of self-preservation.

But it is equally evident that this power was exercised entirely through his manhood, humanly. It was a power that His manhood had made its own.

[1] Luke IV. 28–30. John VIII. 50.
[2] Matt. VIII. 23–7. Cf. John VI. 16–20.
[3] John XVIII. 5, 6.

It was not so superhuman that men could not assimilate it, each in his measure. Thus St. Peter could have walked on the waters with Christ had he had the faith.[1] God's power appropriated by faith is not to be measured; and we need have no doubt that all the power of the Incarnate was really and truly mediated by His manhood. It was never external to His human nature.

The manner in which He saved Himself is of course open to discussion. It may well be that when He passed through a hostile crowd the people themselves had been so excited or distracted as to have lost sight of Him in some confusion. The Holy Spirit may have been the author of some salvation, or angels may have been sent to His help. It is certain that in His Passion He spoke of angels as if they alone could have brought Him safety.[2]

But I think my point is to be taken into account. In whatever way the Incarnate may have used divine power to save Himself from enemies, in whatever way He used such power to master the winds and seas, the power was always so humanly mediated as never to compel belief in His divine nature on the part of those who watched Him.

III

Of a very different kind is the power in which He worked His miracles, although that too was mediated

[1] Matt. xiv. 22–3. [2] Matt. xxvi. 53.

humanly. Not only so, but it was communicated to His disciples and their fellow-workers.

The power of working miracles would seem to be the divine omnipotence moving out to the restoration of the divine law in the universe. It reasserts the fundamental law of life and order, while appearing to override some less fundamental law, or some human generalization from particular instances that has been mistaken for a general law.

This power is always regarded in Scripture as belonging to the man Christ Jesus. It is the power of God, it is the touch of the Finger of God,[1] it is the activity of the Holy Spirit;[2] but in the last resort it is all carried out by the man Christ Jesus. His works witness to His personality, to His origin, and to His divine life.[3] They are signs given to a stubborn generation. But they are so entirely the action of His manhood that few see the divine person in whom that manhood is constituted. Jesus of Nazareth became the prophet of the people, their healer, who went about doing good.[4]

The tendency of modern writers is to argue that so human were His works that they are to be regarded as real human actions done by manhood's power, with the assistance and under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Of course the parallel between Christ's miracles and those of the prophets and Apostles is

[1] Luke xi. 20. [2] Matt. xii. 28.
[3] John v. 36; iii. 2; x. 38; xiv. 11, etc.
[4] Acts x. 38. Cf. Luke xxiv. 19.

to be recognized ; for it helps us to grasp how entirely the divine power was appropriated by the manhood. But if we are asked to say that the parallel holds in regard to the divine power that lies behind the workers of wonders we must hesitate to answer. For the parallel will only hold up to a point. The Apostles worked miracles in a twofold power: the power of the indwelling Christ and the power of the Holy Ghost. What, then, in the Incarnate is parallel with His indwelling power in the Apostles?

The Kenotists answer that the Incarnate's miracles are to be ascribed to the external influence of the Spirit acting upon the manhood of Christ. The Athanasian and Cyrilline position, on the whole, would be that the Incarnate was exercising divine omnipotence, being unlimited in power. But neither of these answers is quite satisfactory. The Gospel story supports both of those views to some extent; but it gives no support to one as against the other.

The Incarnate acts always through the Spirit. He depends personally upon Him. In the Spirit He goes to His battle with Satan ; through the Spirit He casts out devils ; but there is nothing to support the view that this dependence is that proper to a merely human person. It is the Spirit of Jesus upon whom men lean :[1] that is, upon the Holy Spirit who has found His temple in the manhood of Jesus. Why this difference?

In the first place, surely, the eternal Son, the

[1] Acts xvi. 7. Rom. viii. 9, etc.

Word of the Father, always acts from the Father through the Spirit. God is one and not three. The will to become incarnate was from the Father, and was accomplished by the Son through the Spirit, in whose power the sacred manhood was conceived in Mary's womb. His power it was that overshadowed Mary; as it was His power that had striven down the ages to make possible Mary's obedience and the birth of Christ. So too since the moment of the Ascension it is the power of the Holy Spirit in which men are united with Christ's glorified manhood through faith in the redeeming blood. Apart from the Spirit the Son could have found no way into the world: and the coming of the Son may not be isolated from the activities of the Father and the Spirit. We must emphatically assert that in becoming incarnate the Son moves out from the Father, in and through the Spirit.[1]

Therefore the Incarnate at every moment acts from the Father through the Holy Spirit. Just as His initial act of self-restraint is from the Father through the Spirit; just as His modified, limited, and conditioned self-consciousness is from the Father through the Spirit; so every action of His incarnate state is from the Father through the Spirit. To conceive otherwise is to postulate a fundamental change in His divine nature.

It is thus impossible to conceive the Incarnate

[1] Luke I. 35. John XIV. 16, 26; XV. 26; XVI. 7–15. Acts II. 38. Rom. VIII., etc.

working a miracle apart from the Holy Spirit. His divine self-expression is always through the Spirit. And however modified is the self-consciousness of the divine Son in manhood, it must always be a consciousness of Himself in relation to the Father and the Spirit. True, the consciousness of the Incarnate is limited in content by the capacity of His human soul: but limitation in content is not change in essential relationship. We must therefore bear in mind that there is a sense in which no action of the Incarnate can be isolated from the eternal activity of God the Holy Ghost.

But, secondly, we must weigh the fact that the Evangelists do not refer to the internal, essential relationships of the Son with the Spirit. Their references are apparently to some external power of the Spirit, that dates from His descent upon the Christ after His baptism.[1]

We have no means of determining the exact reference of our Lord's own words about the power of the Spirit that was in Him. When He said that He cast out devils by the Spirit, He may have been speaking about the internal relationship. But apart from such passages, we are sure that the Evangelists do mean us to believe that the manhood of Christ was illuminated and empowered by the Spirit, descending upon Him from above, as from without.

Such indeed we should have expected to hear. For the very true manhood of Christ must depend

[1] Matt. III. 16 and parallels. John I. 33.

for its growth and development upon the same divine powers that are necessary to all men. Manhood must receive of the Spirit if it is to be spiritual. The Spirit who formed the manhood in Mary's womb continuously inspired and strengthened it as the years went by, watching and forwarding its growth in wisdom, until in the baptism He could perfectly equip it for its work of ministry. The manhood of the Incarnate could not be independent of the external power of the Spirit unless its perfection were to be of a kind different from our own. And the very fact that the manhood was allowed to limit and condition the activities of the Incarnate establishes its need of the power of the Spirit to develope its faculties and to enlarge its capacities.

Once more, it is possible to see the fitness of this external action of the Spirit upon the Christ. The manhood of Christ is the centre of the race of the redeemed. It is the fountain of our life, and the temple of the indwelling Spirit. Thus it must be the centre of the peculiar activities of the Spirit in the work of sanctification, as distinguished from the actions of the Incarnate of which the Spirit is the mediator. As regards the internal, essential relations, the Spirit mediates all the activities of the Incarnate. But as regards His external relation to the manhood of the Christ, He is the agent of the sanctification of the world, working through that human nature but proceeding from it as from His temple. Thus we may easily understand the vital importance of the

Gospel witness to the external action of the Spirit upon the Incarnate.

Putting together, then, these two truths of the relations of the Incarnate to the Spirit we are able to understand the Gospel picture of the Incarnate working His miracles. We can see His personal activity mediated by the Spirit, the activity of the divine Son under conditions of manhood. And we can realize how wonderfully His human faculties were strengthened and developed to make them able and fit to assimilate and to communicate the divine power. The touch of Jesus, His mere word, even the hem of His garment, all are instinct with life and power and health. The divine power made human was not to be resisted. The Incarnate Word, working within the sphere of those special relationships that constitute His state of incarnation, fulfilled the Father's will through the agency of the Spirit by the medium of His manhood; just as in creation He had fulfilled the Father's purpose through the agency of the same Spirit apart from any human limitations and conditions. The miracles of the Incarnate witness to His oneness with the Father in will and in power; they are the fruits of the conditioned power of the Incarnate Word as manifested in co-operation with the Spirit through the assumed manhood. And the miracles of the Apostles and their followers witness to the indwelling of Christ, and to the co-operating power of the Spirit Who in Christ dwelt in them.

The necessity of the uplifting of manhood into

co-operation with the divine power in the reassertion of the divine laws becomes evident as we dwell on the nature of sin. By the rebellion of the human will against the divine will the universe had been thrown into confusion, and by the obedience of the human will the sovereignty of God was once more recognized. By disobedience man's will shut the way against the power of God, and by the obedience of the Christ that way was once more opened. Hence the importance of the mediation of the divine power by the manhood of the Son of Mary. The Incarnate looks ever upward, signifying the continuous surrender of His personal will to the Father. Through the offering of His human will to the Father's will a true union of holy will-power, divine and human, was effected, whereby the evil will-power, which Satan represents, may be defeated.

God the Father, the loving Creator, has no way into the hearts of men except through their wills; and that way was opened to His restoring and redeeming power through the obedience of the human will of Jesus. This obedience, however, is that of a person: of the Incarnate Son living under conditions of manhood. And once this way was opened the divine power poured forth into the world; the sick were healed, cripples were made whole, the dead were raised, and the final miracle was wrought on Pentecost, when the dead bones of a sin-slain race were clothed with the flesh and inspired by the spirit of the risen and ascended Christ.

IV

Thus it becomes possible for us to reconcile the strength and the weakness of the Christ.

We put on one side, as inadequate, the theories that so exaggerate the freedom of the divine power in the Incarnate as to render the weakness chiefly dramatic, as if each instance of it were the result of a particular withdrawal of normal divine strength.

We also reject as marring the unity of the Redeemer's life and work the theories that ascribe the weakness to unaided humanity, and the strength to an external power alone.

And in place of these theories we plead for the conception of the Incarnate as being so truly conditioned by manhood that He exhibited all the weaknesses which are compatible with perfect humanity; that He manifested normally a divine power of supremacy limited by the measure of His perfect human faculties, and that He exercised upon due occasions, in co-operation with the Holy Spirit, such special power as could be communicated through His manhood and appropriated by His faithful people.

He is at once most powerful and most weak: He Himself, the Incarnate. For His manhood is the measure of His power and His weakness: and as true manhood it can only mediate power in obedience to the divine laws that govern human nature.

We may well marvel at this miracle of weakness: at the self-restraint of the eternal Son as He clothes

Himself with our flesh and carries the burden of our limitations.

But we shall the more marvel as we realize the capacity of our own nature for union with God, as we behold manhood framed without sin, united to the person of Him Whose coming is the coming of the Father and the Spirit, and enabled to be the medium of divine life and power. Perfect, God-assumed manhood is the measure of the divine gift of power to men, as sinful God-rejecting manhood is the measure of the human need for God.

CHAPTER XI

THE CHRIST AND HIS FATHER

THE dependence of the Incarnate upon His Father, both in its measure and its mode, is best seen in a study of the normal prayers of the Christ. Such a study is necessary to any adequate view of the manner of His incarnate life.

To some men the prayers seem to be satisfactorily explained by assuming a quiescence of the divine Word, leaving the manhood free to express itself humanly before the Father. As God, the Christ rules the universe: as man He prays: and both within the sphere of His Incarnation.

To others, the fact that the Incarnate prayed at all appears to require the theory of a self-abandonment of His divine powers, and the very real exercise of the human qualities of faith and hope arising from an ignorance of the future. They argue that the prayers in Gethsemane and on the Cross are not sincere, but rather dramatic, if so be the Christ had a full knowledge of the issue of His Passion and death.

The theory that I seek to establish requires a line of explanation different from both of these; and I

hope to shew that it takes account satisfactorily of all the evidence before us.

I

The Incarnate was accustomed to pray. He spent long nights in solitary communion with the Father on the mountains; He prayed at His baptism; and several of His prayers on important occasions have been recorded for us.

But it is striking that He never prayed in company with others, except in the services of the Temple; and that He is not said to have asked anything for Himself except when He prayed that "the cup" might pass from Him, and when He asked to be glorified with the Father. Thus His normal prayer is pictured to us as unique.

St. Matthew and St. Luke tell us how once He broke out into praise to God that His will is what it is, and that it is always fulfilled. It was as though in His manhood the Incarnate must co-operate with and rejoice in the divine will and purpose.[1]

St. John records how at the grave of Lazarus the Saviour gave thanks that it was always the Father's will to do what His human will had resolved to perform to the divine glory. He rejoices in the union of His will with the Father's, and in the wonderful exhibition of divine power which that union had made possible.[2]

Again, St. John records how the Incarnate was

[1] Matt. XI. 25. Luke X. 21, 22. [2] John XI. 41.

troubled at the prospect of His death, and how He resolutely surrendered Himself to fulfil the purpose for which He had come. This prayer was the personal utterance of the Incarnate, offered through His human soul; and the answer that came was audible to human ears. Through manhood He prayed, and through manhood He was answered. The fact that the answer was so given as to impress the bystanders does not make the medium of the prayer and answer any the less real. It was not a scenic effect: it was an unveiling of the normal.[1]

So far, then, we have found nothing to justify us in saying that He who prayed must have been deprived of His divine powers. There is every reason to believe that the eternal Son conditioned in manhood would rejoice in His Father's will, His joy being mediated by His human soul. There is no ground for saying that such a prayer implies ignorance of the divine purpose. Rather is it an expression of Christ's joyful acquiescence in what He knew and apprehended of the Father's will. The Saviour speaks as one who is certain of His ground; His certainty being none the less compatible with a sense of complete dependence.

Nor have we any ground for believing that these prayers come from the Incarnate as man, His deity lying inactive. For, in that case, who is it who actually prays? The divine Word cannot pray if His divine nature be inactive; nor can He pray if it

[1] John xii. 27, 28.

be in the exercise of unlimited power. Such a view of the matter robs the prayers of their reality. They are made to appear as dramatic utterances; the purpose of which it is not easy to determine.

There should be no fundamental difficulty in conceiving the Incarnate as personally praying to the Father. It is recognized on all sides that in dealing with prayer stress is to be laid upon communion between the soul and God; and upon the union of the human will with His, to whom we dedicate ourselves in prayer. Petition is not the primary characteristic of prayer: it is rather the fruit of filial love which dares to open its heart to the Father, leaving its sorrows and needs at His feet, to be dealt with as He sees fit. The soul desires to speak with Him of itself and its state; to ask anything for itself is rather the sign of undeveloped sonship. But primarily we pray because we love God, or want to know Him, and because we desire that He will knit our wills with His and empower us to walk in His ways, and to co-operate in the works of His kingdom.

If, then, prayer is primarily an act of communion, we may be assured that the Fatherhood of God is characterized by what we may call a desire for communion with us. And since His nature is unchangeable and His Fatherhood eternal, we may safely consider that He has always exhibited this desire; and therefore that it has always been satisfied. But how could this be before men had been created?

St. John helps us by his phrase, "The Word was with God." That is, the eternal Son was always in active personal communion with the Father.[1] It was His as Son always to satisfy the desire of God's Fatherhood for the offering of filial love. Thus not only was it fitting that He who should raise mankind to communion with the Father should be the eternal Son; but it is almost impossible to conceive the Son in manhood refraining from prayer. The desire of God the Father that was to be satisfied by man's love must first be satisfied by the love of the Son in manhood; and He whose nature it is to have communion with the Father could not refrain from prayer in His incarnate state.

II

The great prayer of our Lord written down for us by St. John will afford a very real test of our theory.[2]

It is marked by three great characteristics. First, it is the prayer of one who, being conscious of Himself as limited, has a vivid realization of an unlimited freedom, and a strong certainty of being set free. The Incarnate speaks of Himself as "Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." He is an object of knowledge and a source of life equally with the Father; but His state is not that of the Father. His state can only be described under a human name, Jesus; and the essential characteristic of it is self-surrender

[1] John I. 1. See Westcott and Godet *in loc.*
[2] John XVII.

He was sent to it. That is, He knows Himself as divine Son under limitations, in conditions of manhood. "Jesus whom thou hast sent." Yet at the moment He is mindful of the glory that He had with the Father before the world was; and to this glory He is certain that He is now come, and that to it He will hereafter bring His chosen people.

These are not words of the eternal Son, unlimited and free. Nor are they words of the Son after He has abandoned all His divine attributes. But they do exactly suggest the Incarnate conditioned in manhood, holding communion with the Father through His manhood, and desiring to raise that manhood and His people in it and through it to the state of divine glory.

Secondly, it is the prayer of one who knows that He will be heard and answered as He wishes. "Father, I will" is the keynote to the prayer. It is not a series of requests made in hope by a faithful heart. It is rather the articulation of the will of a son whose position in His Father's house is supreme.

The Incarnate's human will is so identified with the Father's will, being as it is the medium of the personal will of the Son, that the union of the two makes impossible any hindrance to the fulfilment of the desired purpose. The prayer of the Incarnate consists in the laying of His human will side by side with the divine will: this done, the divine power passes into the hearts of those for whom the sur-

render was made. There is no hindrance to the power except individual rebellion against God.

And thirdly, it is a human prayer. Starting from obedience it lays before the Father the will of the Incarnate for Himself and His people. I say the will: for as I have shewn above, the Incarnate exercises His divine will whenever He Himself acts through the human will He assumed. His wills are strictly two: but as God the Son His function of will is merely a function or manifestation of Himself; and the will through which He prays is the human will by and in which His divine will or divine personal action is conditioned.

III

And at this point it is necessary to discuss in what relation our Lord stands to the virtues of faith and hope.

It has become a commonplace of modern writers to attribute to Him both faith and hope, in opposition to the more ancient view in which these virtues seemed incompatible with foreknowledge and divine power.[1] Bishop Westcott, for example, deduced from a statement in the Epistle to the Hebrews that our Lord exercised faith;[2] and Bishop Gore,[3] quoting him with approval, seeks to prove that the prayers

[1] Representative of the older view is Thomas Aquinas. See III, § 7, 3.

[2] Westcott's *Hebrews*, second edition, p. 427; and note on XII. 2.

[3] Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 82, 83.

of the Incarnate necessarily imply anxiety, terror, and a dark future, and therefore require His exercise of faith and trust.

Surely everything depends upon what we mean by faith, and trust or hope.

Faith is variously defined: but in the last resort it is usually regarded as the power to submit the reason to the truths revealed by God; accepting them fully, and holding them with certainty. So defined it is regarded as a God-given power for the removal of the weakness of human reason; a cure for spiritual blindness; and a means of attaining the knowledge of things that belong to the sphere in which unassisted reason has no place. Acts of faith are therefore exercises of the spiritual faculty with a view to the consecration of reason to God, and to its elevation to the level of divine truths.

The Pauline view of faith is wider: it would, I think, include the will. The reason being endowed with spiritual vision, seeing everything in God and God in everything, man is able to dedicate his will in complete self-surrender to Christ Jesus, placing himself under the law of the divine holiness. In this sense, faith is viewed as being in some degree a remedy of sinful weakness and blindness; and a cure for the natural man's wayward self-pleasing.

The interpretation of faith as the power of spiritual vision opens the way to regarding it as a means of perceiving the real nature and true purpose of all that happens, so that the present becomes

tolerable for us in the light of the glory that shall be revealed. Here, of course, it touches upon the sphere of hope: in fact, it is here that it is seen to be the basis of hope. And in this sense faith is held to be the antithesis of anxiety, fear, and ignorance of the future.

It would appear, then, that faith is the gift of God to illuminate the mind of sinful man, with a view to the opening to him of the heavenly vision in ever-increasing degree, to the confirmation of his confidence in God's future restoration of all things, and to the removal of all anxieties and terrors of the soul.

So explained faith is certainly to be spoken of as made necessary to man by his weakness that is due to sin. And were we to ascribe to Christ such faith as this we should be not emphasizing His true humanity but denying His perfection. It is impossible to conceive perfect man as requiring deliverance from an intellectual blindness due to sin, or from incapacity for the spiritual vision, or from inability to surrender himself to God. The measure of His perfection is the absence of such blindness and weakness.

And in fact the Evangelists[1] are very clear in the witness that they offer to Christ's foreknowledge of the details of His Passion, and its issue in glory. They describe Him as going to meet His death as

[1] Matt. XVI. 21; XVII. 9–12; XX. 17–19, and parallels. Also John II. 19; III. 14; VII. 6; XI. 8–10; XII. 27; XIII. 1, etc.

one who knows exactly what will befall Him and the hour at which each incident will occur. There is not the least evidence of any ignorance, or anxiety about the results.

Thus theologians of many ages have agreed in denying to Christ the possession of faith. It has seemed to them that to ascribe to Him faith is to admit His anxiety and ignorance. And Bishop Gore, who follows the opposite opinion, does not hesitate to say that our Lord felt anxiety and terror, and triumphed over them by the exercise of faith and trust. It is, in fact, argued that such a faith is essential to real humanity.

There is, of course, a real difficulty here: due partly to the narrow definition of faith, partly to a too limited view of a perfect human soul, and partly to an undue emphasis upon anxiety and ignorance as necessary to manhood. For, in fact, faith can be defined as the perfect spiritual vision of man. It is essentially the crown and completion of human reason; and only by accident the cure of blindness and the remedy for faintheartedness. Faith is the power by which the soul beholds Him whom it was created to adore; and also it is the act by which it adores Him. Its existence is in no way dependent upon the presence of ignorance, weakness, or blindness. It is a positive quality of the soul, granted indeed to the sinner to save him, but to the Sinless One as the necessary crown of manhood.

In this sense we cannot deny to Christ Jesus the

possession and exercise of faith. But neither can we speak in this sense of our own faith. Our faith is to Christ's faith as our power of forsaking bad habits is to His supreme holiness. In both cases the root is one: the fruits are very different. And it would be well to keep in mind this distinction before we teach men that Jesus exercised human faith. Certainly in the sense in which modern text-books of the Church define faith our Lord did not possess it.

But we do regard our Lord as depending upon His Father, inasmuch as He has assumed all manhood's conditions; so that through the perfect spiritual vision that is His as man He entirely submits Himself to the Father's will. His foreknowledge is in fact mediated by this perfect power of human faith, using the word in the broader meaning that I have claimed for it. He has such perfect faith that all through the Passion He sees with certain eyes the joy that is set before Him, and goes forward calmly through death to glory.

Such a vision and such confidence preclude anxiety and ignorance of the future. But they require for their true interpretation a really deep dread of the pain and shame of the Passion, and of the horror of sin and its works. The Incarnate's perfect faith is not only His spiritual vision: it is His power of knowing God's power and purpose even in the desolation upon the Cross. In fact, the characteristic fruit of perfect faith, the outcome of true vision is obedience—obedient dependence, obedient self-surrender—and

prayer is the articulation of obedience. Thus the prayers of the Incarnate do not point to the presence of anxiety and terror; but to the complete realization of what was to come upon Him, its pain and its sorrow, and to His perfect, obedient, self-surrender to the Father's will.

And surely it was exactly this that He taught His disciples, shewing them that true faith lies in the apprehension of and the search after the Kingdom of God, and in indifference to everything else.[1] He portrays faith not as a remedy for ignorance and anxiety, but as a state of mind in which there is no thought for the morrow and no worry for to-day. In fact, we struggle with anxiety and fear not because we are ignorant of the future, but because we are ignorant of God.

Hope does for the will what faith does for the mind. Thus if we follow the narrower definition of faith we shall give an interpretation of hope that is inapplicable in the case of the Christ. Hope is ordinarily regarded as a divine power infused into the soul with a view to the strengthening of the weak and sinful will in its endurance of trials and temptations, and to the removal from the mind of all pessimistic views of life and its issues. Hope is the groundwork of spiritual strength; the means of our obedient following of the Crucified; and the basis of our confidence and our trust.

Here, of course, we find hope to be the antithesis

[1] Matt. vi. 19–34.

of despair and weakness of will; and in that sense we must never ascribe it to the Incarnate, lest we deny the perfection of His manhood, God-aided and God-assumed.

Rather let us interpret hope in its widest sense as the God-given power that enables the human will to unite itself permanently with the invincible divine will. So defined it is the faculty of obedience raised to its perfection, obedience free and absolute; springing from the will to endure to the end because of the certainty of victory. Hope is the crown of obedience, as faith is of vision. Thus hope can exist apart from despair. It is not the mere negation of despair, nor a remedy for pessimism; but the perfection of the human will through God-given power. Perfect man must possess this perfect will that cleaves to the divine will: he must possess perfect hope. And the Incarnate's human soul possesses and exercises hope as the perfection of obedience, thus conditioning the dependence and surrender that mark His eternal Sonship.

The reality of Christ's perfect hope is not to be measured by the assumption that He went to His Passion ignorant of its end, filled with terror, tending to despair. Rather it is measured by that obedience that underlay His surrender of Himself to sufferings and pain of which He had foreseen the full extent and bitterness and shame.

Enough has been said, I think, to shew that faith and hope may be ascribed to our Lord in the fulness

of their perfection, but not in the sense in which they are associated with our most unworthy movements Godward. Also I trust it has been made clear that just as the Gospels lend no justification to the view that Christ was anxious and fearful and ignorant of the issue of the Passion, so faith and hope are found to be in no sense the necessary antitheses of ignorance and fear. Faith and hope, in their perfection, are the necessary crowns of spiritual vision and moral obedience; and in the Christ they go to form the conditions within which the Incarnate manifests His self-dedication and His obedience.

Thus His prayer stands out as being ultimately the expression of His very true obedience to the Father's will, of His dependence upon the Father's love, and His confident certainty of the triumph of His Father's purpose.

IV

The prayers of the Incarnate, then, are the manifestation of obedience, the assertion of the fittingness of the issue of divine power along the way opened up by His obedience, and the expression of the joy that He feels in His Father's will and power. In short, they are the expression of the Incarnate's consciousness of Himself as divine Son in manhood. They are the means by which He shewed His recognition of His Father's claim; they are the acts by which as man He laid hold upon His Father's will.

Viewed as the act of the Incarnate's mind, prayer

is the reception of the word of the Father; it is the vision of "what the Father doth."[1] In those long nights of secret prayer upon the mountain tops His soul saw God: and in the power of the spiritual vision He came down to His work of ministry and mercy. In this sense He is the author of our faith,[2] of our spiritual vision. But the vision granted to the soul was essentially due to the place in which the soul was between the Son and His Father. The Son in manhood holds communion with the Father through His human soul. So that the vision may be explained truly in two ways. It is the result of the constitution of the soul as the medium between the Father and the Incarnate; but also it is the power by which the human soul is enabled to be the human medium of divine self-consciousness.

Viewed as the act of the Incarnate's will, prayer is His co-operation in manhood with the Father's will. In secret prayer day after day He surrendered His human soul to the Father, accepting His will to the uttermost, consciously, counting the cost; becoming our leader in the life of hope, of confident self-sacrifice. And it was this manifestation of the fundamental habit of obedience that was the basis of the atoning sacrifice. But here, again, this surrender of the human will is the conditioned expression of the eternal oneness of will between the Father and the Son.

Viewed as the act of the Incarnate's heart, prayer

[1] John v. 19. [2] Heb. xii. 2.

is His joyous, loving response to the vision of the glory, the holiness, and the love of Godhead. It is the conditioned, human expression of the filial love of the Son to His Father.

Viewed as the act of the Incarnate in the entirety of His being, prayer is the mysterious communion of the Son conditioned in manhood with His Father; it is the inexplicable approach of the Son to the Father in and through our manhood which He has made His very own.

V

And lastly, the prayer of the Incarnate is the point in which the divine and human will-powers meet in alliance against Satan's evil will. Divine power, which is God's loving will in action, cannot have free way in the world without the co-operation of the wills of men. While Satan swayed mankind the Incarnate came, caught up human will-power into personal union with Himself, and laid it side by side of the Father's will. In that moment divine power was given its entrance into the hearts of men. The Incarnate moved up and down amongst the chosen people healing the sick, raising the dead, and casting out devils. Then followed His final dedication of His will in the Passion, and the foundation of the kingdom of divine love and power, the Church of Christ.

Herein lies the true meaning of the corporate prayer of the Church in Christ. The manhood of

Christ is the medium of His priestly activity. The Church's prayer is her obedience translated into speech: an obedience that is His first, and hers only by His free gift; and a speech that is articulated by His lips alone, in the power of His own Spirit. And the answer to the prayer is the gift of power that comes down to the Church from the Father through the Incarnate's manhood, in the power of the same Spirit of Jesus.

Had the Incarnate been unable to pray, manhood's will had never linked itself to God's will. The victory would have been to Satan.

All that I have tried to say will, I think, be more clear when in the next chapter we discuss the prayers of the Passion. Enough has been said to establish the sufficiency of our theory to take account of the normal dependency of the Incarnate upon His Father.

The picture is that of a divine person in manhood's bonds, having perfect foreknowledge of the day and hour of His arrest, the manner of His trial, the nature of His punishment, and the duration of His sleep in death, together with an absolute certainty of His resurrection, ascension, and glorification. Such an one is found to have a habit of prayer—of prayer different in kind from that which He taught others; differing in intensity from that of the ordinary man. How is the picture to be viewed? Is it the portrait of one single person, or is it a composite picture?

We have tried to supply a reconciliation. It is the picture of the one Christ, the divine Son incarnate, conditioned and limited by manhood. His foreknowledge is divine, conditioned by the limitations of a perfect human mind. His knowledge is the basis of His dependence upon God. And the purpose of His prayer is in part the expression of filial joy and thanksgiving; partly the manifestation of His dependence; partly communion with the Father; and partly the obedient surrender of Himself and all His human powers to the Father.

And always, behind all that is human in the prayer lies the eternal response of divine Sonship to divine Fatherhood.

The Incarnation was the raising of manhood to the level on which it can mediate the relations of the Son to the Father and to men. The prayers of the Incarnate are His normal self-expression before the Father upon that level.

The first prayer was that of the little child at Mary's knee; and its consummation will be in the endless age of the glory of the Christ, when the prayers of the multitudes of the redeemed will be gathered up into His prayer and be presented through His manhood to the God and Father of us all.

CHAPTER XII

THE CHRIST IN HIS PASSION

IN the presence of the Passion of the Incarnate we are aware of the supreme difficulty of arriving at an explanation of the manner of His life in our manhood. For on the one side the Gospels are so emphatic in their witness to the calmness and strength of the sufferer, to His confidence in His power to conquer, and to His personal supremacy over His judges and executioners;[1] while on the other side they are no less strong in their assertion as to the real weakness and sufferings of the Crucified.[2]

The Cyrilline Christologian is hard put to it to explain what to him is the inactivity of the divine nature in Christ which allowed His manhood to suffer and to die. Such a view requires a quick succession of activity and inactivity upon His part: now shewing His power, now accepting human weakness; for there is no one state that will allow of both strength and weakness as being the proper activities of His personal will. He heals the ear that Peter

[1] e.g. John x. 18; xviii. 4–8; xix. 11.
[2] Luke xxii. 44. Mark xv. 21, 22. John xix. 28, etc.

struck off, exercising His divine nature: He is bound and led away because He restrains His divine nature, making it inactive. Again, He pardons the penitent thief by His divine power; He cries out in bitterness by restraining His divine nature. Always the sufferer is conscious of a self within Him, in the same sphere of the Incarnation, who cannot be the subject of suffering. Can we be content with such a view? Is it not a dual Christ who is thus pictured before our eyes?

Kenotic Christologians of the extremer type are also in a difficulty. For they assume an abandonment by the Son of many of His divine attributes, but they do not name Him merely human; so that in the last resort they have still no real explanation to offer of His weakness and desolation. He who is God, how can He be in agony? How can He be desolate? To answer that He was so living in manhood as to share its ignorance is to deny the Gospel evidence as to the foreknowledge that Christ had of His Passion and glory. Again, the evidence requires us to allow for sufficient divine power to carry the Saviour through death to the Resurrection, and on the Kenotic theory He could have had no such power at all.

The solution of the problem which is now before us presents us with a different explanation. It will be best to test its validity and adequacy by applying it to the three great crises of the Passion, each of which called forth from the Saviour a startling prayer.

I

And first we will consider the action of the Saviour at the moment when He was told that the Greeks wished to see Him.[1]

It was the Tuesday before the Crucifixion. Some Greek proselytes of the Gate who had been listening to the teachings of the Christ craved permission to speak with Him. "Sir, we would see Jesus." As they were admitted to His presence the Incarnate began to speak of the atonement that He would make, not for Jews and Greeks only, but for the whole human race. As He spoke, the realization of what the Passion would mean to Him "troubled His soul." His whole being was profoundly moved. Living in manhood, completely depending upon His human faculties for His self-expression, personally conditioned by human nature, He was Himself disturbed by the realization of His sufferings and death. It was not that He allowed His manhood to triumph over His deity for the moment, that by an act of divine will He might suffer; it was not that His deity was so emptied as to be unable to resist the weakness of the manhood; it was that He Himself, conditioned by manhood, must naturally experience manhood's horror at pain and death. He Himself, then, was troubled, because He was self-conscious only through a troubled manhood.

Then it was that He uttered the prayer that opened the heavens.

[1] John xii. 20–30.

In the natural weakness of His manhood He is tempted to ask that He may be saved from the hour of the Passion. "What shall I say? Shall I say, Save me from this hour?" At once He turns the temptation aside.[1] Such a prayer He cannot utter, for He has come into the world to meet His Passion. Then with a great act of self-surrender He prays His great prayer of obedience, "Father, glorify thy name." As Incarnate He lays His will by the side of His Father's will. His human faculties tremble as He prays; it is not a strong nature that of Adam's sons. But in the power of the Spirit manhood is found capable of self-surrender: the Incarnate pledges Himself to glorify the Father.

Do not let us minimize the reality of the struggle: do not let us think that manhood, however perfect, can easily mediate the personal will to suffer on a cross and to die. And if we realize that the Incarnate could neither know nor express Himself except through His manhood we shall understand with what pains He came to His self-dedication.

Because the struggle was both really severe and openly contested, the divine Father answered the Incarnate: a real answer to be by Him humanly received, in a voice so startling as to seem to the witnesses of the struggle like thunder or the voice of an angel.

Here, then, the world was given a glimpse of the

[1] On the interpretations of this passage, see Westcott and Godet *in loc.*

union of the will of the Incarnate with the will of the Father: a union centring in the manhood.

The crisis passed, the Incarnate spoke once more quite calmly of being lifted up upon the Cross, foretelling the downfall of Satan and the powers of evil. After which came His day of rest, to be followed by His last day with His disciples. And then the second crisis, the Agony in the Garden of Gethsemane.

II

The Incarnate has entered the Valley of the Shadow of Death. And, as by symbolic action, He crosses the valley of Kidron and withdraws into the solitude of Gethsemane.[1] There under the olives He stands before God while the shadow falls upon His soul. He is come to His last battle. The forces of evil are met against Him. They will spread their attack throughout the next few hours: Him they will pursue through judgement and condemnation: they will attack numberless souls in the holy city: priests and people, Herod and Pilate, false apostle and true friend: all alike will suffer attack, and each in his measure see defeat: but the fight begins now, in the loneliness of Gethsemane.

And of all the host that is to sustain God's battle against sin, Jesus alone is conscious of the conflict; He alone is alive to its issues; and He alone is prepared to endure all things to the end. More than

[1] Matt. XXVI. 36–46. Mark XIV. 32–42. Luke XXII. 39–46.

that, He sees the conflict before His eyes: He can foresee the falls of those that shall fall, the victory of those few that shall endure. He knows the victory is sure: but He also knows the cost at which He must win it.

And once again, He recognizes that those who fall will fall in spite of all that He is to endure for them; while He is keenly alive to the needs of those, the victors, whose strength must come from His acceptance of weakness.

With all this knowledge adding to His personal weight of heaviness, Jesus tears Himself away from His three friends and casts Himself on His face before His Father.

There is borne in upon the soul of Jesus the bitterness of death, the dishonour done to God by sin, the needs of weak souls, the loss of hardened hearts, the utter failure and corruption of the race of which He is the Head. All these thoughts strike His soul. And these very thoughts are to be Satan's weapons! If only he can make the Saviour refuse His cross, or repine at His lot, or set pity for mankind over against the divine justice!

But Jesus resists him: resists him in the power of His divine person conditioned and limited by His manhood. He has a human mind that must think right: truly human it is, though the mind of God: a mind fuller of divine light than we can measure, yet still human. He has a human heart that must love to the end, in all circumstances: truly human it

is, though it is the heart of God; a heart fuller of divine love than we can conceive, yet still human. He has a human will that must obey to the end, in all pain and suffering and torture: truly human it is, though it is the will of God; a will stronger in divine power than we can think, yet still human.

Apart from this manhood the Incarnate can do nothing: He cannot even be conscious of Himself. And now the human mind is darkened, in horror at the thought of death, so cruel a death; the human heart is deadened by the sense of friendship betrayed, sacrifice despised, and a mother's soul pierced; and the human will is stretched to the uttermost.

For see what lies still before the Christ. The Crucifixion in itself may well stun His manhood's powers: but that of which the Crucifixion is a symbol! What shall we say of that? In crucifying the Christ the Jews will be acting for Satan and for Satan-ridden humanity. By one supreme act they will in the name of sinners finally and utterly reject God, casting Him out from their midst. So doing, they will call down upon themselves and upon the whole race which they represent the ultimate curse of the divine law: "Because thou hast rejected knowledge, I will also reject thee." They will drive God from His Temple, His city, His world: and God will veil His Face from them.

All this is present to the soul of Jesus. For "the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all." He must bear the penalty of the very act that con-

stitutes His murder! His it will be to see the veil fall between His soul and the divine Face. Alone He must enter that darkness: alone He must abide while the darkness thickens: alone He must be at the moment that the Light fails Him. For His mind will cease to mediate actively His longing to pray: His heart will faint within Him. And as He lies in the garden the very contemplation of what is yet to come paralyses His faculties. In an agony of bloody sweat He struggles to find that in His manhood which will mediate His self-consciousness and His obedience. The drops fall: the ground is wet beneath Him: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me!" This bitter cup: this last triumph of the shadow! His mind cannot think it. His heart cannot endure it. But His will breaks through the hostile ranks: "Nevertheless, not my will but thine be done."

So He prayed: so He willed: and in the triumph of His manhood, through His will, He exercised His self-consciousness as God self-limited in manhood; and thereby established Himself as captain of our salvation. By this victory in Gethsemane He was constituted for ever as our leader before the Father. He is now in His mystical body, through His divine power, fighting and conquering: always limited by the measure of our human response; always suffering in us; and it is always in the union of our will with His that He leads us to our victory. Alone then, He is never alone now. And

in union with Him the lonely warrior finds the invisible hosts of God to welcome him.

Is Gethsemane more easily interpreted by assuming that alongside of the Christ-consciousness that was the field of the struggle there lay a dormant God-consciousness? or by arguing that His was a composite, divine-human consciousness? Surely not!

No, He went as God-in-manhood to Gethsemane: the battle was fought on human lines with human weapons: but He who wielded the weapons and conquered is the Son of God. God was making His own our struggles, our weakness, our death. He used our faculties: and He knew Himself only as limited in His use of divine power by such capabilities of co-operation as His human faculties possessed. Had the manhood failed Him, at that moment all the relationships that make up the Incarnate's sphere would have ceased to be. An impossible thought? Yes, but a thought that reminds us how entirely real His manhood is, how entirely it mediates His self-consciousness as Incarnate God, and how necessarily it depended upon the power of His divine personality for a victory that was impossible to mere human strength.

This indeed is the wonder of Gethsemane: that the Warrior of God, Who is divine, can do, can know nothing except it be mediated by the nature that He shares with us for whom He suffered.

And no theory of the Incarnation will be ulti-

mately acceptable that allows for a self-consciousness as God apart from manhood; or at the other extreme so emphasizes the manhood at the cost of divine attributes as to make the Warrior conquer in merely human might. The Gospel Christ has no consciousness of a self that did not truly lie in agony before the Father, really suffer, and really die. But He Who did so really suffer and die knew Himself as the Son of His Father, and in His own personal, limited power won the battle for us.

III

"My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" This is the cry that marks the third crisis of the Passion.[1]

It is the answer of humanity to Satan's taunt: "Will man serve God for nought?"[2] Here is the Son of Mary serving the divine purpose not only for nought but in the face of immeasurable hindrances, spiritual sufferings, and bodily pain. Like Job He has patiently parted with those whom He loves; like Job He has tasted poverty in its barest forms; like Job His body is one vast source of suffering and pain. Unlike the patriarch, however, the Lord Jesus has accepted the loss of His good name: He has made Himself a curse for us Who knew no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth. The Ideal Penitent, He has exhibited before God the perfect acceptance of the deserved penalties that

[1] Matt. xxvii. 46. Mark xv. 34. [2] Cf. Job i. 9.

men had written to their corporate and individual accounts. In all He has been obedient; in all He has been patiently penitent; in all He has preserved the filial attitude to God. Never for a moment has He doubted the Father's love or challenged His justice, or imputed to the loving God the penalties men had brought upon themselves by ignoring or defying the laws of their divinely ordered nature.

More than this: He has by His attitude of patience and filial love confessed the righteousness of the Father's laws, acknowledged the perfect reason that framed them, and accepted as just and wise the penalties attaching to their breach.

Nor is this all. There is a mystery lying behind this bitter cry which, while we cannot hope to fathom it, we must needs consider.

As we have already seen, in Gethsemane Christ had pondered the consummated sin of the human race, which was to be exhibited by the Jewish people, aided by ignorant Roman soldiers, in the crucifixion of God in His person and in His manhood. He had measured the sin, and realized its penalty. Man's final rejection of God by the crucifixion of Jesus must bring its proper penalty. Men had loved the darkness rather than the light, therefore must He, their representative, experience in His manhood the bitterness and loneliness of spiritual darkness, lest they perish for evermore. He had chosen to experience it for the sake of those very Jews, and for all who share man's corporate sin.

Yes, surely that which lies behind this fourth word from the Cross is in some way connected with the supreme act of human sin, the crucifixion of God in His manhood, and with the supreme act of human penitence, the acquiescence in the corresponding darkness of the human soul. This view of it seems to me to help us to understand a little the mystery that passes understanding.

He has only His humanity, as Incarnate, through which to realize His deity: this is His purpose, this is His self-oblation at every moment. As captain of the Lord's people He wills to be as they are, though always and entirely divine. He has, I say, only His humanity, sinless but truly human, in which to endure the desolation and darkness that are coming upon Him. Apart from His manhood He has determined not to appear for us before the Father; for so had the Father willed with and in the Holy Spirit. He will go nowhere where He cannot carry manhood and, in His manhood, the whole human race.

As then the Incarnation is real and effective, so in the same full measure is the desolation real: terrible and overwhelming in its reality. To regard it as only scenic, dramatic, didactic is to rob the Incarnation itself of its meaning and value. For it is the true weakness of the manhood that makes the desolation possible; just as it is the true perfection of that same manhood that demanded its glorification.

The vision of God was suddenly withdrawn from the soul of Jesus: and alone He entered the darkness.

One by one the faculties of His manhood became inactive. Hitherto living in the light of the Divine Vision, they had opened to it as flower-buds open to the sun. But the Vision gone, the sun, as it were, below the horizon, the powers of manhood became inoperative, as flowers close at the approach of night. His heart could feel no answering love: His mind could perceive no illuminating presence: all was dull and lonely and dark. He could not pray as He was wont: heart and mind alike failed Him; failing not in desire, not as sinning, but through sheer inability to reflect God and to express themselves.

There remained to Him in action only His will: a human will, flawless, sinless: yet weakened in this, that it could gain no responsive, active aid from either heart or mind: and with that will Jesus clung to the Father.

Can it stand the test? Is Jesus so truly Saviour that He will carry humanity through its last and greatest struggle? The angels cease their singing; Nature veils her face, her veil striking terror into all whom its edges touch;[1] Hope is almost dead.

Then from the Cross, through the darkness, the last and supreme cry of penitence pierces a way for itself to the throne of Love. "My God, My God." The will has held its own. Not for one moment has it wavered, not one step has it yielded to the foe. God is Love; God is Righteous; God is Just. Man is Hatred; Man is Lawless; Man deserves death. "My

[1] Luke xxiii. 44–8.

God, Thou art Love! In spite of this desolation, Thou abidest Love. My God, Thou art Righteous: this darkness has come deservedly upon Me, the Head of a lawless race. Why hast Thou forsaken Me? Surely because Thou art Just, and we deserve to lose Thee: yet Thou art My God, My God; always God, always My God."

So did the Incarnate suffer and triumph: and in Him penitence was perfected. And with the swift speech of one who knows the end has come, He uttered His last words, fulfilled His task of filial love, and yielded up His life.

Thus died Jesus, the Incarnate Son of God, in His manhood making atonement for all sins, and for the sin that is the head and crown of all sin. Wonderful love! Wonderful wisdom! That great cry which the malicious scheming of the Jews and the ignorant strength of the Romans called forth was itself the atonement for the Romans and the Jews. Sin was consummated, atonement was accomplished in and by that awful cry.

The mystery of the relation of the glory of the Logos to the desolation of the Incarnate may not be pressed in way of objection to this account. Whatever on this score may be urged against the reality of the desolation of Jesus may with equal force be urged against the reality of His prayers, His human weakness, and His temptation. This is only to say that the mystery of the Incarnation does not press

more heavily upon us at one point than at another, except in so far as our individual minds are inclined to limit divine power and love in one direction than another.

Other objections will, of course, be urged. It is difficult to imagine a general agreement upon so great a mystery: nor would I claim for my account either pre-eminence or adequacy. I venture to give it, lest any should think that the theory of the manner of the Incarnation for which I plead will not bear the test of application to this, the most crucial, passage of the Gospel story. In order to anticipate objections let me summarize the chief points in my interpretation of this passage.

Leaving on one side the relations of the eternal, unlimited Logos which have nothing to do with the Incarnation, we find Jesus the Lord depending upon manhood as the medium of His communion with the Father and with men. The manhood becomes inoperative, inactive, almost paralysed by the withdrawal of the Divine Vision. The medium of His self-expression seems to fail Him. Then by a supreme act of will Jesus sends up His cry of confidence, of penitence, of acceptance of penalty: and so crying completes the atonement for sin.

And the special cause of this special cry I have dared to look for, and have thought to find, though I may not press my view, in the drinking of the last dregs of the hateful cup of suffering for sin: in the need, that is, of atoning for the supreme, final, con-

summating sin—the Crucifixion itself. The act that consummated human sin was marked by a peculiar act of penitence.

Thus did God Himself, in our nature, taste for us and with us the bitterness of the suffering we have ourselves incurred; for us and with us He faced the awful power of sin, and the darkness in which death comes to the sinner; for us and in our name He passed triumphant before us into the Light beyond.

It may indeed seem merely rhetorical so to speak, but in fact Christianity is only a message of hope so long as this statement is literally true. If it had been impossible that God should so come in our flesh to hand-grips with death; if we must denude the Incarnate, stripping Him of His divine powers before we can conceive Him desolate upon the Cross; if manhood, mere manhood, can be thought of as capable of so glorious a victory, why was the Incarnation necessary? To bring God down from heaven because we were too weak to fight alone, and to restrict Him not only to human weapons but to human power when He is in our midst, is a process of thought against which reason rebels. The Victor of Calvary is God, though the weapons that he used were human. No power was brought into action which He could not use in and through His sinless humanity. The power with which He drove back the Prince of Darkness at the last was divine in essence, but always mediated by a human will and human faculties. Therefore may we too conquer

and pass triumphant through the Valley of the Shadow of Death if and so long as we dwell in the Incarnate and He in us. This, in short, is the message of the Gospel.

It will be seen that in this interpretation of the Passion we have found room at once for the power and the weakness of Christ.

We have avoided the sharp contrast of His divine nature and His manhood, for we cannot conceive of His personal activity apart from His own eternal nature. That is to say, we do not regard the impassibility of the divine nature to imply its inactivity and quiescence in the Passion of the Incarnate. Rather we would think and speak of His divine self as conditioned by His manhood. The power of the Crucified is the power of the divine Son limited and modified by its expression through human faculties alone; and the weakness of the Crucified is the weakness of the divine Son limited by and in manhood's conditions. It is one and the same Christ who is powerful and weak, as His manhood demands. For He has become man in order that He may die, and by dying conquer.

So also we have avoided conceptions of the Incarnate as self-abandoned. We have provided for the Scriptural evidence as to His divine power that conquered sin and death; finding it present just in the degree in which His manhood was capable of assimilating and using it.

Truly this Man was in the fullest sense the Son of God; God the Son; the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity; but equally truly may we cry, "Behold the Man!"

CHAPTER XIII

THE CHRIST IN DEATH AND GLORY

IT remains to ask, How could the Incarnate die? And what do we know of His life in glory?

I

We know that the death of the body, followed by corruption and dissolution, is the due punishment of sin; following upon the sacrifice of the gift of divine life to human pride and lust. We are led to think that the spiritualizing of the body might have been accomplished as by way of transfiguration through infusion of divine life and glory by the indwelling Word.[1] But being what we are, we look for the redemption of our nature to the purification of the penitent soul after death, and to the remaking of our body after its dissolution; the temporary separation of soul and body being terminated in the resurrection from the state of the dead.

The Incarnate Lord conquered death by carrying manhood to perfection and glory without falling a

[1] Matt. xvii. 1–8. 1 Cor. xv. 51, 53. 2 Cor. v. 2, etc.

victim to the forces that make for corruption.[1] Had His flesh seen corruption He would not have been the conqueror of death. He went to death as man; for man's flesh must die to live. He could not exempt His own body from the law of death, inasmuch as that law had by His own divine will become universal. To have done so would have meant a refusal to be as we are. But He did not see corruption: He conquered death by presenting it with a perfect manhood on which it exercised its powers in vain.

Thus we conceive the dying Christ as truly human. He is the divine Son conditioned in manhood; the Lord of death and Hades. He has come to vanquish death and deliver us from its power. He is not self-abandoned of His might: for His might alone will win us the victory. But no might does He possess that is not truly mediated by His sinless manhood.

The Incarnate bowed His head in death; His soul passed, conquering and to conquer, into the realms of the dead;[2] while His body lay triumphant in death, incorruptible, indissoluble, in the grave by Jerusalem. Manhood had conquered because, both in life and death, it had been made to mediate the power and consciousness of the Son of God.

We cannot advocate the view that ascribes to the dying Christ the plenitude of divine power in action. Such a view has no help to give us: rather it makes the death largely dramatic. What is the death of the

[1] Acts II. 31. [2] 1 Peter III. 18, 19.

Son of God, when His power in no way depends upon the manhood for its self-expression? But regard the Incarnate as self-conscious only in manhood, as expressing Himself only through manhood, and at once we understand how He died, and how the grave is redeemed, together with the life that lies beyond it.

For we see the Incarnate, for three days, appearing before God in His human soul alone: having no help in self-expression from His body. We see Him powerfully living in and redeeming that state of disorganized manhood which to us is so full of wonder and terror. His self-consciousness as God the Son Incarnate is mediated by a soul separated from its body, in order that all who shall come so to live may find redemption and power.

Meanwhile for those three days His body lay in the grave preserved from dissolution and any the least corruption. Separated from its soul it lay powerless, inactive, dead. But powerless as it was to mediate the self-expression of the Incarnate we may not think of it as separated from Him altogether. From Him it derived its power of incorruptibility: and in that divine power it was constituted the seed of immortality and life eternal to the whole human race.

Thus both soul and body remained in union with Him, though themselves separate the one from the other; but He had only one centre of self-consciousness and that His soul.

II

There remains the still more mysterious problem of the relation of the Incarnate to the death of the soul.

The death of the soul is the penalty of consummated sin, which deprives a man of all vision of God. It is at once the ordained penalty and the natural consequence of the soul's own sin.

It will be evident, I think, that our Lord would not have conquered death in the soul if He had experienced it in all its fulness; just as He would not have vanquished death in the body had His flesh seen corruption.

Yet He experienced the attack of this spiritual death. It was that which made for Him the desolation on the Cross, paralysing as it were His heart and His mind. But through it all, as we have seen, His will endured; and His exceeding bitter cry proved Him to have passed through the conflict alive in soul: alive to God's Love and Holiness and Justice.

He experienced the full force of the attack, thus enduring the ordained penalty of our sin, but Death did not succeed in its efforts to slay Him. No! the conquest does not lie in experiencing the victory of the enemy! Jesus held fast to His Father with His will. He conquered death in the flesh by dying without seeing corruption. And He vanquished death in the soul by feeling the desolation without losing His hold upon His Father.

Consider, then, the power that was needed for so

great a victory! Because our manhood was weak, the eternal Son took manhood into Himself that He might carry it safe through death. A self-abandoned Logos could not have done it: for without divine power He could not have effected what human power had utterly failed to accomplish. Nor could the unlimited Logos, in the fulness of His power, have so restrained Himself as to experience truly the utter desolation on the Cross: His cry would have been true in respect of but half His being, and that half the human nature that He had assumed.

But the Incarnate conditioned by manhood, exercising just so much divine power as His manhood could mediate, was at once weak enough to feel the attack personally in its reality, and strong enough to hold fast to God until the force of the attack was spent.

Thus the Incarnate could really die, and in dying really endure the utmost penalty and consequence of sin. So did God love the world that He sent His Son to do for us in our nature all that we could not do, and to endure all that we could not endure; in order that we through union with Him, the Son in manhood, might be set free from the consequences of our revolt against divine law, and confirmed in our obedience to our Father's will.

III

Our final task is to speak of the Incarnate in His glory.

Nor is it a difficult task to pass from such a conception of the dying Christ to a conception of Him in His resurrection life. For death was vanquished both in body and soul, the power of Satan was broken. Christ's manhood had passed naturally into the world of spirit, and it remained for Him to reap the fruits of His victory, and to appropriate the divine glory that was once more His own.

The Incarnate therefore received in His manhood that measure of glory that is fitted to His perfect, God-assumed humanity. His whole manhood was made subject to the laws of the spiritual world, being free from the laws that govern this world of matter; and in being so subjected to the Spirit it received, during the stages that followed the resurrection, all the divine power that a finite, created nature can assimilate and make its own. Of the measure of that glory and power we can form no conception. It is revealed to us that it surpasses any measure to which mere creatures can attain, and in metaphorical language the Incarnate in His manhood is seated with the Father on His throne.[1] Anything short of actual deification may be ascribed, then, to the manhood of Christ.

But the distinction between the divine and the

[1] Rev. III. 21.

human remains true for evermore. Revelation shews us the Incarnate in heaven in His manhood. For as man He is our High-Priest, who ever lives in our nature to make intercession for us. It is as man that He shewed Himself to St. John: as man ruling His Church and judging sinners.[1] And it is as the Lamb of God that He is pictured by the Spirit to the same Apostle: the Lamb, the Man Christ Jesus, who reigns with the Father, and with Him is the Light of the heavenly city for evermore.[2] And the promise to us is not that we shall sit with Him on His Father's throne, but on His own throne; that is, we shall share His glory as Incarnate: His glory conditioned by the capacity of His exalted manhood.

Yes, glorified and empowered, that manhood remains the one medium of the self-consciousness of the Incarnate. Within those special relationships that make the sphere of the Incarnation He is for ever dependent on His glorious manhood as a medium for His self-expression and His power. And this sphere is that of His mystical body, His Church. As Incarnate He is her Head, the First-Born of the Redeemed Creation, the High-Priest and King of the new race of the sons of God.

As man, in manhood that is one in origin with ours, He beholds the Godhead face to face. All that can be known by one who is in some sense limited, the Incarnate knows and that immediately through His glorified human soul.

[1] Rev. I. 12–18, etc. [2] Rev. XXII. 1, 3, etc. [3] Rev. III. 21.

Thus all that may be known of God by us His creatures, each in his measure, is manifest in Him, mediated to us by His glorious manhood: and in that manhood, as in a mirror, the faithful saints behold the glory of God, His beauty, and His Holiness.

So also on the other side, the adoration and obedience which the Incarnate in His human nature offers to the Father is without parallel, and can be measured only by God Himself. No human mind can compass it. And this it is which is the consummation of the Sacrifice of Calvary. His obedience is the representation in terms of human life of that initial act by which He, the Eternal Son, imposed upon Himself the law of self-restraint at the moment of the Incarnation; and that representation was made supremely real in the moment that He shed His blood and poured out His life on Calvary.

And all that mankind may offer to God of adoration, penitence, and obedience is gathered up into that glorified manhood in which we have our new being; and mingled with the adoration, penitence, and obedience of His own perfect heart, it is presented before the Father by the Incarnate, the divine Son in manhood.

There is no room for a Kenotic theory that views the Incarnate in heaven as possessing powers which on earth He had laid aside. Nor can we see our way to the opinion that the Incarnate in heaven, as on earth, possesses and exercises in the sphere of the

Incarnation divine powers that even His glorified manhood cannot mediate.

The Christ of the Bible is one: one Person in two natures. His divine nature is inseparable from His person; its activities are His personal activities, and cannot be isolated from Him. But His human nature is the medium at once of His self-knowledge as Incarnate Son and of the exercise of His divine powers. Thus the limits of the capacity of His manhood constitute the limits of His freedom in His Incarnate life. This is the law of His being as Incarnate: a law unchanging and unchangeable. He became man truly and really; and we may trace the growth and development of His self-consciousness as Incarnate step by step as we trace the growth and development of His manhood. The Incarnate Son in infancy; the Incarnate Son in boyhood; the Incarnate Son in manhood; the Incarnate Son in glory:—One and the same Person throughout, possessing the powers of deity, but conditioned as to His consciousness of Himself and His power by the manhood He had assumed.

His ascension is, therefore, the enlargement of His human capacities to a degree that we cannot measure, and it carries with it a corresponding increase of the content of His consciousness and of the exercise of His powers. There is no break in continuity, no change of state, no resumption of powers that had been laid aside. The great and fundamental law of the Incarnation is found to be valid at every stage:

from the conception in the womb of Mary to the present day; the limits of the capacity of His manhood are at each moment the limits of His freedom in His incarnate life.

IV

"It became Him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings." And again, "He learned obedience by the things that He suffered."[1]

The Incarnate moved towards His perfection. Himself He is God: He has no need to advance in any sense towards perfection. But as God in manhood, as God self-conscious in manhood, He is not at birth perfect in the sense of complete attainment; but only in the popular sense of being free from sin and from the lack of anything necessary to Him at the stage of life in which He was. Perfect God in perfect babyhood is a term of less content than perfect God in perfect manhood. Each is perfect in one sense; but the former may in another sense advance in perfection. Hence progress of a kind was not only possible but necessary.

The Scriptures shew us the progress under two heads.

First, there is the divine self-realization as the penitent Head of the redeemed race: the Incarnate manifesting in progressive perfection His will to bear

[1] Heb. II. 10; v. 8.

the sins of the world, in true obedience accepting the ever-increasing burden of sin's penalty. He was destined to be High-Priest, eternal in the heavens, the basis of His priesthood being His obedience in suffering and death. So that the Incarnate actually did move to His perfect character and work as Priest along the path of pain and suffering.

Secondly, there is the divine self-realization in glorified manhood, which was also a matter of time and development. The Incarnate as boy was not able to be head of the Church: first it behoved Him to pass through Death and Ascension, which together form His glory. Hence the need of the discipline of pain, and of the natural growth and development of the Incarnate's manhood, with the corresponding increase of consciousness of the meaning of divine Sonship conditioned in manhood.

True growth towards perfection, in this sense, we need not fear to ascribe to the Incarnate. Let us remember that the unlimited Logos is the Logos as working outside the sphere of the Incarnation; and that, in order to become truly man, the eternal Son first condescended to be conscious of Himself as God in infancy! So thinking, we are carried along with the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews in adoring contemplation of the gradual expansion of that consciousness: until He who once knew Himself as God in infancy came to know Himself as God in manhood ascended and glorified on the throne of the Father.

For this did He become man, raising manhood

little by little to the level of the superhuman, the conditioned divine: and in His manhood mankind is being uplifted into the glory for which it was created.

How these things could be we may not know now. But we shall know all that human mind can grasp of this mystery of divine power and love in the day in which, with souls purified and bodies glorified, we stand before the Incarnate Son in manhood, looking into His Face; and at the same time with the eye of our soul behold Him, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, in the free, unlimited, divine life of the Godhead. Then and then only shall we be able to understand how He who upholds all things by the word of His power is able at the same time to condition His self-consciousness and His activities within the limits of our manhood.

Meanwhile we believe and confess Him to be true Son of God in manhood's bonds. God is born of Mary! God reigns from the Tree! God is gone up with the sound of the Trump! Lord Jesus, Son of Mary, Thou art my Lord and my God. I have seen Thee: and I have seen the Father.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CHRIST AND THE DOCTRINE OF PERSONALITY

WE have tested the proposed solution of the problem before us by applying it to several important passages of the Gospels, and by interpreting in the light of it the picture of the Christ with which the Evangelists have furnished us.

Our last task is to enquire whether our solution is valid in the face of what we know about personality.

What, then, do we mean by personality?

A competent teacher has bidden us to confine our use of the term to express the quality of being a person or self-conscious subject.[1] No better explanation is available where definition is impossible.

We find in the Gospels three distinct species of personality. Human personality is our own possession known to us in our own experience: the one reality which no sane man may doubt. Divine personality is at once the content of revelation, and the concept demanded by the human mind as it gazes upwards along the lines fixed by its own ex-

[1] Dr. Illingworth, to whose books I am indebted.

perience. And there is the third species, angelic personality, debased in special cases to the satanic.

We may then isolate those attributes of personality, as we conceive it, that are held to be common to all three species without in any way pretending to have sounded the depths of any one of them. While we bow our heads in awe before the Infinite, we may yet hope to conceive that which can make the Infinite rational to our finite minds.

We start, of course, from the centre of our own being: we argue from our own personality to God's. But this reasoning may not be ruled out of court as merely *a priori:* for in each case revelation authorizes and experience confirms what reason has proposed.

The attributes of personality, then, as expressing the quality of being a self-conscious subject, are chiefly six.

I

The first essential attribute is that of Self-consciousness.

Man knows himself. He is an object of his own contemplation. He can differentiate between himself and his neighbour. And he normally judges his environment from the standing-point of self, estimating the benefit or hurt that may come to him from it. Again, he can isolate himself from the faculties of his soul and the powers of his manhood, just because in their present state the content of their revelation of the self is less than that of the

self. This capacity of self-isolation it is that enables him to surrender himself to the Divine Being, and to dedicate to Him each separate part of his nature. Religious man is conscious of his lordship over each faculty of his complex nature, and deliberately assigns to each its duty of service or discipline of limitation, that each may aid in the communion of his conscious self with God. But he is always hindered by the influence of the flesh over his faculties, and their incompetence to express his self adequately before God.

Thus we become aware of a third element in our self-consciousness. To know myself as distinct from others provides me with the relationships necessary to my life in my proper environment; and to know myself as ultimately distinct from the flesh-hindered functions of my being preserves to me my power over my wayward nature. But all this is of no avail, unless I know myself as I am in the life of God. I must be conscious of myself as known of God.

Hence the attribute of self-consciousness is not adequately expressed under the formula, "I and not I." Rather we must extend the formula in some way like this: "I, and my knowledge of myself as I am in my actions, and as I am different from others, and my knowledge of myself as I am in God."

Such a formula errs in the claim that it seems to make of complete self-knowledge; for I do not fully know myself. With this reservation, it may be

allowed to stand as at least pointing us in the right direction.

If then I argue upwards from my own personality to God's it will be necessary to postulate of each Person in the Blessed Trinity self-consciousness of Himself as distinct from, and as yet in vital relationship with, the other Two. Each one knows Himself as He is distinct from the other Two, and also as He is in the life of God.

But it would, I think, be impossible to distinguish Him from His functions, inasmuch as we do not associate with the Divine Being sequence of thought, inadequacy of self-expression, or inability to execute perfectly the purpose of His mind. He is pure spirit: He is not hindered as we are by the influence of matter. It would be falsifying our conception of the Godhead to suppose any one of the divine Persons to be other than completely represented in His activity. God and God's activity are synonymous terms. But man's self and man's activity are terms of different content: the one being spirit, the other spiritual and fleshly in varying combination.

Thus in God the Son we discern consciousness of Himself, first as distinct from the Father and the Spirit, secondly as nevertheless only completely Himself in eternal relation to both, and thirdly as utterly different from all creatures.

This self-knowledge carries with it a complete knowledge of the Father and the Spirit, and of all creation: for the self-consciousness of the eternal

Son, being nothing less than God's knowledge of Himself, carries with it a perfect knowledge of the universe and its Creator.

Hence in a divine Person we conceive self-consciousness as being in fact omniscience.

Therefore we may never speak of omniscience as an external, or physical, attribute of God. Perhaps in respect to creation omniscience may be so described; but only as in a figure. For the omniscience of God is one and eternal; and its basis is His self-consciousness.

Therefore it was that when God the Son became man, limiting the content of His self-consciousness within a certain sphere by freely accepting the conditions of manhood, He conditioned and limited His omniscience. To have abandoned it would have been to have abandoned self-consciousness; to have exercised it in its fulness would have required in Him a second centre of self-consciousness as subject of manhood; but to limit and condition it as He did was to render Himself the very true subject or personal ego of His manhood.

II

The second essential attribute of personality is Self-determination.

Man knows himself as free to choose his own line of action within certain limits determined for him partly by heredity, partly by habit, and partly by

environment immediate or remote. Even in matters where the choice is reduced to the lowest degree of freedom, his inner self may accept or entirely repudiate the mind which the compulsory action may be supposed to exhibit. A slave compelled to some foul deed may whole-heartedly disassociate himself from the underlying lustfulness.

Man is therefore conscious of responsibility for his motives; he is free to select them, in so far as he is not guilty of self-surrender to evil habit; and he knows himself to be ultimately guilty of the failure of his moral being.

This faculty of self-determination is at the root of remorse and penitence; as it is the cause of most feelings of pleasure at praise and of unhappiness at blame. The desire to be credited with the highest motives for our good actions, and with at least good motives when our actions are bad; and the effort of good men to combat this desire: all these may be called to witness to our consciousness of moral freedom.

Thus the formula of self-determination is this: "I am free and responsible for my motives."

But since a knowledge of myself as I am known of God is a necessary part of my self-consciousness, the formula we have given fails to satisfy us. For in fact I am only free to follow the ideal implanted in my soul by God. I am only free in the measure that I choose my motives from amongst those that can drive me along the divinely-ordered path of

development. Outside this path I become a slave to evil habit and a creature of circumstance. My freedom lies in my ability to correspond with my ideal from my heart, and to realize it little by little in action. And the true ideal is that of the divine perfection revealed to me by and in the Incarnate Son. So that the ultimate formula of self-determination for me takes the form: "I am free to correspond with God's ideal for me."

Looking away, then, from man to God, we ask—What is it in Him that constitutes self-determination? And at once we are met by the conception of His almighty Will of which the eternal fruit is His eternal Holiness. Omnipotence is God's self-determination. Omnipotence, that is, viewed not merely as His irresistible power over creation, but as the essential freedom of God to realize His own Holiness. And in the measure that each of the Three Persons is truly personal we ascribe to Him this essential attribute of omnipotence or self-determination. Each one is free to realize Himself and His own Holiness: but since the Godhead is one only we do not conceive any one Person as free to determine Himself as apart from the other Two. As I am free to move Godward, so each divine Person is free within the necessary relationship that constitutes the divine unity. Divine Holiness is one, not three.

We may then truly regard the eternal Son as possessing necessarily and essentially the attribute of omnipotence. As Incarnate He possesses it still: for

to abandon it is to cease to be self-determined, to cease to be personal. But while possessing it He cannot fully exercise it, lest He should cease to allow the bonds of manhood to condition His free self-determination. Therefore we find Him conditioning His omnipotence, exercising it only so far as His manhood may mediate it. He chose to limit His freedom by becoming man. He is perfect God, always possessing omnipotence; but He is perfect man, and therefore possesses it under conditions of manhood. As manhood mediated His self-consciousness so it mediates His self-determination. Or, in other words, as manhood mediates His omniscience so it also mediates His omnipotence.

III

A third essential attribute is Self-identity.

A man is always the same in himself. The basal self is one and the same from birth to death and, as we Christians believe, beyond death for evermore. Change as he must in body and soul, develope or deteriorate, amidst shifting circumstances that vary as the days go by, yet the man's self never changes. He abides, adapting himself to the new even while he wrenches himself free from that which is failing him; the subject of an experience that has no unity at all except in his one unchanging self. He may experience in himself the ordinary chances of human life; steeped in sin, he may relate to a human self

the state of a dissipated animal; cleansed and reformed, to the very same self he may relate the state of true communion with God. But the experience is always that of his own self. The contents of it may be human, or animal, or satanic, or angelic: the subject of it is abidingly human, his one and unchanging self.

Hence the formula of self-identity emerges in the form: "I am always I."

In the Divine Being self-identity is expressed rather in the term eternal. The self-identity of God is His eternity; for eternity is the quality of unchangeableness. God is always God, as I am always I. The difference lies in the connotation of the word always.

The Incarnate Son is therefore possessed of the characteristic of self-identity. He assumes our nature, but He is always God the Son. To have laid aside attributes of divine self-consciousness and self-determination would have been to sacrifice His self-identity; but He may condition His consciousness and limit His powers as He will. A real manhood requires a real subject, of human content. The Incarnate Son came to act as that real subject, or ego: remaining in possession of all His attributes, but willing to undergo a new experience, in a limited state, under conditions of manhood. And this He did remaining always the divine Son. To limit His self-consciousness by assuming a human soul as its medium was in no sense to lose it. He is always and utterly Son of God: but

in the sphere of His humiliation He knows Himself as Son of God in manhood.

A human analogy may perhaps be found, as I have ventured to suggest in an earlier chapter. A king's son may choose to make himself one of the working class, and pass through all the suffering and pain that follow upon loss of employment; he may condition his royalty by the limits of the artisan state, or the limits of the unemployed state, yet, nevertheless, he is always and completely himself, the royal son of the king.

Just because the Incarnate is supremely personal, His attribute of unchangeableness, or self-identity, makes it possible for Him to live and act as the subject or personal ego of manhood. And this because human personality is in the image of the divine, and the attributes of the former are different from those of the latter rather in degree than in kind.

IV

Self-expression will be the fourth attribute of personality that we consider.

Man cannot live to himself. He owes his existence to others, and his normal, natural end is to hand on to others what he has himself received. This faculty of the reproduction of the self is exercised not through the body alone but through the mind. Its fruits are beyond number; as numerous as the actions of the human race. Man must express himself in order

both to realize himself and to gain for himself the satisfaction of his being.

Thus true family life is the sum of the true self-expression of the individual members of it; for love is self-expression. So, too, the artist will paint, the poet will write, the musician will compose: without their art their true life withers, and the best work of each is his highest reproduction of himself, the truest self-expression that his faculties can mediate. So also the true teacher is reproduced in his pupils; and the true man of God in his disciples.

Even selfish lives, whose self-expression has no element of love, are the more marked by the desire to reproduce themselves. For them everything depends upon their power to impress themselves upon others, compelling them to the service of their lusts and pleasures.

Thus the formula of Self-expression may be stated thus: "I and my necessary relationships."

In the Divine Being this same attribute is exhibited. The dogma of the Blessed Trinity becomes luminous when we regard it as the safeguard of the self-expression of the eternal Father. The Father's eternal self-utterance or self-expression, being personal as He is personal, since in the perfect being the content of the self and of the activity of the self are one, is revealed to us as His eternal Word, God the Son; and with the Son there is revealed to us the Holy Spirit, the personal self-expression of the activity of the Father's will and power. Dr. Moberly[1] worked out

[1] See Appendix, note VIII.

this analogy at some length in his volume upon the Atonement, suggesting the thought of man as he is in himself, man as self-expressed in his personal characteristic movements, and man as self-expressed in the best work of his lifetime.[1]

When we concentrate our thoughts upon the eternal Son we shall necessarily look for this quality. What is the self-expression of the Son? Clearly in the first place, it is the power of existing only in eternal and internal relations to the Father and the Spirit. Apart from them He has no existence. And secondly, we see Him as Word of the Father in everlasting relations to all creatures. He upholds all things by His personal power: all things are life in Him.[1] Thus it becomes clear to us that the self-expression of each person in the blessed Trinity implies the eternal relationships of their internal life, and the added relationships with creatures that follow upon the creative act of God.

In a word, then, omnipresence is the quality of self-expression raised to the degree of the divine.

For omnipresence is nothing less than God's power of relating to Himself at one and the same moment all things that are outside Himself. Like omniscience and omnipotence, it is not really a physical or external attribute; it is the basis of the internal relations of the Godhead as well as of the external relations of God to His universe.

Therefore it is that we cannot conceive the Incar-

[1] *Atonement and Personality*, pp. 174–5.

nate as having laid aside His omnipresence; nor can we imagine Him exercising it to the full in the same sphere in which He dwells in manhood. But we are able to fall back upon our theory which assumes the conditioning of the divine quality of omnipresence by limiting it within the capacity of His manhood. The Gospels shew us that those limits are less narrow than we might have supposed; for the Incarnate exhibited a most wonderful power of insight, of sympathy, and of uniting men to Himself.

V

In the fifth place we must name Individuality.

Man is a self-conscious subject: a centre to his own world: an end to himself. For which reasons he is essentially unique; there is no one else who is identical with him.

But we must not go on to say that man is therefore exclusive; independent of all other persons. "I am only I" is true in a sense; true in the sense that there is no one who can claim identity with me. But it is in another sense quite untrue; for the content of the "I" is not exclusively my own. If my manhood were self-derived and self-sufficing, the formula would be universally valid; but if in any the least degree my self reproduces any the smallest elements of my parents' life and characters, to that extent the formula will need modification. In its birth the human self is not exclusive.

From another point of view the attribute of exclusiveness is seen to be unsuited to human personality.

Marriage and the higher forms of friendship are deliberate attempts at a union between two selves. Friendship marks the consciousness of the desire for "inclusive personality"; true marriage is the way of partial attainment that has commended itself to the experience of the race. "I am only I" is a phrase that is altogether out of touch with the facts of life: we owe so much to friends, counsellors, and teachers. "I am I, and all of my friends that I could assimilate to myself." Such is the formula that represents my present self. And this without my losing in any way my self-identity. I am still I; but I know that with my self there is all of my friends that I could assimilate to myself.

Again, exclusiveness is ruled out of the sphere of the spiritual life. "It is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me," may be a Pauline ideal; it is certainly a true description of the tendency of a very large number of lives, as it is their conscious aim. The merging of the self in the greater Self of Christ is an enlargement of the faculty of friendship and human love. The desire for it, as for the less intense forms of self-identification with others, is a sufficient proof that essentially and ultimately personality is not exclusive but inclusive. "I am not only I, but Christ." This is in fact the language common to true personal religion and to social Christianity: as it

is the explanation of the relation of the individual to the mystical body of Christ, the Church.

Again, it must be considered that while my person or self is really unique, the medium of my self-consciousness and self-realization is in no way at all unique.

My manhood, in the broadest sense, I possess in common with unnumbered millions. The particular mode of my own humanity I owe in part to countless ancestral influences; it is a composite portrait of characteristics common to many who went before me. All that is ultimately unique is the basal self in which my humanity is constituted, and the individual character that it has stamped on my manhood. My self and my individual mode of possessing my manhood are alone unique. For the rest I am more or less like my fellow-men. That which constitutes the difference between man and man is the basal self or ego, the human person, which is fundamentally and essentially unique. Each individual possesses a manhood that is practically like that of every other person; but the particular relation of his self to his manhood is unlike that of any other self to its manhood. He is unique because he possesses his manhood in a unique mode. So that every man is unique, and his personality is marked by an individuality of its own. But no man may be said to be independent, or self-sufficient, or exclusive.

When we turn to the divine Person we are able to see the same attribute of Individuality. For in the

first place we are taught both by reason and revelation that God is one and one only. Godhead is spirit: it may not be conceived as distributed among three persons, as human nature is distributed amongst the race of men. Godhead is one and indivisible. But each Person of the Godhead is conceived as possessing the Godhead in a manner peculiar to Himself, according as He Himself is distinct from the other two Persons.

The Father is revealed as possessing the Godhead by way of origination. His distinctive quality that renders Him unique is that of being the Subject of the eternal act of origination, which is His proper act as being the Fountain of divine life. He knows Himself as different from the Son and the Spirit because He knows Himself to have life in Himself.

The Godhead is possessed by the Son in a different mode, for He has it as receiving it from the Father. The quality that renders Him unique is that of being the Subject of an eternal act of reception and dependence. He is the Son. He knows Himself as being different from the Father and the Spirit because He knows Himself to have been granted by the Father to have life in Himself, and to be dependent upon the Father. He is the self-expression of the Father: He exists eternally as the mediator of the Father's self-consciousness: He is the eternal, only-begotten Son.

The Holy Spirit possesses the Godhead in yet a third mode. He knows Himself as receiving the

Godhead eternally from the Father and the Son. And the quality that renders Him unique is that of being the Subject of an eternal act of unification, unifying in His eternal self-consciousness the relationship of the Father with the Son, and of Himself with both. He could not know Himself as eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son by a single, unified procession were He not also able in that very act to mediate the unity, the oneness of the Father and the Son.

This, of course, seems a very bold attempt to explain the inexplicable. But in fact the boldness is only on the surface. We have only followed reason along the path of experience, and that in the direction which revelation allows.

And here let us consider whether it is not possible to make more real to our minds the conception of the oneness of the Godhead and the threefold manner in which it is the medium of a threefold personality.

A human person may be regarded as a single self-conscious subject, expressed through three rational activities, which are modified by their dependence upon bodily powers. And as Christians, we look forward to some such transformation of our bodily powers as will make them adequate media of our rational activities; so that ultimately the content of our self will not be, as it is at present, much greater than the content of our self-expression. Only so can we hope for perfect union with God.

Let us imagine such a transformation in the degree

that would make our bodily powers completely spiritual, so that the only hindrance to our complete self-expression would lie in the activities of the self: in our will and reason and desire.

Next let us imagine that these three activities were set free from all weakness, and endowed with all the attributes of personality. My will, my reason, and my desire would each be a person; but since my nature is one, each person would possess all my nature; and the three would be really one. The distinction between them would lie in the mode in which each possessed my nature. The self-consciousness of each would be mediated by one and the same nature, now become spiritual. My original self or ego would merely cease to exist in its first form. Since self and self-expression would now have become equal, my original self would reappear as the threefold self: the subject possessing threefold consciousness in one nature.

This imaginary self might be called a super-personal being, one being in three personal activities; the subject of it being one, while possessing a threefold consciousness. It would no longer be in the category of person. We should say that each of the three individual activities was a person; but inasmuch as each one was related to the other two in a manner unknown in the realm of human personality, we should call each one a super-personal ego; and the being that is three super-personal egos in one spiritual nature we should call super-personal.

The highest category of which we have experience is person. The person of whom we have actual knowledge is human: a self-conscious ego with three rational activities, depending upon manhood for its medium of self-expression. But apart from experience we can dimly imagine a personal being, the subject of which is not a single self-conscious ego, but a threefold ego with a threefold consciousness, which, however, depends for its consciousness upon a single nature. This conception we arrive at merely by supposing that the threefold activity of the soul could become quite adequate to its subject: so that the content of the self-expression of the ego through its activities should be exactly equal to the content of the ego itself. That is to say, my will, my reason, and my desire, being each personal by hypothesis, form the threefold ego of my manhood. They are my ego.

From this conception it is not far that we have to go to the idea of God that revelation gives us: that of a divine-personal Being, the Subject of which has a threefold consciousness, mediated by the one single divine nature. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God. Each has a different self-consciousness, but each consciousness is mediated by the one divine nature that is possessed by each in a manner peculiar to Himself. Hence God is one, the medium of consciousness being one; yet He is three "persons" because each ego has a unique characteristic, arising from the mode in which He is related to the one

nature. There is one God, one Divinity; and His self-expression is through three divine egos, whom for lack of a word we must call three divine persons. But there is no difference in the category of the Godhead and that of the three personal Activities; although, of course, there is a difference of category between my personal self and that of its three impersonal activities.

Godhead is the nature possessed in common by the three personal, divine Activities: each one possessing it in a different way. So that we may rightly speak of God as one in three persons. One Deity in three divine-personal Activities; while man is one person in three impersonal activities.

God is super-person: above our apprehension; but as super-person He is essentially personal; and in a degree we may recognize the attributes of divinity as one with those of human personality. But deity is a higher category than personality. In fact, it is truer to say that personality is the image of deity than that human personality is the image of divine personality.

It remains, then, to ask how it comes to pass that the Second Person of the Trinity was able to become incarnate without the incarnation of the Father and the Spirit. Can the individuality of the Son account for this?

We are taught that God is one. As possessing the Godhead the Son appears identical with the Father. But we have already seen that He is

distinct from Him because of the unique mode in which He receives the Godhead from the Father. Thus when we name the Son the Image of the Father, we must bear in mind that there is something in the Father that cannot be imaged even in the Son, namely, the act by which He eternally originates the Godhead. The one thing that a man can never make external to himself is the act of self-consciousness. He may know that he knows himself: he cannot know the act by which he knows himself. It is essentially internal and inexpressible.

The Second Person, then, as in no way reproducing the act of origination is essentially the Son, depending in all things upon the Father from whom He receives all that is His. In order, then, to fulfil the eternal will of the Father to redeem mankind through the offering of human obedience and dependence, it was fitting that the eternal Son should modify His personal life and activity so far as to become the subject of a manhood that was in all things to depend upon and receive from the Father. Human sonship was to be raised to the divine level by God the Son descending to the human.

The unique act of the only-begotten Son by which He always receives and depends was to become the basis of a kindred act on the human level; so that as man He should receive and depend. The self-sufficiency of mankind was to be atoned for and done away in Him whose unique attribute it is that He continually receives and never originates. And when

once He had willed to come, He bound Himself by that law of self-restraint under which He lives entirely in the conditions of manhood, and it is the property of manhood always to receive and depend. So bound, limited, and conditioned He continues to receive and to depend: all that as man He requires He receives only through manhood; and the powers of His own personal self, of His divine nature, He exercises only so far as His manhood can mediate and communicate them. Reception and dependence: these are His characteristics in His eternal state, and within the sphere of the Incarnation.

VI

And, lastly, we will speak of the attribute of Unity: which in fact arises from that of Individuality.

The self possessed of personality in the fulness of those attributes that are common to all, yet in a mode peculiar to itself, is the unifying principle of all those attributes and their fruits; and is, as it were, the seal that stamps each attribute and its manifestations with its own individuality.

Again, man cannot exercise any one function of his personality except it be duly related to all other functions, and also subordinated to his own peculiar mode of possessing his humanity. If the former be not the case, if the relations be irregular or broken, there can be no measure of sanity; if the latter be not the case, if the functions may override the basal self,

there can be no ultimate moral responsibility. Man is then master of himself; and each action of his personality is entirely his own, expressing himself.

When therefore we argue from the human to the divine, we naturally look for the corresponding attribute of divine personality. We not only expect to find the individuality of each divine Person in the unique mode in which each possesses the one divine nature or Godhead; we also expect to find each Person exercising supreme control over that one divine nature which is the medium of His self-consciousness.

God is one and God's will is one: but that does not mean that the Son and the Spirit are to be thought of as merely moved by the Father. That were a poor conception of Infinite Power, moving out in infinite love to fulfil the purposes of infinite wisdom! Rather must we conceive each Person as exercising the one divine nature in the mode proper to Himself. The Father originates, the Son images and in imaging freely makes His own; while the Spirit unifies the origination and the image in one active expression of the threefold will. True, in saying this we are only facing the direction in which truth lies. The road is not yet adapted to the vehicles at our disposal. But is it nothing to face the goal and to know it, though it be afar?

On these lines, then, we can in a measure conceive the eternal Son possessing the divine nature and exercising divine powers in a mode so peculiarly His own, although always in dependence upon the Father and

in co-operation with the Spirit, as to be able to submit Himself to the conditions of manhood in fulfilment of the divine will.

Possessing the attributes of individuality and unity, as being really a person, He was able to condition His divine nature and all its powers in obedience to the Father in such a way as to exhibit on earth and through manhood the two essential characteristics of sonship : reception and dependence. So conditioning His divine sonship He raised the sonship of mankind to perfection ; and constituted Himself in manhood the firstborn of the new family of God ; that family whose life is His life communicated to them, and whose sphere of action is the heavenly state to which they have been raised in union with His manhood.

This brief review of the doctrine of personality in its bearing upon the Incarnation will, I hope, have helped a little to make clear certain points that are essential to the dogma.

First, the Son of God is so truly personal that by conditioning His divine attributes He is able to act, adequately and fitly, as the true subject, or ego, of manhood.

Secondly, His personality is so far marked by individuality as to make it fit that He should be the Person of the Godhead who should become incarnate.

Thirdly, His personality is not exclusive ; and therefore His coming in the flesh necessitates the co-operation of the Father and the Holy Ghost :

the Father sending the Son, and the Spirit preparing for His coming and dwelling in the new family of the redeemed. And not only this: for where the Son is, there also must the Father and the Spirit be.

Fourthly, from the point of view of our human personality it is seen that so truly does personality as we know it serve as the image of deity in respect to the attributes that we have considered, that it is quite possible to constitute human nature in a divine Person, provided that the divine Person will accept as His own the conditions and limitations of manhood.

Fifthly and lastly, I trust it will be plain that no theory of the self-abandonment by the Son of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence will ultimately be compatible with a belief in His true, divine personality. For we have seen that these so-called external attributes are in fact essential attributes of His internal life in the Godhead.

If this has become at all clear, it will mean that the theory of the manner of the Incarnation which I have tried to develope will not only explain the Gospel picture of the Christ, but also take due account of what we know of His divine personality. I do not say that my statement of the theory has adequately fulfilled the claim that I make for it: but I feel convinced that in abler hands it can be so stated as to provide for all the facts and commend itself to the reason and the heart.

CHAPTER XV

CONCLUSION

WE have come to the end of our task. We started with the question, Who is the true subject of the manhood of the Incarnate, and what is the content of His ego?

I

To this query we discovered three main answers in history. One we were able to reject at once as unscriptural and heretical: the answer that the subject is either a person born of human parents, with whom the eternal Son willed so to associate Himself as to constitute with him one composite person; or a divine-human person, more than human and not simply divine.

There remain two answers, one of which is ancient, supported by the authority of great names; the other comparatively modern.

According to the former, the subject of the manhood is the eternal Son in the unlimited possession and exercise of His divine powers. But we found various methods of postulating a restraint of the

divine powers lest they should hinder the manhood from its proper functions. Here we were always met by the fact that however much the divine powers were held in check and however natural were the acts of the manhood, yet the Incarnate must always have been conscious of a Self that was too great to be expressed through manhood: a Self that could never be the exactly adequate ego of a manhood which suffered and died. That is to say, either we must conceive of the manhood acting impersonally, which is impossible; or we must confess two centres of consciousness in the Incarnate, which is unthinkable. And for this reason, amongst others, we saw that this answer must be rejected.

According to the latter answer, the subject of the manhood is the eternal Son, self-abased, self-abandoned of the physical attributes of God: an answer which we have tried to refute in so many ways that to summarize them would be to repeat most of what we have said above in this connection.

After discussing these answers, we chose the line of the Athanasian Christology, and sought to develope it in the light of this problem that now troubles men's minds.

We postulated the distinction between the eternal, universal relationships of the Son of God, and the new, particular relationships that make up the world of the Incarnate and His redeemed people. In the former sphere we found all the unlimited activities of the eternal Son for all time, activities from which He

has never ceased; and among them we found the promulgation of the law of self-emptying which He imposed upon Himself: the law of self-restraint that was to make possible the second set of relationships, the sphere of the Incarnation.

Within the sphere of the Incarnation we found the eternal Son living under that law of self-restraint, by which the limits of His manhood at every moment are constituted as the limits of His consciousness and freedom as Incarnate Son of God. We saw Him unconscious of any self that is too great to be mediated by the human soul that He had joined to Himself; He Who is God, possessing all the attributes of God, lives entirely and utterly under conditions of manhood. Apart from His manhood He has no existence as Incarnate, although all the while He lives and reigns in the eternal sphere as the unlimited Word of the Father.

We saw Him incarnate: the unborn Babe, the little Child, the Boy in His mother's home, the Youth in Joseph's workshop, the Man in His ministry of mercy. It was no gradual incarnation that we saw: for the very orderliness of the development of Christ's consciousness proved how truly and utterly He had become man at the first moment of His conception in Mary's womb.

We noted in action the divine powers, conditioned always in and mediated by His manhood; until finally we saw Him, the divine Son incarnate, conquer in our name and in our nature the enemies of our race, Death and Satan.

Finally, we watched the Incarnate pass to His glory: and we saw the wonder of the glorification of the manhood in which He lives before God for evermore.

II

In all this we followed faithfully the evidence of the Scriptures, interpreted within the limits set by the decrees of the Catholic Church. In no case have we transgressed a dogmatic ruling of the Church, or refused to allow for a fact recorded in the Gospels.

It is true we have dared to differ from the actual statements of some great Fathers; but not as rejecting any one of the principles of Christology which we owe to them. We have taken their fundamental axioms and postulates, and have gone a little further along the road of explanation than they themselves had reached.

The chief differences are these:—

(i) I have given reasons for confining all the activities of the unlimited Word to the sphere of His eternal, universal relations; whereas the usual view is to find Him in His freedom within the sphere of the Incarnation. Any disadvantage that might seem to follow upon my view I have obviated by shewing that there is no real wall of separation between the universal and incarnate states. All that under the old view the Christ receives from His divine nature is provided for in my theory.

(ii) I have established as the measure of the In-

carnate's consciousness and power His manhood: flawless, sinless, perfectly developed, and always united with the eternal Son. Whereas the usual view is to allow for two measures in the Incarnate: one which is that of His pre-incarnate state, by which He acts as God unlimited although incarnate; and one which is His as man. Thus I have found a conception of the One Christ which the old view failed to do.

(iii) I have based the self-restraint of the Incarnate Son upon an act of will which He made as the unlimited Word of the Father: an act once made and never to be altered; whereas the usual view is that His self-restraint is due to a series of acts within the sphere of His Incarnation.

These are the chief differences. The basis of my theory is the Christology of the Church: and its issues are entirely Catholic. But on the points that have been specified, I am liable to be called to account. My plea is that these points in which I have dared to suggest some development have never been made the matter of definition by the Church: and that there is nothing in my solution of the problem that brings me under the ban even of St. Cyril's very wide condemnation of heresies.[1]

Of the difficulty in conceiving of the one Christ as I have tried to write of Him notice has been taken, and analogies have been suggested to make the

[1] His twelve anathemas. See Heurtley's *De Fide et Symbolo*, pp. 196 ff.

theory easier. But in the last resort we must leave much unexplained; and fall back upon the love and power of our God whose life is love and the expression of love. In any case there is no more difficulty in this theory than in any other view of the manner of the Incarnation.

III

It remains to suggest some lines of thought along which we can arrive at an estimate of the potential value of such a conception of the Christ as I have tried to express.

First, there is new light to be found in it to illustrate the meaning of the extension of the Incarnation in the Church and Sacraments. If it be true that God in manhood is alone intelligible to us, that apart from His manhood the Christ can neither be conscious of Himself nor be the Teacher of the humau race; if it be true that for evermore manhood is the measure of God's self-revelation, and the way of approach to the Father; then we can the better grasp the importance of the Church as the family of which the Incarnate is the head; as the circle of which Christ is the centre. And thus we come to see the meaning of the Sacraments as relating us to God in manhood. Unsacramental religion loses its meaning, undogmatic teaching its justification, just in the measure that we appreciate the place of the manhood in the Incarnate's life Godward.

Again, the theory for which I plead does most

successfully meet the modern craving for a realization of the humanity of our Saviour, without in any way surrendering the truth of His deity. For it most clearly exhibits Him as God in manhood: truly God, but God entirely conditioned in and by manhood. While becoming man, God raised manhood to a level otherwise unknown to us, yet it is a human level: the level on which sinless, God-aided manhood can live and work; the level to which we hope to attain in Christ in the day of the restoration of all things.

Thus our theory is at once a corrective and an inspiration to those who are in danger from modern humanitarian views. It recalls them to a true conception of manhood's limits and needs; while it opens out vast possibilities for the manhood that is one with that of the Christ.

In short, the One Christ, true God and true Man, God in manhood, God self-conscious in manhood, is seen to be the one true centre of the human race, and its only link with the Father of all men. To Him alone social aspiration may be directed, as it is in Him alone that individual re-creation can be found.

These thoughts are on the surface of the theory. I refer to them not in justification of what I have said; although after all a tree may be valued for its fruit. Rather I desire to bear my witness to the love of the Father who has devised this way for His banished to return to Him; and to record my conviction that no doctrine of the Incarnation is adequate to the task of comforting the broken heart of humanity

that does not offer us a human heart which is exactly the Heart of God Himself.

For the Heart of God is all His love that can be revealed to and received by the heart of man. The heart of the Incarnate is God's love in the measure of man's need and man's capacity, as it is also man's love in the measure that God can, by assuming it, make it worthy of His own acceptance.

This is the Gospel of comfort, of strength; and it is the picture of the human heart of God pierced by sin that makes sinful man realize both his own guilt and the possibilities of the power of God in manhood.

The Passion gains a deeper meaning as we learn to see in the Incarnate no consciousness of a self that could not suffer; just as our hope of attaining perfection is increased as we gaze upon that manhood of the Christ which for evermore has a necessary place in the relations of the Incarnate to His Father.

This is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes.

APPENDIX

NOTE I

DEFINITION OF THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON

THE late Dr. Bright translates it as follows: "Following, then, the holy Fathers, we confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ; and we all with one accord announce Him the self-same perfect in Godhead, the self-same perfect in Manhood, truly God and truly Man, the self-same, of a reasonable soul and a body; of one essence with the Father as to Godhead, of one essence with us as to Manhood, in all things like unto us, sin excepted; before the ages begotten of the Father as to Godhead, but in the last days, for us and for our salvation, the self-same (born) of Mary, the Virgin Mother of God, as to Manhood. One and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, recognized in Two Natures without confusion, change, division, separation; the difference of the Natures being nowise removed by reason of the Union, but, on the contrary, the property of each Nature being preserved, and combining into one Person and one Hypostasis," and so on. See his *History of the Church*, A.D. 313 to 451, ed. 5, pp. 409–10.

The whole definition in the original will be found in Heurtley's *De Fide et Symbolo*, pp. 23–8.

With the definition must be studied the letters of St. Cyril and St. Leo that are accounted Œcumenical. Those of St. Cyril are his second and third to Nestorius, and his letter to John of Antioch. They are printed by Heurtley in the work we have named; and are also published cheaply by Parker, as edited, with translation, by the late

Philip Pusey. St. Leo's tome, or letter to Flavian, will be found in Heurtley.

The English reader should procure *St. Leo on the Incarnation*, by the late Dr. Bright.

These letters are the authorized commentary on the dogma of the Incarnation, but they are not a dogmatic utterance of the Church. We are not bound by every word of the two writers: only by their doctrines as generally stated.

NOTE II

THE ATHANASIAN SCHOOL OF CHRISTOLOGY

It is composed of writers who regard our Lord's human actions as quite natural and spontaneous; postulating a temporary quiescence or inactivity of the eternal Son in the sphere of the Incarnation, in order to make possible the manifestation of the human. The mark of the school is that it allows for some measure of real weakness and even ignorance in the Incarnate in respect to His manhood.

Ignatius of Antioch does little more than assert the reality of our Lord's manhood as against Docetic teaching. See especially *Ad Trall.*, c. 9; *Ad Smyrn.*, cc. 1, 2, 3.

Justin Martyr emphasizes the independence of our Lord of external help from the Spirit. See *Dial. Tryph.*, cc. 87, 88. But he has no doubtful teaching about the reality of the manhood and temptations of Christ (*Dial. Tryph.*, c. 125). He also refers to His prayers (*Dial. Tryph.*, c. 106), and to the reality of His sufferings (*Dial.*, c. 103).

Irenaeus is more fruitful in evidence; he is, indeed, the first theologian of the post-Apostolic Church. Justin is rather a philosopher, and the nature of his writings shuts out the discussion of a point such as we are considering. The following passages of Irenaeus shew that he is rightly placed among the Athanasians, and that he may be counted as a true forerunner of the great Athanasius himself:—

(1) "The only-begotten Son of God, who is also the Word of the Father, having . . . been incarnate in a human being for man's sake" (*Contra Haer.*, III, XVII. 4).

(2) "For as He was man, that He might be tempted, so was He also the Word that He might be glorified: the Word remaining inactive in His temptation and dishonour and crucifixion and death, but going along with the Man in His victory and endurance, and works of goodness, and resurrection and ascension" (III, X.; XIX. 3).

(3) "He, the Invisible made visible, and the Incomprehensible made comprehensible, and the Impassible made capable of suffering, and the Word made man" (III, XVI. 6).

(4) "They did also see the Son of God . . . affirming that He who was then in heaven had gone down to the clay of death" (IV, XX. 8).[1]

Irenaeus regards the power of Christ's deity to be sometimes restrained, sometimes active. He does not teach a permanent quiescence of the Logos within the sphere of the Incarnation; nor does he see the difficulty of postulating a self in the Incarnate of a content too great to be mediated by His manhood.

A question arises about his view of our Lord's ignorance of the day of judgement. The passage in dispute is II, XXVIII. 8. For various interpretations, see Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, ed. 12, p. 468, note; and Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 111–12.

Athanasius follows the method of Scripture. He recognizes the divine and the human in the Christ, but attempts no reconciliation. Large passages may be quoted to shew that he fully allowed for the reality of the manhood in Christ. See *Orat.*, III, XXVI. 31–5; XXVIII. 46; XXIX. 54–7. *De Incar.*, XVIII.

[1] Translation in the Oxford Library of the Fathers, published by Parker.

But it is clear that he had not faced the question of the content of the subject of the manhood; for he ascribes to the Incarnate knowledge and ignorance of one and the same fact: knowledge as God and ignorance as man. See *Orat.*, III, xxvii. 38 ff.; xxviii. 43.

It seems to me that Athanasius unconsciously accepted two centres of Christ-consciousness: the Incarnate as subject of deity, and the Incarnate as subject of manhood. This becomes evident in his refusal to allow for the growth of the Incarnate in wisdom. He says the growth affects only His manhood. See *Orat.*, III, xxviii. 51–3. As man He advanced in wisdom; as God He could not so advance: therefore He has two centres of consciousness.

St. Gregory Nazianzen is fairly represented in such a passage as this: "He was baptized as Man, but He remitted sins as God. . . . He was tempted as Man, but He conquered as God. He asks where Lazarus was laid, for He was man; but He raises Lazarus, for He was God" (*Orat.*, xxix. 20; cf. 17–19). Or, again, "We are to understand the ignorance in the most reverent sense, by attributing it to the Manhood, and not to the Godhead" (*Orat.*, xxx. 15). It will be seen that the second passage qualifies the first, giving it just that mark which characterizes the Athanasian school.

St. Basil shews signs of a desire to escape from the full force of the words of St. Mark about the ignorance of Christ concerning the day of judgement. See Ep. 236. But it is a letter to a great friend (cf. Ep. 232) and must not be taken as a treatise. However, he allows that Christ may have been ignorant of the point as regards His manhood. For the reality of the manhood, see *De Spiritu*, xv. 35. For the co-operation of the Spirit with the manhood, see the same treatise, xvi. 39.

Tertullian may be read with the Athanasian Fathers, though I have not classed him with them. See especially *De Carne Christi*, v.; ix.; xiii.; and *Adv. Praxean*, xv.;

XXVI.; XXVII; XXX. The mark of the Athanasian school is most evident in his treatment of the desolation on the Cross, *Adv. Prax.*, XXX.

NOTE III

THE ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL

Clement is inclined to exalt the divine in Christ at the cost of the human. He wrote, of course, before the times of Christological controversy. To him the incarnation of the Word is the very centre of his faith. But he does not seem to have realized the need of the identity of Christ's humanity with ours. It is possible that his view of redemption may be due to his failure to grasp the truth of hereditary sinfulness. In his system the soul of Christ is the ransom for sin (*Paed.*, I. 9, 85); and our souls, received independently of our parents, are led to knowledge and salvation by the teaching of the Word, and by the communication of His risen life (*Paed.*, I. 2; III. 3.) The body is of minor importance; so much so that Clement does not hesitate to minimize the likeness of Christ's bodily nature to ours (*Paed.*, I. 2; *Strom.*, VI. 9; *Cohor.*, X., near the end). Clement was a Platonist, and did not honour the body. See Bigg's *Christian Platonists* for the whole of Clement's doctrine.

Origen stands alone. He regards the soul of Christ as eternal, the eternal link between the Word and the body that He was to take (*De Princip.*, II. 6). He allows for the growth of our Lord's mind, and postulates a self-emptying of the divine Logos that has to be made good by a human growth in wisdom (*In Ier. hom.*, I. 7). Also, as he says, "Christ must learn to speak like a child with children" (*In Ier. hom.*, I. 8). Bishop Gore claims Origen as one of the few Fathers who conceived of a true kenosis (*Dissert.*, pp. 144 ff.).

NOTE IV

THE CYRILLINE SCHOOL

It is composed of writers who tend to minimize the reality of the weakness and limitations of the manhood of Christ as being incompatible with the fulness of divine power that was His even in the sphere of the Incarnation.

St. Gregory of Nyssa tries to account for all the facts of Scripture, and is very much at one with the Athanasian school in his ordinary statement of the reality of the humanity. He allows for a real temptation in soul and body, and true mental growth, and real ignorance as man (*Adv. Apoll.*, II. 14, 24). He lays stress upon the wonderful power that could bring God to the lowness of humanity (*Orat. cat. mag.*, 24). But he writes just a little uncertainly about the miracles of Christ. Normally he attributes them to the divine power of the Son, but in one place he thinks that they may be ascribed to power communicated by God from without (cf. *Adv. Eunom.*, v. 5, and *Adv. Apoll.*, 28). On the other hand, he has the Cyrilline tendency to deify the manhood, thus cutting himself off from the Athanasian writers (*Adv. Apoll.*, 20, 25, 42). For Gregory's position see Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 141–4; Ottley, *Incarnation*, Vol. II, pp. 60, 287, 289; and Dorner, Div. I, Vol. II, pp. 366–7, 384 ff.

St. Hilary conceives a very real self-emptying on the part of the Son, not as a single act preparatory to a period of powerlessness, but as a continuous, habitual, loving self-restraint (*De Trin.*, IX. 51; in Ps. LXVIII. 25). But he makes the manhood a little unreal to us. He does not admit any human ignorance (*De Trin.*, IX. 62); and his account of the Christ's sufferings is unsatisfactory. His desire to magnify the moral value and beauty of each act of the Saviour in His passion makes him minimize the reality of the manhood; each act being assigned to a separate act of divine self-restraint (*De Trin.*, X. 23, 24, 47,

48, 62; in Ps. LIII. 12; *De Synod.*, 49). The Agony in the garden of Gethsemane is explained away (*De. Trin.*, X. 41). He regards the body as empowered through its conception by the Holy Ghost (*De Trin.*, X. 35, 44, etc.).

St. Ambrose says that our Lord pretended to be ignorant of the day of judgement for the sake of the disciples, lest He should hurt them by telling them the truth (*De Fide*, V, XVIII. 219. Cf. XVI. and XVII.).

St. Augustine in all his sermons on the Nativity emphasizes the fact that the Incarnation is the unveiling of divine love and power (e.g. Sermo 186, I.; 187, I., III.; 188, II.; cf. 225, III.). In his treatment of the doctrine generally he is most careful to differentiate the acts of the Christ as God and His acts as man (Sermo 124, III. is a good example). But in his treatment of the manhood he fails to allow for all the facts. He adopts the explanation that the ignorance of our Lord was assumed (*De Trin.*, I. 23); and denies that He was ignorant of anything except sin (in Ps. XXXIV., Sermo 2, II.). He maintains that the advance in wisdom was only in the manhood (*Contra Max. Arian.*, II., XXIII. 7). But the positive evidence on this matter is contained in the retractation by Leprius of his view that Christ was really ignorant as man, to which Augustine put his name as a witness (Ep. 219).

St. Cyril is the second prophet of the Incarnation, St. Athanasius being the first and chiefest. Of the general principles of his Christology it is superfluous to speak. For "in proportion as Christians of this age confess their faith in the atoning work of this one Christ, they are daily debtors to St. Cyril" (Bright, *History of the Church*, p. 371). But he did minimize the human weakness and limitations of Christ, lest men should doubt the presence of the fulness of deity in the Incarnate. He ascribes to our Lord a pretended ignorance, and a merely apparent growth in wisdom. The passages of his works that prove these

statements are most carefully arranged and translated by Professor Bruce. See *The Humiliation of Christ*, Lecture II, Note A.

St. Leo is the great preacher of the Incarnation. His sermons are of first importance to the faith. But he does shew a leaning to the Cyrilline school of thought. His line is that the Incarnation does not mean any loss of omnipotence to the Son (Sermo 27, I.) It is rather an unveiling of divine power and glory (Sermo 21, II.; 22, I). His Tome, or epistle to Flavian, lays down the principle that some things in the life of the Christ are proper to the deity, and some things to the manhood. But he does not go on to shew in what sense the Incarnate as subject of the manhood is also able to be the subject of the divine nature (*Ep. ad Flav.*, Ep. 59, etc.). Leo shews the mark of the Cyrilline school in the frequent antithesis of divine omnipotence and human weakness in the Incarnate, without any attempt at unifying the conception of the self of the Incarnate (Sermo 56, II.; 62, III.; Ep. 28, IV.; Sermo 64, IV.; 70, III.). His language is in itself quite compatible with the theory that will be advocated in this book; but it is clear that he had no idea that any theory was needed. He did not feel the need of defining the content of the subject of manhood of Christ.

NOTE V

KENOTIC AUTHORS NAMED IN CHAPTER V

Thomasius. See Dorner, *Person of Christ*, Div. 2, Vol. III, pp. 228–46, etc. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, pp. 138–44, 177–8, 386–94.

Fairbairn. Christ in Modern Theology, pp. 346–57, 475–9. Note especially his differentiation of God and Godhead, pp. 385 ff.; and the development of the idea of sonship, pp. 470 ff. The crucial passage for the kenosis is at pp. 475–7.

Gess. See Bruce, pp. 144–52, 178–81, and 394–410. Godet, *St. John*, Vol. I, p. 401. (T. and T. Clark.)

Godet. St. John, Vol. I, pp. 362 ff., 378, 396 ff., 399 ff., 403, note.

Clarke. Outline of Christian Theology (15th ed.). For the distinction of Trinity and Triunity, see pp. 161–81. For the manner of the Incarnation, see pp. 285–302.

Martensen. Christian Dogmatics (T. and T. Clark), pp. 240 ff., 259 ff., 264 ff.

Gore. Dissertations, pp. 94–7, 192–3, 202–7, 215–25.

NOTE VI

PASSAGES BEARING ON OUR LORD'S KNOWLEDGE

(i) *Instances of Insight.*

Matt. IX. 4; XII. 15, 25; XXVI. 21, 34.
Mark II. 8; XIV. 18, 30.
Luke VI. 8; VII. 39, 40; XXII. 21, 34, 61.
John II. 24, 25; VI. 70, 71; XIII. 21; XI. 11–14; XIII. 38; and I. 47, 48.

(ii) *Foreknowledge of the Passion.*

Matt. XVI. 21; XVII. 22, 23; XX. 18, 19; XXVI. 2.
Mark VIII. 31; IX. 9, 31; X. 33, 34.
Luke IX. 22; XVIII. 32, 33.
John II. 19; XII. 32, 33; XIII. 1–3; XVIII. 4.

(iii) *Special manifestations of knowledge.*

Matt. XVII. 27; XXI. 2.
Mark XI. 2; XIV. 13.
Luke XIX. 30; XXII. 10.
John IV. 17, 18.

(iv) *Questions for information.*

Mark V. 30; VI. 38.
Luke VIII. 45–8.
John XI. 34.

(I do not quote cases that I have not discussed, as there is much dispute about passages under this head.)

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(v) *Ignorance of the Judgement Day.*
Matt. xxiv. 36.
Mark xiii. 32.

(vi) *Questions used in teaching, and rebuking, and to support conversation.*
These cases are too numerous to mention. Examples are :—
Matt. viii. 26 ; ix. 4, 28.
Mark xii. 15.
John vi. 5, 6.

NOTE VII

THE BRETHREN OF OUR LORD

I have taken the traditional view that our Lord's mother was ever a virgin ; and that the so-called brothers and sisters of the Christ were the children of Joseph by his first wife. The whole matter can be studied in Lightfoot's dissertation on the subject in his commentary on the Galatians. The new *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* also has an article.

For the view that they were the children of Mary herself, see J. B. Mayor's discussion in his commentary on the Epistle of St. James.

NOTE VIII

Some readers may be struck by a certain similarity between points in my theory and points in Dr. Moberly's work on *Atonement and Personality*. It is fair to them and to myself to say that at the time that I composed the dissertation which is the basis of this book I had not read Dr. Moberly's book. Books take a very long time to reach a mission library. It is, however, a great joy to me to find that on some points I could quote so high an authority as the late Regius Professor of Pastoral Theology.

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